CL-CRI-1163
actor · actor:cl-cri-1163
Unit 42's designation for a cluster targeting the Brazilian financial sector via job-themed phishing, deploying an iteratively-versioned Go-based SOCKS5 tunneler (SockTz) with AI-generated exploit scripts (Unit 42, 2026-09-03).
Defender insights
What each entry about CL-CRI-1163 tells a defender to do, newest first.
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (7 across 3 tactics)
7 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application · Phishing
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager · OS Credential Dumping: NTDS
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: DNS · Proxy · Protocol Tunneling
Initial Access TA0001
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
T1566Phishing×1
Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.003OS Credential Dumping: NTDS×1
Adversaries may attempt to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information, as well as obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights. By default, the NTDS file (NTDS.dit) is located in <code>%SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit</code> of a domain controller.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.004Application Layer Protocol: DNS×1
Adversaries may communicate using the Domain Name System (DNS) application layer protocol to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
T1090Proxy×1
Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
T1572Protocol Tunneling×1
Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/cl-cri-1131-1163-breeze-comet-latam-ai-augmented-intrusions · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about CL-CRI-1163 (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- cloud.google.com1 (33%)
- darkreading.com1 (33%)
- unit42.paloaltonetworks.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Group / Mandianthttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/financially-motivated-threat-actor-breeze-comet-targets-brazil
- darkreading.comDark Readinghttps://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/breeze-comet-brazilian-global-financial-systems
- unit42.paloaltonetworks.comPalo Alto Networks Unit 42https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ai-tool-use-targeting-latam-orgs/