2026-07-24NOTABLEexploitedIran-linked PLC intrusions now hit Schneider and Siemens gear; the fix is exposure and integrity checking, not a patch
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix
product · product:rockwell-automation-compactlogix
Coverage
1
first 2026-07-24 → last 2026-07-24
Latest activity
2026-07-24
Iran-linked PLC intrusions now hit Schneider and Siemens gear; the fix is exposure and integrity checking…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
energy
sectors: energy, water, public-sector · regions: us, europe
Sources cited
3
2 hosts
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Rockwell Automation CompactLogix, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Baseline the running logic and Add-On Instructions on any internet-reachable Rockwell, Schneider Modicon M340 or Siemens S7-1200 PLC against a known-good copy, and alert on unauthorised changes; the actors disable shutdown/alarm interlocks so HMI displays mask unsafe states.2026-07-24Iran-linked PLC intrusions now hit Schneider and…
Defender insights
What each entry about Rockwell Automation CompactLogix tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
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Releases covered
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 6 tactics)
3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
- Initial AccessValid Accounts
- PersistenceValid Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts
- ImpactData Manipulation
Reconnaissance TA0043
T1595Active Scanning×1
Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1565Data Manipulation×1
Adversaries may insert, delete, or manipulate data in order to influence external outcomes or hide activity, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, or decision making.
Evidence: 2026-07-24/cyberav3ngers-plc-aa26-097a-schneider-siemens-expansion · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Rockwell Automation CompactLogix (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- cisa.gov2 (67%)
- trendmicro.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- cisa.govCISA / FBI / NSA / EPA / DoE / USCYBERCOM / Treasury (joint advisory AA26-097A, updated)https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-097a
- cisa.govCISA Newshttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-fbi-epa-and-us-government-partners-update-warning-iran-affiliated-threat-actors-targeting
- trendmicro.comTrend Micro Researchhttps://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/26/g/plc-exploitation.html