ctipilot.ch

UAC-0145

actor · actor:uac-0145 single-source-national-cert

CERT-UA-tracked subcluster of UAC-0002 / Sandworm (APT44, Seashell Blizzard), Russia's GRU-linked destructive-actor family. From June–July 2026 it compromised at least 10 legitimate websites to serve ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA lures whose C2 content-domain is resolved on-chain via an Ethereum smart-contract call (EtherHiding, using the bespoke injector SMARTAXE over Cloaking.House), staging VBS persistence (GHETTOVIBE), PowerShell recon (SCOUTCURL) and a Python backdoor (FREAKYPOLL); it separately distributes a full-featured Android backdoor (COWARDDUCK) via Signal disguised as security software (CERT-UA, article 6318437, 2026-07-19).

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-07-20 → last 2026-07-20
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
2
2 hosts
Sections touched
1
active-threats
Co-occurring entities
1
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
6
pinned v19.1 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

6 techniques observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions—such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs—that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

T1568Dynamic Resolution×1

Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the malware's communications. These calculations can be used to dynamically adjust parameters such as the domain name, IP address, or port number the malware uses for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-07-20/uac-0145-sandworm-clickfix-etherhiding-android-backdoor · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-20CERT-UA: Sandworm subcluster UAC-0145 pairs ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA with Ethereum-smart-contract C2 resolution and a Signal-delivered Android backdoor
    active-threatsGRU's Sandworm adopts ClickFix, blockchain-hidden C2 (EtherHiding) and a Signal-lured Android backdoor — transferable tradecraft for EU CI defenders

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • cert.gov.ua1 (50%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (50%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about UAC-0145 (1)

2026-07-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOA2

CERT-UA: Sandworm subcluster UAC-0145 pairs ClickFix fake-CAPTCHA with Ethereum-smart-contract C2 resolution and a Signal-delivered Android backdoor

CERT-UA reports that UAC-0145 — a subcluster of UAC-0002 / Sandworm (APT44, Seashell Blizzard), the GRU-linked destructive-actor family — compromised at least 10 legitimate websites between June and July 2026 to serve a fake CAPTCHA that instructs visitors to paste and run a PowerShell command in the ClickFix pattern (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The PowerShell one-liner drops a VBS persistence stub into the Startup folder — "one of the variants of such a program was called GHETTOVIBE," per CERT-UA — which stages a PowerShell reconnaissance script (SCOUTCURL) that profiles the host, while two loaders, FLUIDLEECH (masquerading as software for removing computer viruses) and LOADLOOP, fetch a Python backdoor, FREAKYPOLL (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19). The compromised-site injection uses a bespoke tool, SMARTAXE, layered on the commodity Cloaking.House traffic-filtering service to serve different content by visitor; the injected CAPTCHA "content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract" (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19) — a eth_call-style read that replaces a hardcoded C2 domain and survives takedowns because the resolution layer lives on-chain.

Separately, UAC-0145 distributes a full-featured Android backdoor, COWARDDUCK, via Signal disguised as security software; it collects contacts, files matching targeted extensions, and real-time geolocation, uploading via the Dropbox API and pulling C2 tasking from content hosted on legitimate services (e.g. Steam Community) proxied through a public search-engine proxy — both chosen to blend into normal outbound traffic (CERT-UA, 2026-07-19). CERT-UA frames this as a continuation of its multi-year UAC-0145 tracking; the group's earlier tradecraft (trojanized torrent installers, Signal "antivirus" lures) is background — the in-window delta is the ClickFix vector, the EtherHiding C2-resolution layer, and the COWARDDUCK mobile backdoor. The ClickFix pivot marks a departure from Sandworm's prior reliance on trojanized Windows/Office installers (The Hacker News, 2026-07-19).

The CAPTCHA content to be injected into the web page employs the EtherHiding technique to retrieve the domain name of the remote resource from an Ethereum smart contract using an address specified in the source code.

The malware embedded in the APK file is a full-featured backdoor codenamed COWARDDUCK that can clandestinely collect the following details

The Hacker News 2026-07-19
threat20 Jul 04:30Zsingle-source · national CERTOpen finding ↗