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REDCap unauthenticated survey passthrough to Data Import code execution chain; exploited (Unit 42, CISA KEV 2026-11-18); fixed in 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS, 17.4.4

cve · CVE-2026-90817

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-19 → last 2026-11-19
Latest activity
2026-11-19
REDCap unauthenticated survey-to-RCE chain exploited and on CISA KEV; upgrade to 16.0.49, 17.3.10 or 17.4.4
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
7
6 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about CVE-2026-90817, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every REDCap server to 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS or 17.4.4 Standard and, on any server that was internet-reachable on an older build, check for transient Blade-template files under the web temp cache, crontabs, the authorized_keys of every account, ~/.profile and Monero miner processes, treating a hit as a server compromise, because Unit 42 saw the chain used for mining with persistence that an upgrade does not remove.
    2026-11-19CVE-2026-90817

Defender insights

What each entry about CVE-2026-90817 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-19HIGHexploitedREDCap unauthenticated survey-to-RCE chain exploited and on CISA KEV; upgrade to 16.0.49, 17.3.10 or 17.4.4

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-19CVE-2026-90817, REDCap 13.3.0 up to 16.0.48 LTS, 17.3.9 LTS and 17.4.3 Standard: an unauthenticated chain from a public survey request through the Data Import controller to code execution on the server, exploited as of 2026-10-07 for cryptocurrency mining and listed by CISA; fixed in 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 Standard (CVSS 3.1 9.8)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesREDCap unauthenticated survey-to-RCE chain exploited and on CISA KEV; upgrade to 16.0.49, 17.3.10 or 17.4.4
ATT&CK techniques (10 across 7 tactics)

10 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Cron · Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Steganography · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: Clear Command History
  • Command and ControlIngress Tool Transfer
  • ImpactResource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1

Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell×1

Adversaries may abuse Unix shell commands and scripts for execution. Unix shells are the primary command prompt on Linux, macOS, and ESXi systems, though many variations of the Unix shell exist (e.g. sh, ash, bash, zsh, etc.) depending on the specific OS or distribution. Unix shells can control every aspect of a system, with certain commands requiring elevated privileges.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1

Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.004Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys×1

Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.003Scheduled Task/Job: Cron×1

Adversaries may abuse the <code>cron</code> utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. The <code>cron</code> utility is a time-based job scheduler for Unix-like operating systems. The <code> crontab</code> file contains the schedule of cron entries to be run and the specified times for execution. Any <code>crontab</code> files are stored in operating system-specific file paths.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1098.004Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys×1

Adversaries may modify the SSH <code>authorized_keys</code> file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions, macOS, and ESXi hypervisors commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The <code>authorized_keys</code> file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <code>&lt;user-home&gt;/.ssh/authorized_keys</code> (or, on ESXi, `/etc/ssh/keys-<username>/authorized_keys`). Users may edit the system’s SSH config file to modify the directives `PubkeyAuthentication` and `RSAAuthentication` to the value `yes` to ensure public key and RSA authentication are enabled, as well as modify the directive `PermitRootLogin` to the value `yes` to enable root authentication via SSH. The SSH config file is usually located under <code>/etc/ssh/sshd_config</code>.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.003Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography×1

Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

T1070.003Indicator Removal: Clear Command History×1

In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1496.001Resource Hijacking: Compute Hijacking×1

Adversaries may leverage the compute resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability.

Evidence: 2026-11-19/redcap-cve-2026-90817-unauth-survey-rce-exploited-kev · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about REDCap unauthenticated survey passthrough to Data Import code execution chain; exploited (Unit 42, CISA KEV 2026-11-18); fixed in 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS, 17.4.4 (1)

2026-11-19 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-90817exploitedNATOB1

CVE-2026-90817, REDCap 13.3.0 up to 16.0.48 LTS, 17.3.9 LTS and 17.4.3 Standard: an unauthenticated chain from a public survey request through the Data Import controller to code execution on the server, exploited as of 2026-10-07 for cryptocurrency mining and listed by CISA; fixed in 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 Standard (CVSS 3.1 9.8)

Securifera, which found the flaw, describes a chain of five faults in REDCap, the research-data platform from Vanderbilt University. The public survey handler checks the passthrough value in two forms, so a double-encoded value reaches the root index.php dispatcher while the route restriction is skipped; the project user-rights object is built before the respondent identity exists, so the public context receives the Data Import privilege and the POST CSRF check is skipped because NOAUTH is defined; the Data Import commit path trusts the posted file name as a local path or PHP stream; the byte-order-mark cleanup writes changed bytes back to the same stream, which turns a CSV cleanup into an arbitrary overwrite; and a compiled-template cache file is then rendered as PHP through a route that works without a login (Securifera, 2026-09-27). An attacker needs only a valid survey hash, with no account, project membership, session cookie, role or CSRF token (Securifera, 2026-09-27); Securifera's repository publishes a proof of concept (Securifera repository, 2026-10-01).

Unit 42's note of 2026-10-07 reports active exploitation: an unauthenticated POST to a public survey URL stages a transient Blade-template web shell under the temp cache, run by php-fpm with the web server's permissions, which executes a Base64 bash cradle entirely in memory and pipes a payload disguised as a JPEG into bash (Unit 42, 2026-10-07). The chain deploys Monero miners, run with randomized syslog-themed process names, with at least four live workers; persistence is a modified crontab, an RSA public key appended to the authorized_keys of every accessible profile and an edited ~/.profile, and the attackers unset HISTFILE and purge the bash history (Unit 42, 2026-10-07). CISA added the flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-11-18 on evidence of active exploitation it does not describe (CISA, 2026-11-18).

Google's GTIG reported in June 2026 that the PRC-nexus cluster UNC6508 had exploited internet-facing REDCap servers of North American academic and medical organisations (Google GTIG, 2026-06-15). REDCap 13.3.0 through 16.0.48 LTS, 17.3.9 LTS and 17.4.3 Standard are vulnerable (Pentest-Tools, 2026-10-23); the CVE record names 16.0.49 LTS, 17.3.10 LTS and 17.4.4 Standard as the upgrade targets (OpenCVE, 2026-09-20).

Triage: the survey flow is supposed to allow only the PDF route (PdfController:index), so a public survey request that reaches the Data Import controller or carries a stream wrapper in the file-name field is not benign (Securifera, 2026-09-27).

Attackers are actively exploiting CVE-2026-90817

Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 (timely threat intel) 2026-10-07

based on evidence of active exploitation

CISA 2026-11-18

An attacker only needs a valid survey hash; no REDCap account, project membership, session cookie, role, or CSRF token.

Securifera (discoverer) 2026-09-27

REDCap versions 13.3.0 through 16.0.48 LTS, 17.3.9 LTS, and 17.4.3 Standard contain an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability.

Pentest-Tools 2026-10-23

Builds on: PRC UNC6508 ran year-plus espionage through internet-facing REDCap servers and a Google…

vulnerability19 Nov 05:14Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • github.com2 (29%)
  • app.opencve.io1 (14%)
  • cisa.gov1 (14%)
  • cloud.google.com1 (14%)
  • pentest-tools.com1 (14%)
  • securifera.com1 (14%)