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SilentDelivery

campaign · campaign:silentdelivery-watering-hole-2026

CopperDragon-linked 2026 watering-hole operation against Europe and Asia that serves a fake Chrome certificate warning and the SquadC backdoor from compromised government, shipping, IT and research sites (Check Point Research, 2026-11-10).

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-11 → last 2026-11-11
Latest activity
2026-11-11
Check Point: a Sparrow-framework supplier fronts government watering holes with a fake Chrome certificate…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, transport, technology · regions: europe
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about SilentDelivery tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-11NOTABLECheck Point: a Sparrow-framework supplier fronts government watering holes with a fake Chrome certificate warning

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

uses

overlaps with

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-11CopperDragon: Check Point ties three China-nexus intrusion sets to one Sparrow-framework supplier, among them SilentDelivery watering holes on government, shipping, IT and research sites that show a fake Chrome certificate warning (Czech Republic, Germany and France in its telemetry)
    active-threatsCheck Point: a Sparrow-framework supplier fronts government watering holes with a fake Chrome certificate warning
ATT&CK techniques (20 across 9 tactics)

20 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
  • ExecutionWindows Management Instrumentation · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceCreate Account: Local Account · Traffic Signaling · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider · Compromise Host Software Binary
  • Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider
  • StealthRootkit · Obfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indirect Command Execution · Traffic Signaling · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · Input Capture: Keylogging
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
  • CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: DNS · Traffic Signaling · Protocol Tunneling

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1047Windows Management Instrumentation×1

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems. WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1205Traffic Signaling×1

Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.005Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider×1

Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1554Compromise Host Software Binary×1

Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.005Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Security Support Provider×1

Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1014Rootkit×1

Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1202Indirect Command Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse utilities that allow for command execution to bypass security restrictions that limit the use of command-line interpreters. Various Windows utilities may be used to execute commands, possibly without invoking cmd. For example, Forfiles, the Program Compatibility Assistant (`pcalua.exe`), components of the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL), `Scriptrunner.exe`, as well as other utilities may invoke the execution of programs and commands from a Command and Scripting Interpreter, Run window, or via scripts. Adversaries may also abuse the `ssh.exe` binary to execute malicious commands via the `ProxyCommand` and `LocalCommand` options, which can be invoked via the `-o` flag or by modifying the SSH config file.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1205Traffic Signaling×1

Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1

Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1

Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1205Traffic Signaling×1

Adversaries may use traffic signaling to hide open ports or other malicious functionality used for persistence or command and control. Traffic signaling involves the use of a magic value or sequence that must be sent to a system to trigger a special response, such as opening a closed port or executing a malicious task. This may take the form of sending a series of packets with certain characteristics before a port will be opened that the adversary can use for command and control. Usually this series of packets consists of attempted connections to a predefined sequence of closed ports (i.e. Port Knocking), but can involve unusual flags, specific strings, or other unique characteristics. After the sequence is completed, opening a port may be accomplished by the host-based firewall, but could also be implemented by custom software.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-11-11/copperdragon-silentdelivery-fake-certificate-watering-holes · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about SilentDelivery (1)

2026-11-11 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

CopperDragon: Check Point ties three China-nexus intrusion sets to one Sparrow-framework supplier, among them SilentDelivery watering holes on government, shipping, IT and research sites that show a fake Chrome certificate warning (Czech Republic, Germany and France in its telemetry)

Check Point Research's year-long investigation groups three intrusion sets under one malware-supply entity it calls CopperDragon, a possible "digital quartermaster" for China-nexus actors that use the cross-platform Sparrow framework (FamousSparrow and Earth Estries among them); Check Point itself cautions that the use of the same backdoor or C2 infrastructure "does not necessarily mean" the same actor ran two intrusions, so this is a hypothesis (Check Point Research, 2026-11-10).

SilentDelivery, active since early 2026 against Europe and Asia, is the set nearest the constituency. Compromised government, shipping, IT and research websites, one through cross-site scripting in an unsanitised input field, carry obfuscated JavaScript that fingerprints the visitor and replaces the page with a language-localised fake Google Chrome SSL warning urging a "Certificate Fix" utility; the MSI, served from compromised cloud storage buckets, installs the new SquadC backdoor or a SparrowDoor variant (Check Point Research, 2026-11-10). SquadC can be set to run only while a browser process is alive, persists through a Run key named WindowsUpdateAssist, and offers file operations, command execution and screenshots. A second route is a spear-phishing RAR whose LNK abuses ftp.exe, with the same C2 (Check Point Research, 2026-11-10). Positive Technologies independently documented the same fake-certificate chain, with victims in Taiwan, Germany, Indonesia and the Czech Republic (Positive Technologies, 2026-08-21).

The other two sets show what follows an intrusion. OceanGate in Asia starts from an exploited internet-facing Linux server and moves through trojanised ssh and sshd binaries that log passwords, a Linux backdoor that can load a kernel rootkit, FRP and Chisel tunnels, a hidden local administrator account and an LSA security-package credential interceptor; recent SparrowDoor builds embed the WinDivert driver to share a service port such as 443. DarkWire against Latin American telecom and government bodies uses DLL sideloading of uncommon executables, SoftEther VPN renamed to system-process names, DNS MX tunnelling and WMI lateral movement (Check Point Research, 2026-11-10). No Swiss victim is named.

Triage: WinDivert is legitimate in VPN and firewall products, so the signal is a parent that is a sideloaded DLL or backdoor rather than the vendor's signed service; SoftEther is legitimate software, but not under a system-process name in a non-system path; a genuine Chrome SSL warning is never cleared by installing an MSI.

The fake warning blocked access to the website and instructed the user to install a “Certificate Fix” utility.

All the compromised websites we confirmed were related to the government, shipping, and IT and research sectors.

Based on Check Point telemetry, the operations primarily targeted organizations in countries such as the Czech Republic, Germany, France, Taiwan, Nepal, Hong Kong and Indonesia.

However, the use of the same backdoor or C2 infrastructure does not necessarily mean that two intrusions were conducted by the same actor.

Check Point Research 2026-11-10

Based on the samples we identified, we determined that the threat actor used an infection chain involving compromised websites and fake certificates in at least four locations: Taiwan, Germany, Indonesia, and the Czech Republic.

Positive Technologies

Builds on: ESET: a China-aligned actor's new backdoor forges call stacks with legitimate kernel32.dll…

threat11 Nov 03:40Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • medium.com1 (50%)
  • research.checkpoint.com1 (50%)