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ANSSI REACTIV situation report no. 1 (September 2026)

report · report:anssi-reactiv-situation-report-2026-09 single-source-national-cert

First situation report of ANSSI's REACTIV operation, published 2026-09-30: 99 data breaches reported against French state services since 2026-08-01, 67 confirmed, with recurring causes in Metabase CVE-2026-72898 exploitation, infostealer credentials without a second factor, IDOR flaws, weak or missing MFA and compromise through suppliers; the figures are provisional (ANSSI / CERT-FR, 2026-09-30).

Aliases: CERTFR-2026-CTI-006, ANSSI REACTIV point de situation

Coverage
1
first 2026-10-02 → last 2026-11-13
Latest activity
2026-11-13
ANSSI's second REACTIV report: 64 new breaches, reuse of stolen secrets the one technique; SMS 2FA and IDOR…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
4
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about ANSSI REACTIV situation report no. 1 (September 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-02NOTABLEANSSI's second REACTIV report: 64 new breaches, reuse of stolen secrets the one technique; SMS 2FA and IDOR cases

Exposure · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

documents

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-02ANSSI's REACTIV situation reports on French state data breaches: 99 since 1 August in the first, driven by Metabase CVE-2026-72898, infostealer credentials without MFA, IDOR flaws and supplier rebound, and 64 more in the second, which names the reuse of stolen secrets as the one recurring technique
    researchANSSI's second REACTIV report: 64 new breaches, reuse of stolen secrets the one technique; SMS 2FA and IDOR cases

Hunting pivots

Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 4 tactics)

3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application · Trusted Relationship
  • PersistenceValid Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-02/anssi-reactiv-situation-report-99-state-data-breaches · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about ANSSI REACTIV situation report no. 1 (September 2026) (1)

2026-10-02 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOA2

ANSSI's REACTIV situation reports on French state data breaches: 99 since 1 August in the first, driven by Metabase CVE-2026-72898, infostealer credentials without MFA, IDOR flaws and supplier rebound, and 64 more in the second, which names the reuse of stolen secrets as the one recurring technique

ANSSI published the first situation report of its REACTIV operation on 2026-09-30, set up after the Prime Minister asked on 2026-09-01 for a reinforced response capability for state services, including the power to have ministries take urgent measures within tight deadlines (ANSSI, 2026-09-30). Since 2026-08-01, 99 data breaches have been reported to ANSSI, 67 of them confirmed and 32 of those still being handled by the agency, and the report says its figures are provisional (ANSSI, 2026-09-30). It names the recurring causes: mass exploitation of the Metabase SQL injection CVE-2026-72898 since early August, with nine ministry instances compromised and a fix available since 2026-08-06; credentials stolen by infostealers on personal devices used for work, or taken from earlier breaches, that opened exposed services without a second factor; IDOR flaws, sometimes combined with other weaknesses, that allowed mass document exfiltration; missing or weak MFA, an email second factor counting as weak; compromise by rebound through a supplier that held ministry data; and, less often, missing authorization checks, SQL injection and exposed files (ANSSI, 2026-09-30). ANSSI asked all ministries to inventory their Metabase instances and verify they are updated (ANSSI, 2026-09-30).

ANSSI's second report, published on 2026-11-12, counts 64 further breaches brought to its attention since 2026-09-30, five of them at ministries or bodies under their supervision, and says they all exploit the weaknesses already listed in September, naming the reuse of stolen secrets to reach ministry applications as the technique, with renewing compromised secrets as the first containment step (ANSSI, 2026-11-12).

The report's incident summaries show the shape of the losses: a compromised Tchap account of an Education nationale agent was used to read public and private rooms it already had access to and the conversations were exfiltrated; a claimed IDOR data leak on a Service national universel portal would expose 275,000 users and is still under investigation; and the compromise of the subcontractor of the operator of a TRACFIN reporting portal's support module led to exfiltration of the contact data of 136 reporting entities and the content of 213 support requests, after which the administration ended its relationship with that supplier (ANSSI, 2026-09-30).

This vulnerability, of the SQL injection type, gives an unauthenticated user access to the database of the Metabase application and administrator rights on the instance. (translated from French)

Next (quoting the ANSSI report)

This document is a situation report that reflects ongoing investigations and rapidly evolving incidents. (translated from French)

ANSSI / CERT-FR (report page) 2026-09-30
Updaterun 2026-11-13T0256Z-inteltitleheadlinesummarysourcessourcing_notebody

ANSSI's second REACTIV situation report, published on 2026-11-12, counts 64 new data breaches brought to its attention since the first report of 2026-09-30, five of them at ministries or bodies under their supervision, with a significant fall in breaches detected or claimed at ministry level; it says all of them exploit weaknesses already named in September and gives the reuse of stolen secrets to reach ministry applications as the technique, which lets attackers extract the data legitimately (translated from French) (ANSSI, 2026-11-12). The new cases it describes: stolen technical accounts reused against a foreign-ministry library portal after a server compromise; an IDOR flaw in the payment API of a public registration portal for the hunting-licence exam, exposing more than a thousand people; an agent's France Travail account compromised with the SMS second factor validated, with the data of more than 60,000 agents and professionals claimed on a forum; and partner-account credentials from infostealers without two-factor authentication, combined with an IDOR flaw on a URL exposing file identifiers, which let attackers extract close to 1.2 million files from the CAF's VACAF service in three days. Education nationale is now put at 25 of 30 académies, with lateral movement over the interministerial network (ANSSI, 2026-11-12). ANSSI's recommendations are renewing compromised or suspect secrets first, systematic strong authentication, strict control of privileged accounts and tighter filtering to prevent exfiltration (ANSSI, 2026-11-12).

Builds on: Metabase Cloud was breached through its own 0-day; self-hosted instances stay vulnerable until… · DGFiP confirms a 678,000-record theft via a stolen agent account and a third party's…

research02 Oct 04:52Zsingle-source · national CERTOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • cert.ssi.gouv.fr2 (50%)
  • cert.cyber.gouv.fr1 (25%)
  • next.ink1 (25%)