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Siemens Software Center DLL side-loading (CWE-427, CVSS 4.0 8.4), exploited by a ClickFix campaign that ships its own signed copy; fixed in V4.0.9.8 (SSA-580366)

cve · CVE-2026-110936 single-source

Coverage
1
first 2026-10-20 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-10-20
Siemens confirms exploitation of a Software Center DLL side-loading flaw; attackers bring their own signed…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
4
4 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about CVE-2026-110936 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-20NOTABLEexploitedSiemens confirms exploitation of a Software Center DLL side-loading flaw; attackers bring their own signed copy

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-20CVE-2026-110936, Siemens Software Center: a ClickFix campaign runs a genuine signed copy of the application and side-loads its own DLLs, and Siemens confirms exploitation (CVSS 4.0 8.4)
    trending-vulnerabilitiesSiemens confirms exploitation of a Software Center DLL side-loading flaw; attackers bring their own signed copy
ATT&CK techniques (5 across 4 tactics)

5 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthSystem Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1218.007System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec×1

Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi). The Msiexec.exe binary may also be digitally signed by Microsoft.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/cve-2026-110936-siemens-software-center-clickfix-sideload · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Siemens Software Center DLL side-loading (CWE-427, CVSS 4.0 8.4), exploited by a ClickFix campaign that ships its own signed copy; fixed in V4.0.9.8 (SSA-580366) (1)

2026-10-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2026-110936exploitedNATOA2

CVE-2026-110936, Siemens Software Center: a ClickFix campaign runs a genuine signed copy of the application and side-loads its own DLLs, and Siemens confirms exploitation (CVSS 4.0 8.4)

Siemens ProductCERT says it has validated active exploitation of CVE-2026-110936, a DLL side-loading flaw in Siemens Software Center that Siemens fixed in version 4.0.9.8 and described in advisory SSA-580366 of 2026-10-15 (Siemens ProductCERT, 2026-10-19). The advisory scores it CVSS 4.0 8.4 (6.7 on CVSS 3.1, with a local vector and high privileges required) and lists every version before V4.0.9.8 as affected (Siemens ProductCERT, 2026-10-15). The attackers did not rely on a copy already on the victim's PC: they used a genuine, validly signed copy of Software Center and placed their own files next to it, chosen as a carrier because it is signed and trusted and because version 3.5.8.7, the latest at the time, loaded helper files from its own folder without checking them; the Siemens program itself was not modified, and Siemens says no Siemens system, product or update channel was breached to its knowledge (Siemens ProductCERT, 2026-10-19). Siemens labels the activity the Romulus multi-platform ClickFix campaign and names no actor (Siemens ProductCERT, 2026-10-19); one address that Siemens lists as the distribution channel of its malware bundle also appears among the ROMULUS hosts in Forescout's write-up of a ClickFix delivery platform, which does not mention Siemens software, and Forescout says it has no evidence that its panel is related to RomulusLoader, the malware Proofpoint reported (Forescout Vedere Labs, 2026-10-15). Huntress documented the same chain with other signed applications on 2026-09-28 and warned to expect more signed hosts (Huntress, 2026-09-28).

Triage: a real installation runs from the Siemens install location; the same executable running from the user profile's Programs folder, started by msiexec, with unexpected files beside it or start-up entries on a PC that never had the product, is the abuse (Siemens ProductCERT, 2026-10-19).

The attackers used a genuine copy of Siemens Software Center with a valid signature and placed their own files next to it.

No Siemens system, product or update channel was breached to our knowledge.

Existing installations update automatically the next time they start.

Detect on folder and behaviour, not on the Siemens file fingerprint

Siemens ProductCERT 2026-10-19

Unfortunately, we (and you) should expect more costumes.

Huntress 2026-09-28

we have no evidence that this panel is related to the RomulusLoader reported by

Forescout Vedere Labs 2026-10-15

Builds on: Huntress: a ChatGPT Custom GPT lure feeds a ClickFix chain that ends in a signed-host DLL…

vulnerability20 Oct 03:36Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • cert-portal.siemens.com1 (25%)
  • forescout.com1 (25%)
  • huntress.com1 (25%)
  • productcert.siemens.com1 (25%)