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UPDATE: ShinyHunters lists Charter Communications (Spectrum) — telco victim in the Salesforce-credential campaign
From CTI Daily Brief — 2026-05-25 · published 2026-05-25
UPDATE (Salesforce-credential extortion campaign, originally covered 2026-05-19 via the 7-Eleven breach): ShinyHunters listed Charter Communications — operating consumer services under the Spectrum brand — on its leak site around 22–23 May, claiming over 42 million PII records and setting a 27 May negotiation deadline before threatened release (CyberInsider, 2026-05-23). The 42M figure is the actor's own unverified leak-site claim. Charter issued a narrowly-worded statement confirming it is "following security protocols" and "alerting appropriate authorities" while explicitly denying that "sensitive personal information (PI) or customer proprietary network information (CPNI)" was exfiltrated — language calibrated to FCC-protected categories. The exclusion of non-CPNI PII (billing name, address, email) from that denial is conspicuous and leaves room for lower-sensitivity data exposure even if the denial holds.
By our own campaign tracking Charter is the first telco/ISP victim of this wave to respond publicly — an inference from the prior named victims (Instructure, Vimeo, Wynn, Vercel, Medtronic, 7-Eleven), none of them telcos, rather than a claim made by the cited sources. The pattern is consistent with the broader ShinyHunters wave against enterprise Salesforce tenants — abuse of exposed OAuth tokens and misconfigured connected-app / Experience Cloud integrations, not a vulnerability in Salesforce itself — the same vector behind the confirmed 7-Eleven breach (600k records, covered 2026-05-19). The fresh Charter listing is independently corroborated by Troy Hunt's Weekly Update 505, 2026-05-24, which records ShinyHunters' new claimed victims. For CH/EU public bodies running Salesforce: audit connected-app OAuth scopes, rotate long-lived connected-app credentials, restrict Experience/Community Cloud guest-user access, and baseline bulk-object query volumes via Shield Event Monitoring — an anomalous large
SELECTagainst Account/Contact objects is the data-exfiltration signature to alert on.