Silent Train
campaign · campaign:silent-train-covert-network-2026 single-source
Rotating chain-of-compromised-devices relay framework that Lumen's Black Lotus Labs says Volt Typhoon used since late 2023 for exploitation, credential access and exfiltration, including one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against management and control-plane platforms (Lumen Black Lotus Labs, 2026-10-28).
Aliases: Silent Train covert access network
Defender insights
What each entry about Silent Train tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
attributed to
- Volt TyphoonLumen Black Lotus Labs describes Silent Train as Volt Typhoon's covert access network
Story timeline
Every entry that names Silent Train, newest first. Rows tagged mention only name it in passing: they are listed for completeness and add nothing to the action items, pivots or ATT&CK profile on this page.
- 2026-10-30Silent Train: Lumen's Black Lotus Labs describes the rotating relay network Volt Typhoon used for one likely and four confirmed zero-day campaigns against management and control-plane platforms (Quest KACE, Versa Director, N-able N-central, Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN, Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator)
- 2026-10-29KeyDrift: Talos reports UAT-11473 exploiting CVE-2026-20127 in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN controllers to run an implant inside the control-plane daemon that collects data-plane keys, with infrastructure overlapping Volt Typhoon's Silent Train network
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (7 across 6 tactics)
7 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentCompromise Infrastructure: Network Devices
- Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
- PersistenceServer Software Component: Web Shell
- StealthIndicator Removal
- Lateral MovementRemote Services: SSH
- Command and ControlProxy: Multi-hop Proxy · Protocol Tunneling
Resource Development TA0042
T1584.008Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices×1
Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not Initial Access to that environment, but rather to leverage these devices to support additional targeting.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1
Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1070Indicator Removal×1
Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Lateral Movement TA0008
T1021.004Remote Services: SSH×1
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into remote machines using Secure Shell (SSH). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1090.003Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy×1
Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×1
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-10-30/silent-train-volt-typhoon-relay-network-zero-days · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Silent Train (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller×2
- Volt Typhoon×2
- Arista VeloCloud Orchestrator On-Prem×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller, Manager and Validator peering authentication bypass (CVSS 10.0): exploited by UAT-8616 and, per Talos on 2026-10-28, UAT-11473, which ran the KeyDrift implant; Lumen reports Volt Typhoon exploiting it from late 2025×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager×1
- Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator×1
- KeyDrift×1
- N-able N-central×1
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- blog.talosintelligence.com1 (20%)
- cisa.gov1 (20%)
- lumen.com1 (20%)
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.com1 (20%)
- thehackernews.com1 (20%)
All cited sources (5)
- blog.talosintelligence.comCisco Taloshttps://blog.talosintelligence.com/uat-11473-keydrift/
- cisa.govCISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
- lumen.comLumen Black Lotus Labshttps://www.lumen.com/blog/en-us/silent-train-volt-typhoon-operational-framework
- sec.cloudapps.cisco.comCisco PSIRThttps://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-rpa-EHchtZk
- thehackernews.comThe Hacker Newshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/10/volt-typhoon-used-covert-silent-train.html