ShinyHunters used a single vishing call into the company's identity platform to breach Madison Square Garden

404 Media's review of the stolen Madison Square Garden data and the attackers' own account confirm the intrusion began with a vishing call, the operators phoned a low-level employee and talked them into letting them into MSG's systems (404 Media, 2026-06-24). Reporting attributes the breach to ShinyHunters; after MSG missed a 15 June ransom deadline, roughly 45 GB / 26M+ records were published (The Next Web, 2026-06-16). The wider pattern this fits (and the one worth detecting) is the vishing → identity-platform (Entra/Okta) → MFA-enrollment → SSO-pivot chain that Abnormal Security documents generically: an IT-impersonation call manufacturing MFA-reset urgency, real-time credential and one-time-code capture on a tenant-branded phishing page, enrollment of an attacker-controlled MFA device, then a pivot into connected SaaS (Abnormal Security, 2026-02-06). Maps to T1566.004 (vishing), T1078.004 (cloud accounts), and T1556.006 (MFA manipulation).

Why it matters to us: the victim is a US private entity, but the kill chain is identity-platform-agnostic and lands the same way against EU public-sector Entra/Okta tenants. Hunt Entra audit logs for new MFA-method registration events correlated with anomalous sign-in geo/user-agent and post-enrollment impossible-travel risk events; the durable control is phishing-resistant FIDO2/passkey MFA that cannot be relayed in real time, plus Conditional Access requiring a compliant device for MFA enrollment.