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Silent Train

campaign · campaign:silent-train-covert-network-2026 single-source

Rotating chain-of-compromised-devices relay framework that Lumen's Black Lotus Labs says Volt Typhoon used since late 2023 for exploitation, credential access and exfiltration, including one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against management and control-plane platforms (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28).

Aliases: Silent Train covert access network

Coverage
2
1 about it · 1 mention · first 2026-10-29 → last 2026-10-30
Latest activity
2026-10-30
Lumen: Volt Typhoon's Silent Train relay chains fronted zero-days against SD-WAN, N-central and KACE
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
telco
sectors: telco, public-sector, defense
Sources cited
5
5 hosts
2026-10-292 appearances2026-10-30

Defender insights

What each entry about Silent Train tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-30NOTABLELumen: Volt Typhoon's Silent Train relay chains fronted zero-days against SD-WAN, N-central and KACE

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed to

Story timeline

Every entry that names Silent Train, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.

  1. 2026-10-30Silent Train: Lumen's Black Lotus Labs describes the rotating relay network Volt Typhoon used for one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against management and control-plane platforms (Quest KACE, Versa Director, N-able N-central, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN, Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator)
    active-threatsLumen: Volt Typhoon's Silent Train relay chains fronted zero-days against SD-WAN, N-central and KACE
  2. 2026-10-29KeyDrift: Talos reports UAT-11473 exploiting CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers to run an implant inside the control-plane daemon that collects data-plane keys, with infrastructure overlapping Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network
    mentionactive-threatsTalos: UAT-11473 implants KeyDrift in Cisco SD-WAN controllers through CVE-2026-20127 to collect data-plane keys
ATT&CK techniques (7 across 6 tactics)

7 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentCompromise Infrastructure: Network Devices
  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • PersistenceServer Software Component: Web Shell
  • StealthIndicator Removal
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: SSH
  • Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Protocol Tunneling

Resource Development TA0042

T1584.008Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices×1

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070Indicator Removal×1

Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1

Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Silent Train (1)

2026-10-30 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Silent Train: Lumen's Black Lotus Labs describes the rotating relay network Volt Typhoon used for one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against management and control-plane platforms (Quest KACE, Versa Director, N-able N-central, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN, Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator)

Lumen's Black Lotus Labs reports that Volt Typhoon used a covert framework it calls Silent Train, first seen in late 2023, for the phases that need protection: exploitation, credential access, data exfiltration and continued access to victims (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28). A session starts from a virtual private server outside the US, passes through compromised non-US SOHO and IoT devices and leaves through a compromised US device before the victim; more than 27 device classes were enrolled, from TP-Link routers and Netgear Orbi devices to Fortinet appliances and CyberPanel servers, and the enterprise platforms stayed in chains for one to three months as final hops (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28). The operators exploit exposed web interfaces on the relay devices and deploy only what chained SSH needs, namely temporary SSH services, keys, configuration files and living-off-the-land utilities, with reverse tunnels over open-source proxies in later variants; sessions averaged about four hours, and at the end the operators removed all artifacts and dismantled the chain (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28).

Lumen says its monitoring helped identify one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against endpoint and network management platforms and SD-WAN orchestrators: Quest KACE, where the activity looked like an undisclosed flaw, affected more than 30 victims and fell after Quest's October 2025 updates (a moderate-confidence assessment); Versa Director in 2024; the N-able N-central flaws CVE-2025-8875 and CVE-2025-8876; Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN through CVE-2026-20127, exploited by late 2025 and after Cisco's February 2026 disclosure; and Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator through the zero-day later designated CVE-2026-16812 (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28). Post-incident analysis found in-memory webshells, credential harvesting and abuse of native platform features such as endpoint control and remote file transfers, and in several cases erased or altered logs (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28). The victims it names are US government, telecommunications, defence-industrial, managed-service and critical-infrastructure organisations, concentrated in Hawaii, California and Texas, and it names no European or Swiss victim (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28). The Hacker News carries the same findings from a report Lumen shared with it (The Hacker News, 2026-10-28).

This insight helped identify one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns targeting network and endpoint management platforms and SD-WAN orchestrators used by critical organizations.

At the end of each session, operators removed all artifacts and dismantled the chain.

Post-incident analysis with partners uncovered in-memory webshells, credential harvesting and abuse of native features such as endpoint control and remote file transfers.

Lumen Black Lotus Labs 2026-10-28

Builds on: Talos: UAT-11473 implants KeyDrift in Cisco SD-WAN controllers through CVE-2026-20127 to… · Arista patches an actively exploited unauthenticated command-injection flaw in on-prem… · Arista confirms exploitation of a VeloCloud Orchestrator flaw: any tenant login, even… · PHP2Shell: Trend Micro Apex Central and Apex One await patches to 11 Nov; Quest KACE and NetApp…

threat30 Oct 03:50Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (20%)
  • cisa.gov1 (20%)
  • lumen.com1 (20%)
  • sec.cloudapps.cisco.com1 (20%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (20%)