Kaspersky GReAT: "StrikeShark" loader deploys Cobalt Strike via "Perfect DLL Hijacking" against government targets

Kaspersky GReAT published a full technical analysis (2026-06-26) of SharkLoader, an undocumented loader used in a cluster it tracks as StrikeShark and assesses with low confidence as a Chinese-speaking actor (based on the Chinese-authored FScan/Searchall/Pillager toolkit it deploys) (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-06-24). The loader's signature is "Perfect DLL Hijacking": it sideloads through legitimate signed binaries (SystemSettings.exe, msedge.exe), then forcibly releases LdrpLoaderLock and decrements LdrpWorkInProgress so it can spawn threads from DllMain without deadlocking the Windows loader, an unusually sophisticated pattern. Two encrypted modules (DscCoreR.mui, Blowfish; SyncRes.dat, AES-128) install Microsoft Detours hooks across 50+ APIs to null ETW (EtwEventWrite), spoof svchost.exe as parent PID (T1134.004), and demote Beacon memory from RWX to RW during sleep via MinHook on VirtualAlloc/Sleep to evade memory scanners (Help Net Security, 2026-06-26). Initial access is via a long list of public-facing RCEs (ProxyLogon CVE-2021-26855, Openfire CVE-2023-32315, GeoServer CVE-2024-36401, F5 BIG-IP CVE-2023-46747, FortiOS CVE-2024-21762), with European targets including North Macedonia and Serbia. Why it matters to us: Swiss/EU organisations still exposed on any of the listed CVE versions are in the initial-access set. Hunt for SystemSettings.exe executing from %APPDATA% subdirectories, PrintDialog.dll loaded outside system32 (Sysmon EID 7), and processes whose ETW subsystem produces zero events.