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ScreenConnect guest file-push spray (CVE-2026-84869)

campaign · campaign:screenconnect-guest-file-push-spray-2026-10

Attacker guest sessions that repeatedly asked technician clients to run update.bat-style files, exploiting CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect host clients older than 26.6.5: 688,000 run-file requests on 42 MSP servers from 2026-10-20 to 2026-11-16, with one MSP technician workstation fully compromised on 2026-11-12 (Huntress, 2026-11-16).

Coverage
1
first 2026-09-12 → last 2026-11-17
Latest activity
2026-11-17
ConnectWise patches a ScreenConnect flaw Huntress had already watched turn every infected connection into the…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, technology
Sources cited
5
4 hosts

Action items (3)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about ScreenConnect guest file-push spray (CVE-2026-84869), newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Update every ScreenConnect technician host client and Access agent to 26.6.5 or later now, not only the server, because the vulnerable code runs on the technician's machine; where that waits, remove the TransferFiles permission from every role and session group (Administration > Security > Roles).
    2026-09-12CVE-2026-84869
  • Treat any pre-26.6.5 client that shows a second, unfamiliar RMM tool or an unexplained ScreenConnect connection ID as compromised and reimage it rather than patching in place, because a technician's session can already have propagated the infection to every host that client connected to.
    2026-09-12CVE-2026-84869
  • On every ScreenConnect server, read a copy of App_Data\\Session.db for guest-originated RanFiles or SentFiles events that overlap an open host connection, and on any hit isolate the technician's workstation and rotate every credential reachable from it (RMM, PSA, vault, customer admin accounts), because Huntress saw one workstation fully compromised nine seconds after its client ran a guest-pushed file.
    2026-09-12CVE-2026-84869

Defender insights

What each entry about ScreenConnect guest file-push spray (CVE-2026-84869) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-09-12HIGHexploitedConnectWise patches a ScreenConnect flaw Huntress had already watched turn every infected connection into the next one's launch point

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

exploits

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-12CVE-2026-84869, ConnectWise ScreenConnect: a missing file-transfer authorization check lets an active remote session push and auto-run files on the Host, and Huntress traced worm-like exploitation back to 20 August, weeks before any patch existed (CVSS 9.9)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesConnectWise patches a ScreenConnect flaw Huntress had already watched turn every infected connection into the next one's launch point
ATT&CK techniques (14 across 9 tactics)

14 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessTrusted Relationship
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Exploitation for Client Execution
  • PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder · Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control
  • StealthSystem Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
  • Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools
  • Lateral MovementLateral Tool Transfer
  • Command and ControlProxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools
  • ImpactResource Hijacking

Initial Access TA0001

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×1

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on a system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219Remote Access Tools×1

An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1496Resource Hijacking×1

Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.

Evidence: 2026-09-12/cve-2026-84869-connectwise-screenconnect-worm-file-transfer · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about ScreenConnect guest file-push spray (CVE-2026-84869) (1)

2026-09-12 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-84869exploitedupdatedNATOA1

CVE-2026-84869, ConnectWise ScreenConnect: a missing file-transfer authorization check lets an active remote session push and auto-run files on the Host, and Huntress traced worm-like exploitation back to 20 August, weeks before any patch existed (CVSS 9.9)

ConnectWise's own disclosure describes a client-side condition in ScreenConnect Support and Access sessions where file-transfer actions could be processed through an active remote session "without proper authorization or Host confirmation," letting files be transferred to and executed on the Host system, including through elevated execution paths (ConnectWise, 2026-09-08). ScreenConnect servers are not affected, only client versions before 26.6.5, the release that fixes CVE-2026-84869 (CVSS 9.9).

