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Norway Digdir / ID-porten DDoS (August 2026)

incident · incident:norway-digdir-idporten-ddos-2026-08

A 64-hour distributed denial-of-service attack against Digdir's IT partner Vivicta disrupted ten Norwegian government digital services, including the national identity gateway ID-porten (4.5M+ users), from 24 to 26 August 2026; the third such attack against Digdir infrastructure since June 2026, described by Digdir as two to three times larger than the prior one (Digdir status page, The Record, 2026-08-25).

Coverage
1
first 2026-08-31 → last 2026-08-31
Latest activity
2026-08-31
A 64-hour DDoS against Norway's ID-porten shows what happens when one gateway authenticates health, tax and…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: nordics
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Norway Digdir / ID-porten DDoS (August 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-08-31NOTABLEA 64-hour DDoS against Norway's ID-porten shows what happens when one gateway authenticates health, tax and business-registry logins at once

Story timeline

  1. 2026-08-31Norway's shared national identity gateway ID-porten knocked out for 64 hours by the third escalating DDoS against Digdir since June
    active-threatsA 64-hour DDoS against Norway's ID-porten shows what happens when one gateway authenticates health, tax and business-registry logins at once

Hunting pivots

ATT&CK techniques (1 across 1 tactic)

1 technique observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ImpactNetwork Denial of Service

Impact TA0040

T1498Network Denial of Service×1

Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/norway-digdir-id-porten-ddos-third-attack · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Norway Digdir / ID-porten DDoS (August 2026) (1)

2026-08-31 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOA1

Norway's shared national identity gateway ID-porten knocked out for 64 hours by the third escalating DDoS against Digdir since June

A distributed denial-of-service attack against Vivicta, the IT partner operating infrastructure for Norway's Digitalisation Agency (Digdir), disrupted ten government digital services from the early hours of Monday 24 August through roughly 19:30 on Wednesday 26 August 2026, about 64 hours, with intensity varying and short recovery windows in between (Digdir status page, 2026-08-28). The disrupted services include ID-porten, the shared identity gateway more than 4.5 million people use to log into government services via BankID and MinID, plus eFormidling, eSignering, Maskinporten and several other cross-agency data-exchange and access-management systems. Because ID-porten authenticates far beyond Digdir's own services, the disruption also affected parts of Norway's health infrastructure, several health services rely on ID-porten for authentication, and authorities warned of possible problems accessing online pharmacies and the electronic prescription system (The Record, 2026-08-25).

Digdir press officer Are Kvistad told Norwegian broadcaster NRK the attack was two to three times larger than the previous one, and it is the third DDoS incident to hit Digdir's infrastructure since June 2026 (The Record, 2026-08-25). Digdir states no sensitive data stored in the affected systems was accessed, and as of the incident's close, normal operation was expected to resume within days; some disruption from foreign traffic persisted afterward. No attribution has been made public, and it remains unclear whether the three 2026 incidents are connected or represent a broader campaign.

The attack started during the night of Monday at 03:38 and stopped around 19:30 Wednesday evening. Except for short periods, ID-porten and the shared solutions have been available the whole time.

Digitaliseringsdirektoratet (Digdir) status page 2026-08-28

What is special about this latest attack, which has now been ongoing for a day, is that it is two to three times larger than what we experienced last time

The Record (Recorded Future News) 2026-08-25
incident31 Aug 04:50Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • status.digdir.no1 (50%)
  • therecord.media1 (50%)