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Polyfill CDN domain reactivation 2026

incident · incident:polyfill-io-domain-reactivates-http-401-credential-prompts

From late May 2026 the Polyfill CDN domain hijacked in 2024 answered HTTP 401, so pages still loading its script raised browser sign-in prompts (Toshiba, Muji and others).

Coverage
1
first 2026-06-07 → last 2026-10-11
Latest activity
2026-06-07
Leftover Polyfill script tags raised browser sign-in prompts on Toshiba and Muji sites once the hijacked…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology, retail, manufacturing · regions: apac
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Polyfill CDN domain reactivation 2026 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-06-07NOTABLELeftover Polyfill script tags raised browser sign-in prompts on Toshiba and Muji sites once the hijacked domain answered HTTP 401

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-07The hijacked Polyfill CDN domain came back online answering HTTP 401, so leftover script tags raised browser sign-in prompts on Toshiba, Muji and other sites
    active-threatsLeftover Polyfill script tags raised browser sign-in prompts on Toshiba and Muji sites once the hijacked domain answered HTTP 401

Hunting pivots

ATT&CK techniques (2 across 3 tactics)

2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
  • Credential AccessInput Capture: GUI Input Capture
  • CollectionInput Capture: GUI Input Capture

Initial Access TA0001

T1195.001Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools×1

Adversaries may manipulate software dependencies and development tools prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications, such as pip and NPM packages, may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. This may also include abandoned packages, which in some cases could be re-registered by threat actors after being removed by the original owner. Adversaries may also employ "typosquatting" or name-confusion by choosing names similar to existing popular libraries or packages in order to deceive a user.

Evidence: 2026-06-07/hijacked-polyfill-io-domain-reactivates-surfacing-native-bro · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1

Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).

Evidence: 2026-06-07/hijacked-polyfill-io-domain-reactivates-surfacing-native-bro · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1

Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).

Evidence: 2026-06-07/hijacked-polyfill-io-domain-reactivates-surfacing-native-bro · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Polyfill CDN domain reactivation 2026 (1)

2026-06-07 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

The hijacked Polyfill CDN domain came back online answering HTTP 401, so leftover script tags raised browser sign-in prompts on Toshiba, Muji and other sites

Starting in late May 2026, the Polyfill CDN domain that was bought and used to serve malicious scripts in 2024 became active again and answered requests with HTTP 401 authentication challenges, which a browser shows as its own username and password dialog (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-05). Pages that still loaded the Polyfill script two years after the service was abandoned therefore raised a sign-in prompt that looked as if it came from the site itself. Toshiba warned on 2026-06-02 that parts of its website showed such a screen, asked users to choose Cancel without typing anything, told anyone who had entered a username and password to change it at every service that uses it, and added on 2026-06-04 that the screen no longer appears (Toshiba, 2026-06-02). Muji published a similar warning, and Japanese media reported Zojirushi, FiNC Technologies, Ishiyaku Publishers and Hobonichi affected, while a researcher saw the prompt on Samsung Smart TVs and websites on 2026-06-01; there is no indication the sites were hacked or that typed credentials were stolen (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-05).

At the moment, there is no indication that impacted websites were hacked or that credentials entered on these rogue login screens were stolen.

BleepingComputer 2026-06-05
Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-audittitleheadlinesummaryprioritytagsentitiestechniquesaffected_productssourcesevidenceclassificationupdate_ofbody

The earlier text advised moving the script to two other domains. BleepingComputer describes those domains as the service's relaunch after the 2024 incident, not as vetted mirrors, and the project's creator recommended removing the service (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-05). The earlier text also recommended Subresource Integrity, which does not stop a browser from showing the sign-in prompt for an HTTP 401 answer. Toshiba reported on 2026-06-04 that the prompt no longer appears on its site (Toshiba, 2026-06-02). The priority moves from high to notable: the prompts collected nothing that is known to have been stolen, and the fix is a cleanup.

incident07 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (50%)
  • global.toshiba1 (50%)