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ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025 – Q1 2026

report · report:eset-apt-activity-report-q4-2025-q1-2026-sandworm-lazarus

ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-30 → last 2026-05-30
Latest activity
2026-05-30
ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector…
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
energy
sectors: energy, defense, technology · regions: europe
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-30ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset
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Entries about ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025 – Q1 2026 (1)

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset

ESET published its APT Activity Report covering October 2025 through March 2026 on 28 May 2026 (ESET WeLiveSecurity, 2026-05-28). EU- and NATO-relevant findings for public-sector defenders: Sandworm (Russia/GRU) intensified destructive winter operations against Ukrainian infrastructure and targeted a Polish energy company in December 2025; a NATO member state critical-infrastructure attack attributed with medium confidence; this represents continued Sandworm willingness to conduct wiper operations beyond Ukraine's borders. Sednit/APT28 deployed Covenant and BeardShell implants against Ukrainian military, drone manufacturers, and logistics companies. Lazarus Group ran Operation DreamJob targeting European drone manufacturers, ESET assesses this as technology acquisition for North Korea's weapons programme. Operation DangerousPassword compromised the axios JavaScript library (100+ million weekly npm downloads), injecting trojanised code and demonstrating ongoing North Korea supply-chain interest in developer ecosystem targeting. UNC5221 (China-nexus) deployed a new implant assessed as part of the SPAWN toolset, specifically targeting Ivanti VPN appliances (Connect Secure, Policy Secure); organisations running unpatched Ivanti VPN should audit for SPAWN toolset artefacts including SPAWNANT installer, SPAWNMOLE tunneller, SPAWNSNAIL SSH backdoor, and SPAWNSLOTH log-tampering utility. The report PDF is available at https://web-assets.esetstatic.com/wls/en/papers/threat-reports/eset-apt-activity-report-q4-2025-q1-2026.pdf. Key defender actions: (a) confirm Sandworm wiper detection capability (file-destruction followed by MBR/VBR overwrite patterns, VSS deletion); (b) review Ivanti VPN logs for SPAWN footprints per CISA AA24-060A indicators; (c) audit npm dependency trees for axios versions <1.8.0 or 0.x released after the DangerousPassword campaign window.

annual-report30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • cisa.gov1 (33%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (33%)
  • welivesecurity.com1 (33%)