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HIGHCVE-2026-9058vulnerability

CVE-2026-9058 — Szafir SDK (KIR): signature-verification routine reports success on an untrusted certificate chain, enabling auth bypass in Polish e-government

discovered 2026-05-26 05:00 UTCrun 2026-05-26-ae9d0d4b2 sourcesmulti-source

CERT Polska disclosed CVE-2026-9058, an improper-certificate-validation flaw (CWE-393 / CWE-637) scored CVSS 4.0 9.3 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N) in Szafir SDK, the qualified-electronic-signature library developed by clearinghouse Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa (KIR) and embedded across Polish public-administration systems (CERT Polska, 2026-05-25; ENISA EUVD-2026-31679, 2026-05-25). The defect is precise and instructive: the SDK returns the success code /VerifyingTaskItem/Signature/VerificationResult/Result/@code == 0 ("Positively verified") from cryptographic signature verification even when the signer certificate's trust status is nondetermined — i.e. the chain could not be validated to a trusted root. A consuming application that gates on the result code alone treats a signature backed by an unverifiable or attacker-supplied certificate as valid, yielding authentication bypass and user impersonation without possession of a legitimate qualified certificate (T1606). Any application that consumes Szafir to accept qualified electronic signatures is therefore exposed to forged-signature acceptance — squarely the qualified-signature use case across Polish e-government and regulated industry; the issue is fixed in version 463.

This clears the § 2 bar on ENISA EUVD CVSS ≥ 9.0 and as a national-CERT primary disclosure for its own jurisdiction. Defender action beyond upgrading to ≥ 463: applications must validate the certificate trust status independently of the result code — check …/SigningCertificate/@certificateType != "nondetermined" before accepting the signature — and audit verification logs for events where Result/@code == 0 coincided with a nondetermined certificate, which indicates likely abuse. The broader lesson generalises to any CH/EU qualified-signature stack: never collapse "cryptographically intact" and "anchored to a trusted root" into a single boolean. No in-the-wild exploitation is reported.

Defender actions

  • Upgrade Szafir SDK to ≥ 463 and fix the validation logic, not just the version — in every application consuming the SDK, gate signature acceptance on the certificate trust status (SigningCertificate/@certificateType != "nondetermined"), not on the result code alone, and review verification logs for Result/@code == 0 events that coincided with a nondetermined certificate (§ 2, CVE-2026-9058). The same "verify trust status, not just cryptographic integrity" check applies to any CH/EU qualified-signature stack (CERT Polska, 2026-05-25).

ATT&CK mapping

1 technique mapped from the cited reporting · MITRE ATT&CK v19.2

Credential Access TA0006
T1606Forge Web Credentials

Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access.

overlap matrix · ATT&CK page ↗

PROVENANCE

AI-generated · no human review · this permalink is the shareable record for the finding · verify operationally critical claims against the linked primary source.