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TrickMo C

tool · tool:trickmo-c-2026

TrickMo variant ('TrickMo C'): Android banking trojan with C2 migrated to The Open Network blockchain, adding SOCKS5/SSH device-as-pivot; campaigns in FR/IT/AT.

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-13 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-13
New TrickMo variant hides its C2 in The Open Network and turns infected phones into network pivots
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
finance
sectors: finance · regions: europe
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about TrickMo C tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-13NOTABLENew TrickMo variant hides its C2 in The Open Network and turns infected phones into network pivots

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-13TrickMo C: Android banking trojan moves its C2 onto The Open Network and turns infected phones into SOCKS5 and SSH network pivots
    researchNew TrickMo variant hides its C2 in The Open Network and turns infected phones into network pivots
ATT&CK techniques (11 across 5 tactics)

11 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • StealthMasquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
  • Credential AccessInput Capture: Keylogging · Input Capture: GUI Input Capture · Multi-Factor Authentication Interception
  • DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · Network Service Discovery
  • CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Input Capture: GUI Input Capture · Screen Capture
  • Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Proxy · Ingress Tool Transfer · Protocol Tunneling

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1

Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1111Multi-Factor Authentication Interception×1

Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1046Network Service Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1056.002Input Capture: GUI Input Capture×1

Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the operating system to prompt the user for proper credentials to authorize the elevated privileges for the task (ex: Bypass User Account Control).

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-05-13/trickmo-trickmo-c-android-banking-trojan-migrates-c2-to-the · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about TrickMo C (1)

2026-05-13 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

TrickMo C: Android banking trojan moves its C2 onto The Open Network and turns infected phones into SOCKS5 and SSH network pivots

ThreatFabric identified a new TrickMo variant between January and February 2026 that is progressively replacing its predecessor in campaigns against banking and wallet customers in France, Italy and Austria (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11). The on-device feature set is largely unchanged: once the user grants the accessibility-service permission the bot coerces, the operator gets overlay credential phishing, keylogging, screen recording and streaming, remote control, and SMS and notification interception that silently suppresses one-time-password messages, while the offensive code arrives as a module fetched from operator infrastructure at runtime (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11). Campaign tags point to TikTok-themed apps delivered over Facebook (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11); the droppers pose as adult-friendly versions of TikTok and the malware as Google Play Services (The Hacker News, 2026-05-12).

Command and control now runs over The Open Network: an embedded native TON proxy starts on a loopback port, the bot's HTTP client sends every request through it to .adnl hostnames resolved inside the TON overlay, and the few clearnet names it still needs are resolved over public DNS-over-HTTPS (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11). New operator commands run curl, DNS lookups, ping, multi-port TCP-connect probes and traceroute from the device's network position, open SSH local-forward and remote-forward tunnels, the latter reaching into the corporate or home LAN the phone is on, and start an authenticated SOCKS5 proxy whose traffic appears to come from the victim's IP and so defeats IP-based fraud checks (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11). The Pine hooking framework and a full set of NFC permissions are bundled but unused, which ThreatFabric reads as preparation for features delivered at runtime later (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11).

Traffic-pattern detection at the network edge sees only TON traffic, which is encrypted and indistinguishable from any other TON-enabled application's outbound flow.

these dormant components suggest the operators are preparing the platform for future runtime-delivered features

ThreatFabric 2026-05-11

Dropper apps containing the malware masquerade as adult-friendly versions of TikTok through Facebook

The Hacker News 2026-05-12
Improvementrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

ThreatFabric's point about the TON transport is that traffic analysis at the network edge sees only encrypted TON traffic, indistinguishable from any other TON application's, and that domain takedowns lose effect because the endpoints live inside the overlay (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11); it does not say TON shares standard internet routes, and no source describes "unusual entitlements" as a signal. The Pine hooking framework and the NFC permissions are bundled but not exercised, which ThreatFabric reads as capability reserved for features delivered at runtime later, possibly NFC-targeted, not as contactless-payment interception in development (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11). The droppers are TikTok look-alikes delivered through Facebook campaigns (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11; The Hacker News, 2026-05-12); no source says ads. The observable activity is on the device: accessibility-service grants to an app posing as Google Play Services, and network probes originating from a phone inside the LAN (ThreatFabric, 2026-05-11).

research13 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • securityaffairs.com1 (33%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (33%)
  • threatfabric.com1 (33%)