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Beagle

tool · tool:beagle-fake-claude-stac4713-2026

Windows backdoor distributed through a counterfeit Claude AI download site: DonutLoader shellcode plus DLL side-loading against a signed G DATA antivirus updater (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07).

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-10 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-10
Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Beagle tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-10NOTABLESophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed G DATA AV updater

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-10Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed G DATA AV updater
    research

Hunting pivots

ATT&CK techniques (11 across 6 tactics)

11 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Malvertising
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic · User Execution: Malicious File · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceBoot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationBoot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthIndicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window · Hijack Execution Flow · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
  • Command and ControlEncrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

Resource Development TA0042

T1583.008Acquire Infrastructure: Malvertising×1

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements. Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic×1

Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with no planned future evolutions, VB is integrated and supported in the .NET Framework and cross-platform .NET Core.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1

Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.003Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window×1

Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden. This may be utilized by system administrators to avoid disrupting user work environments when carrying out administrative tasks.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-05-10/sophos-beagle-backdoor-distributed-via-fake-claude-ai-site-u · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Beagle (1)

2026-05-10 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

Sophos: "Beagle" backdoor distributed via fake Claude AI site using DonutLoader + DLL sideloading on a signed G DATA AV updater

Sophos X-Ops published a write-up on 2026-05-07 of a counterfeit Claude AI site distributing a previously undocumented Windows backdoor it named Beagle, and assesses that the site is likely part of an active malvertising campaign (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07). The chain delivers a roughly 505 MB ZIP archive containing a malicious MSI that drops a legitimate, signed G DATA antivirus updater executable, an encrypted data file and an attacker-controlled DLL into the user's startup folder, so the updater sideloads the malicious DLL (DLL side-loading) (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07). The DLL decrypts the data file and executes the resulting Donut (DonutLoader) shellcode, an open-source in-memory loader, which loads Beagle (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07). Beagle communicates with a subdomain of the same lookalike site over TCP/443 and UDP/8080 with AES-encrypted payloads, and its eight commands are uninstall, cmd, upload, download, mkdir, rename, ls and rm (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07). Sophos notes that an almost identical G DATA sideloading chain has previously been associated with PlugX, which several threat groups use, and suggests the Beagle payload may reflect an actor retooling or imitating another actor's chain. It does not attribute the campaign (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07). A possible hosting server was set up in March 2026, and Sophos found related samples reusing the same XOR key from February, March and April 2026, while cautioning that further evidence would be needed to link them to the same actor (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07).

Sophos places the campaign in a wider pattern of threat actors crafting lures that imitate legitimate AI sites, often through malvertising (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07).

Contradiction: Malwarebytes, describing the same archive, identifies the payload as PlugX, by analogy with an earlier campaign that used the same G DATA sideloading files (Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10), while Sophos analysed it as a previously undocumented backdoor it named Beagle (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07).

Triage: the updater is a legitimately signed G DATA binary, so the parent process can look benign to endpoint tools; by inference from Malwarebytes' sandbox and dropper-script analysis, the discriminator is the sequence, in which WScript.exe writes the updater, the DLL it loads from its own directory and an encrypted data file into a user's Startup folder and starts the updater with a hidden window while the freshly installed Claude application opens in the foreground (Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10).

Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditsummarybodyclassificationtechniques

The description above previously tied the campaign to Sophos's STAC4713 cluster, which Sophos mentions only for AdaptixC2 activity linked to a separate March sample. Sophos lists eight Beagle commands, dates the related samples to February, March and April 2026, and does not claim TTP similarity with named PlugX clusters or say who the lures target. It assesses the lookalike site as likely, not confirmed, part of an active malvertising campaign (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07).

Malwarebytes' report of 2026-04-10 covers the same attack, not an earlier wave. Sophos refers to it as coverage of this attack, and both describe the same download archive (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-05-07; Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10).

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-audittagssectorstechniquesbody

Malwarebytes gives a host check for the trojanized installer: it puts a working copy of Claude under a misspelled lookalike of the Claude directory name inside the Anthropic program folder. Its VBScript dropper, run by WScript.exe, copies the three sideloading files into the user's Startup folder and starts the signed G DATA updater with a hidden window, and a signed parent like this can look benign to endpoint tools (Malwarebytes, 2026-04-10).

research10 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • malwarebytes.com1 (50%)
  • sophos.com1 (50%)