Tycoon 2FA after the March 2026 takedown: operators add OAuth device-code phishing against Microsoft 365 alongside the credential-relay kit
Tycoon 2FA adds device-code phishing: victims approve token issuance to an attacker device on genuine Microsoft pages
Analysis
eSentire's Threat Response Unit analyzed in late April 2026 a campaign by operators of the Tycoon 2FA phishing-as-a-service kit, which kept running after the March 2026 takedown led by Microsoft and Europol, that keeps the kit's in-browser tradecraft but ends in Microsoft's legitimate device-login flow instead of a credential-relay proxy (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). The device-code variant runs beside the relay kit: eSentire still names the OfficeHome AppId as the primary marker of the credential-relay variant and treats the two AppIds as one detection set (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12), and BleepingComputer reports that the kit now supports device-code phishing (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-17).
The lure, a forwarded vendor-invoice reminder, carries a Trustifi click-tracking URL whose clean-reputation domain launders the link, and Trustifi redirects to a throwaway Cloudflare Workers subdomain that returns an AES-GCM-encrypted page decrypted in the browser (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). The decrypted controller blanks the page for headless browsers and Burp, suppresses developer-tool shortcuts, redirects to microsoft.com when a debugger timing trap fires, checks the visitor's network owner against 230 cloud, sandbox, security-vendor, VPN and AI-crawler names, and stops rendering after a hardcoded expiry date (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). A Microsoft-branded fake CAPTCHA then queries a Tycoon 2FA Check Domain, which serves suspected analysts a benign decoy website and real victims a Microsoft 365 voicemail lure (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12).
The voicemail page displays a user code that the operator's backend obtained from Microsoft's device-code endpoint, copies it and opens microsoft.com/devicelogin; the victim signs in at login.microsoftonline.com, approves the MFA push and consents to Microsoft Authentication Broker, and Microsoft issues access and refresh tokens to the operator's polling client, after which the kit sends the victim to their real Outlook inbox (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). A victim already signed in sees no authentication step at all, only the consent prompt (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). Because the Broker is a Microsoft first-party application it does not trigger unverified-publisher OAuth detections, and its token can be exchanged for Exchange, Graph and OneDrive tokens without further interaction (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). The backend traffic still uses the CryptoJS AES-CBC layer with a hardcoded key and IV unchanged since eSentire's April 2025 analysis, which works as a kit fingerprint rather than protection, and the operators' token traffic came from Alibaba (US) hosting, which eSentire has seen across both kit variants since about 2026-04-10 in addition to the hosting providers documented before (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12).
Triage: a device-code sign-in alone can be a legitimate command-line tool or input-constrained device; eSentire's discriminators are a source with no prior device-code activity and Node.js user agents against the Broker AppId in non-interactive sign-ins, which it calls highly anomalous in production environments (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12).
Cited evidence
Doing so authorizes the attacker to register a rogue device with the victim’s Microsoft 365 account, giving them unrestricted access to the victim's data and services, including email, calendar, and cloud file storage.
The user's MFA worked exactly as designed. There is no proxy, no credential capture, no fake Microsoft page; everything from login.microsoftonline.com onward is authentic Microsoft infrastructure responding to authentic Microsoft authentication events.
Successful device-code authentication (AuthenticationProtocol = deviceCode, ResultType = 0) from sources with no prior device-code activity.
We recommend organizations get as close as possible to a unilateral block on device code flow.
Updates1
Tycoon 2FA operators did not move away from the credential-relay kit: eSentire still names the OfficeHome AppId as the primary marker of the relay variant and treats it and the Broker AppId as one detection set, and BleepingComputer reports that the kit now supports device-code phishing (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12; BleepingComputer, 2026-05-17). The Alibaba (US) hosting seen since about 2026-04-10 is an addition to the hosting providers documented before, not a replacement (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). The lure page shows a user code obtained by the operator's backend and tells the victim to paste it at microsoft.com/devicelogin (BleepingComputer, 2026-05-17), after which the victim sees a consent prompt reading "Are you trying to sign in to Microsoft Authentication Broker?" (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). The detection signals eSentire publishes are successful deviceCode sign-ins from sources with no prior device-code activity, tokens issued to the Microsoft Authentication Broker AppId, node or undici user agents in non-interactive sign-ins, and ResultType 50173 after revocation (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12). eSentire says the phish does not bypass MFA but changes what MFA authorizes, and recommends blocking the device-code flow with Conditional Access as the control that removes the attack class (eSentire TRU, 2026-05-12), in line with Microsoft's advice to get as close as possible to a unilateral block (Microsoft Learn); no source says that FIDO2 sign-in defeats device-code phishing.
Sources3
Revision history
- Published 2026-05-18-2eabc1cf
- Correction 2026-10-21T1148Z-audit
Tycoon 2FA operators added an OAuth device-code variant alongside the credential-relay kit rather than abandoning it, and the Alibaba (US) hosting eSentire saw since about 2026-04-10 joins the previously documented providers instead of replacing them. The lure shows a device code fetched by the operator's backend and has the victim paste it at microsoft.com/devicelogin; the detection signals are eSentire's own (successful deviceCode sign-ins from sources with no prior device-code use, the Microsoft Authentication Broker AppId, node or undici user agents, ResultType 50173 after revocation). eSentire's hardening leads with a Conditional Access block on the device-code flow, and no source says that FIDO2 sign-in defeats device-code phishing.
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