FBI/CISA: Russian intelligence now phishing Signal Backup Recovery Keys for persistent account takeover

The FBI and CISA issued an updated joint advisory (PSA I-062626-PSA, 2026-06-26) escalating their March 2026 warning about Russian Intelligence Services operators tracked as UNC5792 (FSB-linked) and UNC4221 (military-linked) (FBI IC3, 2026-06-26). The new tactic abuses Signal's optional encrypted-backup feature rather than any flaw in the Signal Protocol: operators impersonate Signal support, walk the target through Settings → Chats → Chat Backups, then elicit the 30-character Backup Recovery Key. With that key an attacker can download and decrypt the complete private and group message history offline. Critically, the advisory states the compromised key remains valid even if the victim later re-registers a new account on the same phone number, generating a new key in Settings invalidates future downloads but does not undo data already exfiltrated (FBI IC3, 2026-06-26). Stated targets are current and former government officials, military personnel, political figures, journalists, and Ukraine-related officials. This is T1598.003 (spearphishing via service) leading to T1078 (valid-account takeover via the backup mechanism), with no platform-layer sensor, detection relies on user reporting and MDM telemetry for backup-enable events. Why it matters to us: Swiss federal, cantonal-police, and parliamentary staff using Signal for sensitive coordination sit squarely in the named target population. Issue policy now: high-risk personnel should regenerate their Signal Backup Recovery Key, treat any unsolicited "Signal support" message as hostile, and on managed devices disable Signal backups via MDM where operational security requires it.