ctipilot.ch

The Gentlemen — RaaS surged Q1 2026 (192 attacks, 588% QoQ); 32% of victims European; FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 initial-access funnel

actor · actor:TheGentlemen

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-05-10
Briefs
1
1 distinct
Sources cited
7
6 hosts
Sections touched
1
weekly_long_running
Co-occurring entities
5
see Related entities below

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-10CTI Weekly Summary — 2026-W19 (May 04 – May 10, 2026)
    weekly_long_runningFirst coverage. W1 horizon research surfaced operator pattern: 192 Q1 2026 attacks, 588% QoQ surge, 32% European targeting, FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 initial access with 14,700 pre-exploited devices, GPO-injected scheduled-task encryptor propagation, X25519+XChaCha20 encryption, 90/10 affiliate split, SystemBC C2 tunnelling. EU victims: Oltenia Energy (RO), The Adaptavist Group, Anderlues la Commune (BE), Dorotea Kommun (SE).

Where this entity is cited

  • weekly_long_running1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org2 (29%)
  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (14%)
  • comparitech.com1 (14%)
  • cybermaxx.com1 (14%)
  • research.checkpoint.com1 (14%)
  • zerofox.com1 (14%)

Related entities

Items in briefs about The Gentlemen — RaaS surged Q1 2026 (192 attacks, 588% QoQ); 32% of victims European; FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 initial-access funnel (2)

The Gentlemen RaaS — Europe-skewed operation surged approximately 448% QoQ; 32% of Q1 2026 victims in Europe; FortiGate CVE-2024-55591 initial-access funnel

From CTI Weekly Summary — 2026-W19 (May 04 – May 10, 2026) · published 2026-05-11 · view item permalink →

W1 horizon research identified an in-window operator gap the daily briefs missed. "The Gentlemen" emerged in August 2025 and per ZeroFox surged to the second- or third-most-active ransomware operation globally in Q1 2026 — 192 attacks that quarter, a approximately 448% QoQ increase, 32% of Q1 2026 victims in Europe (up from 2% in Q4 2025) (ZeroFox Q1 2026 Wrap-Up, 2026-04-17). Check Point Research's DFIR report on the operator confirms the post-compromise tradecraft observed during a single incident-response engagement: Cobalt Strike delivered via RPC from a Domain Controller; Mimikatz for credential harvesting; GPO abuse to inject a scheduled task into Group Policy that propagates the encryptor to all domain-joined systems near-simultaneously (compressing time-to-encryption to minimise IR response window); SystemBC SOCKS5 C2 tunnelling and covert payload staging; encryption using X25519 Diffie–Hellman key exchange per file combined with XChaCha20 stream cipher, per-file ephemeral key pair with a random 32-byte private key (Check Point Research DFIR Report, 2026-04-20 · BleepingComputer — The Gentlemen + SystemBC, 2026-04-20). CPR explicitly states the precise initial-access vector could not be conclusively determined for the engagement it analysed; broader reporting attributes initial access to a FortiOS / FortiProxy attack surface that includes CVE-2024-55591 (authentication bypass, CVSS 9.8 — patched January 2025), with secondary reporting describing an operator database of pre-exploited devices and brute-forced VPN credentials primed for deployment — defenders should treat patch-state-alone as insufficient if the device was unpatched against CVE-2024-55591 at any point during the exposure window.

European victims surfaced in BleepingComputer's SystemBC coverage and in quarterly leak-site aggregation include Oltenia Energy Complex (Romania — described as a significant portion of national electricity supply, December 2025) and The Adaptavist Group; Comparitech's Q1 2026 healthcare roundup attributes 10 healthcare-sector claims to the operator in the quarter; the operator's leak-site footprint and the absence of an "off-limits" sector convention make hospitals, water utilities, and similar critical-infrastructure targets in-scope. The cross-finding with this week's other concerns: GPO-injected scheduled-task propagation defeats backup-isolation defences if the AD environment is in the encryption path; if the operator's initial-access funnel includes unpatched FortiGate devices, that surface intersects directly with the Polish water-OT NIS2 coverage-gap framing (§ 4, § 6) since small municipal CI operators are over-represented in the unpatched-FortiGate population. Defender priorities for 2026-W20: hunt scheduled tasks in SYSVOL pointing to UNC paths or temp directories; profile SystemBC SOCKS5 beacons; add XChaCha20 file-header pattern detection at backup / DLP tier; re-verify FortiGate patch state against CVE-2024-55591 and any later FortiOS / FortiProxy auth-bypass advisories.

Akira playbook quarterly context — Q1 2026 healthcare concentration; Qilin remains the dominant operator on German healthcare victims

From CTI Weekly Summary — 2026-W19 (May 04 – May 10, 2026) · published 2026-05-11 · view item permalink →

W1 horizon research added Q1 2026 healthcare quarterly context to the Groupe 3R item in § 1. Across Q1 2026, Akira posted 84 victims in March alone (second-most-active month on record) and claimed 5 healthcare victims; Qilin led healthcare at 23 claims (with RENAFAN GmbH and Suchthilfe direkt Essen gGmbH as Qilin's confirmed German victims), and The Gentlemen at 10 healthcare claims (Comparitech Q1 2026 Healthcare, 2026-04-29 · CyberMaxx Q1 2026). Akira's documented attack chain for healthcare: initial access via unpatched VPN (Cisco ASA, SonicWall, Fortinet) or compromised RDP credentials; lateral movement via T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol and T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation; LSASS credential harvesting via comsvcs.dll / Mimikatz; AV termination via PowerTool weaponising the Zemana AntiMalware driver (BYOVD); data exfiltration; double extortion. The cross-finding for Swiss / DACH operators reading after Groupe 3R: at least two ransomware-as-a-service operators (Akira and Qilin) are hitting European healthcare in Q1–Q2 2026 via the edge-device / unpatched-VPN attack surface, and the operator that hits a given hospital is less salient defensively than the shared initial-access funnel they exploit.