ScreenConnect crypto-exchange bait sessions (November 2026)
campaign · campaign:screenconnect-crypto-bait-sessions-2026-11 single-source
Unattributed enrolment of thousands of fake guest sessions named after crypto exchanges into self-hosted ScreenConnect consoles from 2026-11-03, which Huntress hypothesises is bait for technicians running clients older than 26.6.5 and has seen used for nothing so far; Huntress found no overlap with the SCKit indicators (Huntress, 2026-11-14).
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about ScreenConnect crypto-exchange bait sessions (November 2026), newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- On every self-hosted ScreenConnect server your organisation or its IT providers run, list guest sessions with an exchange-and-role name or empty company or site fields, copy App_Data\\Session.db and its WAL file before deleting any, and where a technician connected to one from a client older than 26.6.5, inspect that workstation's ScreenConnect Temp and Startup folders and process history and treat text sent through the session as exposed credentials, because Huntress suspects the sessions are bait for the file-transfer flaw CVE-2026-84869.2026-11-15Huntress: 2,223 crypto-named fake sessions sit on…
Defender insights
What each entry about ScreenConnect crypto-exchange bait sessions (November 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
affects
- ConnectWise ScreenConnectHuntress counted 2,223 fake guest sessions on 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers
Story timeline
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 2 tactics)
2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- Command and ControlRemote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software
Stealth TA0005
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/screenconnect-crypto-bait-guest-sessions-118-servers · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1219.002Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software×1
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software tools, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
Evidence: 2026-11-15/screenconnect-crypto-bait-guest-sessions-118-servers · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about ScreenConnect crypto-exchange bait sessions (November 2026) (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- huntress.com1 (100%)