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ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025 – Q1 2026

report · report:eset-apt-activity-report-q4-2025-q1-2026-sandworm-lazarus

ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026

Coverage timeline
2
first 2026-05-25 → last 2026-05-30
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Sources cited
3
3 hosts
Sections touched
2
research, weekly-annual-reports
Co-occurring entities
0
no co-occurrence
ATT&CK techniques
0
no mapped behavior yet

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-30ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset
    research
  2. 2026-05-25ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026 — three state programmes converging on EU energy, defence and edge appliances
    weekly-annual-reports

Where this entity is cited

  • weekly-annual-reports1
  • research1

Source distribution

  • cisa.gov1 (33%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (33%)
  • welivesecurity.com1 (33%)

explore in graph

Entries about ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025 – Q1 2026 (2)

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset

ESET published its APT Activity Report covering October 2025 through March 2026 on 28 May 2026 (ESET WeLiveSecurity, 2026-05-28). EU- and NATO-relevant findings for public-sector defenders: Sandworm (Russia/GRU) intensified destructive winter operations against Ukrainian infrastructure and targeted a Polish energy company in December 2025 — a NATO member state critical-infrastructure attack attributed with medium confidence; this represents continued Sandworm willingness to conduct wiper operations beyond Ukraine's borders. Sednit/APT28 deployed Covenant and BeardShell implants against Ukrainian military, drone manufacturers, and logistics companies. Lazarus Group ran Operation DreamJob targeting European drone manufacturers — ESET assesses this as technology acquisition for North Korea's weapons programme. Operation DangerousPassword compromised the axios JavaScript library (100+ million weekly npm downloads), injecting trojanised code and demonstrating ongoing North Korea supply-chain interest in developer ecosystem targeting. UNC5221 (China-nexus) deployed a new implant assessed as part of the SPAWN toolset, specifically targeting Ivanti VPN appliances (Connect Secure, Policy Secure); organisations running unpatched Ivanti VPN should audit for SPAWN toolset artefacts including SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNMOLE tunneller, SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor, and SPAWNSLOTH log-tampering utility. The report PDF is available at https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/threat-reports/eset-apt-activity-report-q4-2025-q1-2026.pdf. Key defender actions: (a) confirm Sandworm wiper detection capability (file-destruction followed by MBR/VBR overwrite patterns, VSS deletion); (b) review Ivanti VPN logs for SPAWN footprints per CISA AA24-060A indicators; (c) audit npm dependency trees for axios versions <1.8.0 or 0.x released after the DangerousPassword campaign window.

annual-report30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-05-25 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026 — three state programmes converging on EU energy, defence and edge appliances

ESET's APT Activity Report covering Q4 2025–Q1 2026 landed mid-window (first covered 2026-05-30). The daily recapped the headline findings — a rare out-of-Ukraine Sandworm destructive incident (a medium-confidence December 2025 attack on a single Polish energy company), Lazarus targeting the EU drone/defence sector, and UNC5221 pivoting to the Ivanti SPAWN toolset. The synthesis a daily reader could not see from those three bullets is that they are the same story told by three different state programmes: Russia-, North-Korea- and China-nexus operators are independently converging on (a) European energy and defence-industrial-base supply chains as the target set — Sandworm's move against a Polish energy target being notable precisely because the operator rarely acts destructively outside Ukraine — and (b) internet-facing edge appliances (Ivanti) as the entry vector. For a Swiss / European public-sector SOC the implication is a prioritisation argument rather than a new IOC list: edge-appliance patch SLAs and defence-supplier third-party-risk review are where all three programmes are applying pressure simultaneously, so they should outrank generic campaign awareness in the next planning cycle. The report reinforces, with cross-actor telemetry, the structural shift the W21 Verizon DBIR and Rapid7 reports flagged — exploitation of exposed software as the dominant access vector.

annual-report25 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