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Beagle

tool · tool:beagle-fake-claude-stac4713-2026

Backdoor distributed via a fake Claude AI site (claude-pro[.]com): DonutLoader plus DLL sideloading against a signed G DATA AV updater (Sophos STAC4713).

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-05-10
Latest activity
2026-05-10
Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
4
3 hosts

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-10Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed G DATA AV updater
    research

Hunting pivots

Tags
infostealerphishing
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 2 tactics)

2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionHijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • StealthHijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL

Execution TA0002

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Beagle (1)

2026-05-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed G DATA AV updater

Sophos X-Ops (cluster STAC4713) published a write-up on 2026-05-07 of a malvertising campaign using the counterfeit claude-pro[.]com site to distribute a previously-undocumented Windows backdoor named Beagle (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07 · Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10 (earlier wave)). The chain delivers a 505 MB ZIP archive containing a malicious MSI that sideloads an attacker-controlled DLL alongside a legitimate, signed G DATA antivirus updater executable (T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading). The first-stage DonutLoader shellcode then fetches and injects Beagle into memory. Beagle communicates with license.claude-pro[.]com over TCP/443 and UDP/8080 with AES-encrypted payloads; supported commands are cmd, upload, download, ls. Sophos notes TTP similarity with PlugX operators (BRONZE PRESIDENT / Dragon Breath clusters) but explicitly does not confirm attribution. The campaign's distribution infrastructure was established March 2026 with samples observed in February, April and May.

The targeting class is the operationally important part: counterfeit AI-tooling sites lure technical users (developers, ML engineers, IT admins) who often hold privileged access to source code, cloud environments, and secrets. Defenders should treat AI-tool installer downloads as a high-risk software class and require allow-listed sources (anthropic.com, claude.ai, OS package managers) rather than ad-hoc web search results.

research10 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →
Sources: Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07 · Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org2 (50%)
  • malwarebytes.com1 (25%)
  • sophos.com1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)