M-RED-TEAM

AsyncAPI npm packages backdoored via a GitHub Actions pull_request_target token theft, delivering a multi-stage IPFS implant (M-RED-TEAM)

On 2026-07-14 an attacker compromised the asyncapi/generator GitHub repository by abusing a pull_request_target workflow that checked out the pull request's own code while still running "in the context of the base repository with full access to secrets" (Wiz, 2026-07-14). The attacker opened 37 pull requests — almost all a decoy adding a fake charity-donation page — while a single one (PR #2155, 05:08 UTC) carried obfuscated JavaScript that scanned the Actions runner environment for secrets and exfiltrated them to a paste-site dead drop, capturing the token of asyncapi-bot, a service account with organization-wide access; by 06:58 UTC the attacker pushed a malicious commit to the next branch and from 07:10 UTC the release workflow published five trojanized versions across four packages — @asyncapi/generator 3.3.1, @asyncapi/generator-helpers 1.1.1, @asyncapi/generator-components 0.7.1, and @asyncapi/specs 6.11.2 and 6.11.2-alpha.1 — which "combined, these packages see over three million downloads a week" (Wiz, 2026-07-14). A contributor had opened a fix for the vulnerable workflow on 2026-05-17; it was still unmerged 58 days later when the attack landed.

The injected code executes on import/require, not at install time: it spawns a detached Node child process that downloads a later stage from IPFS into a per-user application-support directory, then runs an encrypted multi-stage bundle whose runtime "explicitly self-identifies as 'M-RED-TEAM v6.4' in code comments" (Wiz, 2026-07-14). It establishes persistence via a systemd user service on Linux (with platform-specific equivalents on macOS and Windows) and beacons over multiple command-and-control channels — HTTP, Nostr relays, Ethereum smart contracts, and a libp2p mesh — accepting remote commands for file operations, directory listing and data exfiltration; its obfuscation uses javascript-obfuscator with a custom base64 alphabet matching prior incidents. The bundle carries credential-theft capabilities targeting saved browser passwords and cookies, SSH keys, npm and GitHub tokens, AWS credentials, the macOS Keychain and crypto wallets. Wiz notes technical fingerprints overlapping the Miasma framework (a miasma-branded persistence service and relay tags) and a dead-drop naming pattern matching the separately-tracked prt-scan pull-request-abuse campaign, but states that "beyond the references and initial obfuscation method the payload contains minimal resemblance to previous Miasma and Shai-Hulud payloads" and that "at this time, we are not making any definitive attribution." SafeDep, tracking the same incident, reports the payload self-identifying as miasma-train-p1 rather than Wiz's M-RED-TEAM v6.4 and frames the Miasma link more directly — "this is either a private, parallel build by the same operators or a separate group that adopted the Miasma brand after the source was published" (SafeDep, 2026-07-14); a team hunting code-comment strings should check for both identifiers.

Defender takeaway. This is a recurring 2026 pattern of pull_request_target "pwn request" abuse feeding npm-ecosystem backdoors, and the load-bearing control gap is a CI/CD one: any workflow that triggers on pull_request_target and then checks out untrusted PR code runs attacker code with access to repository secrets. Audit your own Actions workflows for that pattern, and — because the payload runs on import rather than install — a --ignore-scripts install policy does not neutralise it; only pinning to known-good versions and rebuilding from a clean state does.

Triage: a legitimate require() of AsyncAPI tooling performs no runtime network activity; the signal is a detached Node child process spawned from an npm/node parent at import time that reaches out to an IPFS gateway or a peer-to-peer mesh and then creates a user-level persistence service — process-lineage telemetry (a script interpreter spawning a hidden detached child with outbound egress) plus a new systemd/user-service artifact created outside a package-manager transaction is the discriminator, since benign build tooling produces neither.