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StorifyMe

product · product:storifyme

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-17 → last 2026-11-17
Latest activity
2026-11-17
OptimJack: poisoned vendor scripts route iPhones to exploit kits; Optimizely files also skim cards; Basel hit
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
education
sectors: education, finance, media · regions: switzerland
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about StorifyMe, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • List every page of your organisation's sites, and of the agencies that build them, that has loaded Optimizely project JavaScript, Kissmetrics i.js, a StorifyMe widget or the minute-ly loader since 2026-11-13, capture the bytes the browser receives and compare them with the provider's own project content, and where a file carries the injected loader remove it, keep the response bytes as evidence and treat the payment, login and form pages that loaded an affected Optimizely file as exposed to card and session theft.
    2026-11-17OptimJack: poisoned vendor scripts route iPhones to…

Defender insights

What each entry about StorifyMe tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-17HIGHOptimJack: poisoned vendor scripts route iPhones to exploit kits; Optimizely files also skim cards; Basel hit

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-17OptimJack: poisoned scripts served by Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly route iPhones to exploit-kit stages, the Optimizely files also carry a crypto clipper and card skimmer, and the University of Basel site loaded a poisoned StorifyMe widget on 2026-11-14
    active-threatsOptimJack: poisoned vendor scripts route iPhones to exploit kits; Optimizely files also skim cards; Basel hit

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
StorifyMe
ATT&CK techniques (9 across 5 tactics)

9 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
  • Credential AccessInput Capture · Steal Web Session Cookie
  • CollectionInput Capture · Screen Capture · Clipboard Data
  • ImpactData Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation · Financial Theft

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1056Input Capture×1

Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1056Input Capture×1

Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be transparent to the user (e.g. Credential API Hooking) or rely on deceiving the user into providing input into what they believe to be a genuine service (e.g. Web Portal Capture).

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

T1113Screen Capture×1

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

T1115Clipboard Data×1

Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1565.002Data Manipulation: Transmitted Data Manipulation×1

Adversaries may alter data en route to storage or other systems in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating transmitted data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-11-17/optimjack-poisoned-vendor-scripts-skimmer-iphone-router · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about StorifyMe (1)

2026-11-17 · view entry permalink →

HIGHNATOB2

OptimJack: poisoned scripts served by Optimizely, Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and minute-ly route iPhones to exploit-kit stages, the Optimizely files also carry a crypto clipper and card skimmer, and the University of Basel site loaded a poisoned StorifyMe widget on 2026-11-14

Per Ohey, from 2026-11-13 the scripts served by Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Optimizely customer project files gained a few lines that load a small router script for iPhones, and minute-ly's loader was replaced outright (Ohey, 2026-11-17). Hudson Rock recovered nine poisoned vendor files itself, eight Optimizely project files and the minute-ly loader, matched 16 archived vendor responses from 15 site captures, and names 21 web properties, among them BBC, Zoom, GitLab's marketing site, HSBC UAE and the University of Basel (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16). The Basel capture, scanned on 2026-11-14 at 03:27 UTC, recorded a poisoned StorifyMe web component (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16). How the files were altered, who operates the campaign and how many visitors loaded them are unknown (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16).

The financial theft sits in the Optimizely files: Ohey says that on 2026-11-16 they switched to a script that swaps copied wallet addresses and skims card numbers in every browser and adds the router only on iPhones and iPads (Ohey, 2026-11-17). Hudson Rock describes the stealer as skimming card number, expiry and CVV from form and fetch POST bodies and conditionally sending readable cookies with an image of the page, and says a response that only delivers the router loader establishes the mobile-router path, not the theft modules (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16). The BBC and HSBC UAE Optimizely files also embed a complete fallback copy that runs when the remote fetch fails or takes longer than 2.5 seconds, so blocking the attacker host does not stop the clipper (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16). The router's configured branches, in Hudson Rock's reading of Ohey's captures, send iOS 13 to 17 to a Coruna-associated entry and iOS 18 to 25 to a DarkSword-labelled entry (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16), and Ohey states that DarkSword attacks iPhones running iOS 18.4 to 18.7.2 through Safari (Ohey, 2026-11-17); Hudson Rock stresses that these are delivery observations, not demonstrated iPhone compromises (Hudson Rock, 2026-11-16). GitLab's and Zoom's Optimizely files and minute-ly's loader still carried the code at 21:10 UTC on 2026-11-16 (Ohey, 2026-11-17).

The confirmed compromise is malicious code inside responses served from third-party providers’ own script and widget endpoints.

These are delivery observations, not demonstrated iPhone compromises.

A FAZ capture records a poisoned StorifyMe widget response. Later captures include Sydney Morning Herald, University of Basel and vidaXL.

A DNS or network block is useful, but it does not remove the poisoned trusted script.

Hudson Rock (InfoStealers) 2026-11-16

DarkSword attacks iPhones running iOS 18.4 to 18.7.2 through Safari.

GitLab's and Zoom's Optimizely files and minute-ly's loader still carried it at 21:10 UTC on 16 November.

Ohey (Kirk)

Builds on: DeadTag: expired tag domains send visitors to iPhone exploit kits; opening the page is enough… · APT29-linked watering hole uses n-day iOS and Chrome chains; CISA lists CVE-2024-27834; updated…

threat17 Nov 04:38Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • amirulcyber.com1 (33%)
  • infostealers.com1 (33%)
  • ohey.ca1 (33%)