FortiClient EMS CVE-2026-35616: exploited API authentication bypass used to push VPN on-connect scripts that drop EKZ Infostealer on managed endpoints
Attackers abused a FortiClient EMS auth bypass to add VPN connect scripts that installed a credential stealer posing as a Fortinet patch
Analysis
CVE-2026-35616 is an API authentication bypass in FortiClient EMS 7.4.5 and 7.4.6 that Fortinet has observed exploited in the wild; a hotfix exists for both versions and 7.4.7 includes the fix (Fortinet PSIRT, FG-IR-26-099). CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-04-06 (CISA KEV catalog, 2026-04-06). Bishop Fox traced the bypass to EMS's Django middleware trusting client-supplied X-SSL-CLIENT-VERIFY and certificate headers as if Apache had set them, combined with chain validation that matches only subject and issuer names without checking signatures, so a forged certificate chain passes (Bishop Fox, 2026-04-07).
Arctic Wolf documented a campaign that used the flaw to reach managed endpoints (Arctic Wolf, 2026-05-27). After authenticating as a Fabric device, the actor deferred upgrade reminders and edited the Remote Access Profile and endpoint policy to add scripts that run when FortiClient establishes a VPN tunnel; within seconds of an IPsec tunnel coming up, fortitray.exe launched GUID-named .cmd files through cmd.exe, which ran base64-encoded PowerShell that downloaded and ran a payload, slept 90 seconds and sent the script output out (Arctic Wolf, 2026-05-27). The payload, disguised as a Fortinet patch executable, is EKZ Infostealer, which exports credentials, cookies and autofill data from Chromium and Firefox browsers to a log file; for Chromium it copies itself into the browser's Application directory and relaunches from there to pass Chromium Elevation Service path validation before decrypting the browser's master key, and stolen cookies can let attackers reuse sessions without triggering MFA (Arctic Wolf, 2026-05-27).
Cited evidence
Fortinet has observed this to be exploited in the wild and urges vulnerable customers to install the hotfix for FortiClient EMS 7.4.5 and 7.4.6
Updates2
Bishop Fox attributes the bypass to EMS's Django middleware accepting client-supplied certificate headers and to chain validation that checks names without signatures (Bishop Fox, 2026-04-07); the earlier comparison with a SharePoint flaw was wrong. In Arctic Wolf's campaign the endpoints ran attacker scripts through VPN on-connect settings that fortitray.exe or ipsec.exe launched, and EKZ copies itself into the browser's Application directory (Arctic Wolf, 2026-05-27); the earlier detection guidance on update tasks and profile writes did not match the observed behaviour.
Fortinet scores CVE-2026-35616 at CVSSv3 9.8, with 9.1 as the temporal score (Fortinet PSIRT, FG-IR-26-099). On Chromium browsers EKZ copies itself into the browser's Application directory and relaunches from there to pass Chromium Elevation Service path validation; Arctic Wolf's hunts also cover the payload running from the shared ProgramData folder and a log file there that PowerShell reads, posts out over HTTP and deletes together with the payload (Arctic Wolf, 2026-05-27).
Sources4
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-29-c7f56b00
- Correction 2026-10-11T1307Z-audit
The mechanism was wrong: the bypass rests on EMS's Django middleware trusting client-supplied certificate headers plus name-only chain validation, not a reverse proxy stamping a header, and it bears no relation to the SharePoint CVE-2026-45659. The CVSS 9.1 is the temporal score of a vector with availability impact; the EPSS figure and the push of a signed update task had no source. The campaign ran through VPN on-connect scripts launched by fortitray.exe or ipsec.exe, and EKZ copies itself into the browser's Application directory, not into profile folders. The evidence quotes were not on the Arctic Wolf page and the region and sector tags had no source. The entry is rewritten from Fortinet, Bishop Fox and Arctic Wolf with exposure, detection and takeaway lines, verbatim evidence, a rating and an ATT&CK mapping.
Changed: title headline summary event_date tags regions sectors techniques affected_products cves sources evidence classification deep_dive deep_dive_category body
- Improvement 2026-10-21T1149Z-audit
Fortinet's base score is CVSSv3 9.8, with 9.1 its temporal score. The Chromium step now reads as Arctic Wolf states it, a self-copy into the browser's Application directory to pass Elevation Service path validation, and the detection guidance adds Arctic Wolf's ProgramData staging and log-file exfiltration hunts. The payload and log file names are replaced by descriptions of the behaviour.
Changed: cves body
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