Huntress had been tracking the exploitation since 20 August, more than two weeks before ConnectWise's 8 September disclosure. Starting 20 August 2026, its SOC found rogue ScreenConnect clients deployed via social engineering (a fake tech-support Quick Assist session in one case, a phishing-driven MSI in another) that immediately spawned four chained VBScript stagers via wscript.exe. The stagers profile the host (existing ScreenConnect install, installed security-product names, available RAM to rule out a sandbox), then pull an AES-encrypted payload bundle keyed to that profile from Dropbox. Depending on the profile, the final PowerShell stage installs a ScreenConnect backdoor client concealed as a hidden Windows service (its registry Uninstall entry removed and a restrictive service security descriptor applied), builds a UAC-bypass helper via a hijacked ms-settings: protocol handler routed through ComputerDefaults.exe, sets AmsiUtils.amsiInitFailed = true to blind AMSI, adds all of C:\Users as a Defender exclusion, and disables Defender reporting, notifications and Hypervisor-Protected Code Integrity; the package also drops a vulnerable WinRing0 kernel driver alongside the payload (Huntress, 2026-09-03).

The installed backdoor client is what turns the bug into a worm: it continuously inspects ScreenConnect's own connection-status collection for newly established Host sessions and, on each new connection, packages the same four VBScript stagers into a ScreenConnect file-transfer message flagged to auto-run, the exact abuse path CVE-2026-84869 patches. A technician's ScreenConnect client that has been infected this way silently re-infects every subsequent host it connects to, independent of the original social-engineering vector (Huntress, 2026-09-03). No named threat-actor cluster is attributed by any source; CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-09-11 (CISA KEV, catalogue version 2026.09.11).

A condition in the ScreenConnect client may allow files to be transferred and executed through an active remote session without authorization or Host confirmation in certain circumstances. ScreenConnect servers are not impacted.

ConnectWise (vendor disclosure) 2026-09-08

This creates a worm-like behavior: propagating infections over new ScreenConnect connections. Connecting to an infected ScreenConnect client can cause the server-side Host system to receive and execute the same four-stage VBScript chain.

In late August, our Security Operations Center (SOC) sent out three critical incident reports for what looked like malicious ScreenConnect installation and unexpected process execution.

A malicious guest exploiting CVE-2026-84869 can push a file to the technician's machine and get the technician's own client to run it.

Updating the server alone doesn't fix this, because the vulnerable code runs on the technician's machine.

Huntress 2026-09-03
Updaterun 2026-11-17T0355Z-intelentitiessourcesevidenceactionsbodytitletechniques

Huntress confirmed exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 against MSP technicians in a campaign it separates from the crypto-exchange-named decoy sessions it reported on 2026-11-13, and it describes the SCKit malware as appearing to leverage a vulnerable server-side extension, not to exploit this flaw directly (Huntress, 2026-11-16). On 2026-11-12 a technician at one MSP joined a blank-named Access session on the MSP's server and the host client ran a batch file the guest had pushed, with no prompt; within about nine seconds a hidden PowerShell relaunch, a curl download and an administrative-image unpack of an MSI ended with a rebranded ScreenConnect client connected to an attacker relay on port 8041 (Huntress, 2026-11-16). Huntress read the delivery side from server databases: between 2026-10-20 and 2026-11-16 attacker guests made 688,000 run-file requests for update.bat-style files from 29 source addresses on 42 MSP servers, repeating them in case a technician joined, and Huntress assesses with high confidence that the spray operator and the relay operator are the same (Huntress, 2026-11-16). In October an attacker also joined three real customer support sessions as an extra guest and asked the technician's client to run a path-traversal file into the Startup folder; two of the three technicians were on vulnerable Windows clients and the Mac client failed (Huntress, 2026-11-16).

The vulnerable code runs on the technician's machine, so updating the server alone does not close it, and Huntress saw many technicians on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after 26.6.5 shipped (Huntress, 2026-11-16). Server-side, Huntress points to guest-originated file-run events (RanFiles, EventType 85, or SentFiles, 86) in App_Data\Session.db, read from a copy, that overlap an open host connection; on workstations it points to the ScreenConnect client running batch or script files from its Temp folder, and to any client whose command line names a relay the organisation does not own (Huntress, 2026-11-16).

vulnerability12 Sep 04:09Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • huntress.com2 (40%)
  • cisa.gov1 (20%)
  • github.com1 (20%)
  • securityweek.com1 (20%)