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Five Eyes "Safeguarding Our Secrets" — Chinese military intelligence systematically recruiting via LinkedIn and job platforms

From CTI Weekly Summary — 2026-W23 (1–7 June 2026) · published 2026-06-08

On 2026-06-03 the five Five Eyes domestic intelligence agencies (ASIO, CSIS, FBI, MI5, NZSIS) released a joint bulletin warning that China's military-intelligence apparatus is systematically using professional-networking and freelance-work platforms — LinkedIn, Indeed, Upwork — to identify and cultivate cleared personnel, academics, researchers and defence/policy staff (MI5; The Record, 2026-06-03; daily 2026-06-06). The tradecraft: operatives pose as recruiters or think-tank staff for fabricated cover companies outside China, open with benign foreign-policy research commissions paying hundreds to a few thousand dollars per deliverable, then escalate toward sensitive material and migrate the relationship to encrypted messaging to reduce platform visibility. Switzerland — outside Five Eyes but a hub for international organisations, financial regulation, and dual-use research — is squarely in the target set. The defensible surface is personnel-security, not EDR: brief cleared and research staff on the innocuous-task-to-sensitive-request progression and give them a low-friction route to report unsolicited foreign-recruitment contact.