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SCKit

malware · malware:sckit

Host-keyed 16-file toolkit pushed through the Run Command feature of cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels on 2026-11-11: it adds Microsoft Defender exclusions, installs a second attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client, stops the legitimate client and runs a per-host compiled executable from a scheduled task, with a designed second stage that spreads to technician workstations (Huntress, 2026-11-11).

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-12 → last 2026-11-12
Latest activity
2026-11-12
ScreenConnect: rogue clients pushed to 288+ endpoints; Huntress ties it to RMM+ extension with blank access…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about SCKit, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every ScreenConnect instance your organisation or its IT providers run, review Run Command and Toolbox history and the instance audit logs for executions nobody started, including before 2026-11-11, check managed endpoints for a second ScreenConnect client service, and disable the five named extensions (on-premises instances by hand), RMM+ versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 first because they accept a blank access key; open no interactive session to a suspect host, use EDR live response or WinRM, because a session can trigger the toolkit to spread to the technician's workstation.
    2026-11-12ScreenConnect: rogue clients pushed to 288+…

Defender insights

What each entry about SCKit tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-12HIGHScreenConnect: rogue clients pushed to 288+ endpoints; Huntress ties it to RMM+ extension with blank access key

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-12ScreenConnect: commands pushed through Run Command to at least 288 managed endpoints at 48 Huntress customers within 90 minutes on 2026-11-11 installed a rogue second client and the SCKit toolkit; Huntress links the activity to the RMM+ extension, whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key
    active-threatsScreenConnect: rogue clients pushed to 288+ endpoints; Huntress ties it to RMM+ extension with blank access key

Hunting pivots

Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (13 across 9 tactics)

13 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Software Deployment Tools
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information · System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec
  • Defense ImpairmentDisable or Modify Tools
  • Credential AccessSteal Web Session Cookie
  • Lateral MovementSoftware Deployment Tools · Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software
  • ImpactService Stop

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. PowerShell can also be installed on Linux and macOS. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1072Software Deployment Tools×1

Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1072Software Deployment Tools×1

Adversaries may gain access to and use centralized software suites installed within an enterprise to execute commands and move laterally through the network. Configuration management and software deployment applications may be used in an enterprise network or cloud environment for routine administration purposes. These systems may also be integrated into CI/CD pipelines. Examples of such solutions include: SCCM, HBSS, Altiris, AWS Systems Manager, Microsoft Intune, Azure Arc, and GCP Deployment Manager.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1550.004Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie×1

Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

T1219.002Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software×1

An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software tools, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1489Service Stop×1

Adversaries may stop or disable services on a system to render those services unavailable to legitimate users. Stopping critical services or processes can inhibit or stop response to an incident or aid in the adversary's overall objectives to cause damage to the environment.

Evidence: 2026-11-12/screenconnect-sckit-toolkit-pushed-to-hundreds-of-endpoints · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about SCKit (1)

2026-11-12 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB1

ScreenConnect: commands pushed through Run Command to at least 288 managed endpoints at 48 Huntress customers within 90 minutes on 2026-11-11 installed a rogue second client and the SCKit toolkit; Huntress links the activity to the RMM+ extension, whose versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key

On 2026-11-11 Huntress observed an operator using access to several cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to run commands as SYSTEM on groups of managed endpoints through the Run Command feature, hitting at least 288 hosts at 48 organisations that use Huntress within 90 minutes (Huntress, 2026-11-11). Each host checked for a ScreenConnect client, silently installed an attacker-controlled one, wrote a dropper and fetched SCKit, a 16-file toolkit delivered encrypted whose decryption values the server issues against the requesting machine's UUID (Huntress, 2026-11-11). The kit adds Defender exclusions, installs a second attacker-controlled client, sets the legitimate client to manual start so the attacker's copy replaces it, and runs a per-host executable from a scheduled task (Huntress, 2026-11-11).

Huntress's later update says the activity seems related to RMM+, a third-party extension that bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and MFA and authenticates requests with a shared access key: versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank key when an administrator had never set one, commands reached endpoints across several instances within minutes with no corresponding login activity and were linked in the logs to RMM+; most RMM+ installations it saw were legitimate (Huntress, 2026-11-11). ConnectWise suspects the actor used independent third-party extensions that partners may have added, and disabled five (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) in about 400 partner environments; on-premises customers must disable them by hand (BleepingComputer, 2026-11-11); Huntress says ConnectWise had not yet identified an initial access vector or the full scope (Huntress, 2026-11-11). Huntress reconstructs a second stage meant to spread through the connecting technician's panel but saw no successful jump (Huntress, 2026-11-11). Huntress says sequential attacker tags suggest other MSPs were compromised earlier; BleepingComputer found a batch script first uploaded on 2026-07-25 that references one of Huntress's rogue client IDs, its link to this campaign unclear (BleepingComputer, 2026-11-11).

On November 11, 2026, Huntress observed an operator using access to multiple cloud-hosted ScreenConnect panels to push commands to groups of managed endpoints.

The legitimate installation of ScreenConnect is then stopped, set to manual start, and the attacker controlled copy of ScreenConnect positioned to replace it.

Huntress 2026-11-11

Disabling these 3rd party extensions is a precautionary containment measure. It does not establish that unauthorized software, persistence mechanisms, or access already present on affected devices has been removed

BleepingComputer (quoting the ConnectWise advisory)

versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 contained a serious authentication flaw

Huntress 2026-11-11

Builds on: ConnectWise patches a ScreenConnect flaw Huntress had already watched turn every infected…

threat12 Nov 04:07Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (33%)
  • huntress.com1 (33%)
  • sophos.com1 (33%)