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GitHub Enterprise Server

product · product:github-enterprise-server single-source

Coverage
2
first 2026-10-27 → last 2026-11-14
Latest activity
2026-11-14
GitLab critical patch: a merge request can reach a Git heap overflow on Gitaly; update to 19.5.4, 19.4.6 or…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
8
7 hosts

Action items (2)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about GitHub Enterprise Server, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Upgrade every self-managed GitLab to 19.5.4, 19.4.6 or 19.3.8 now (self-compiled installs rebuild the Git in Gitaly and the Git at git.bin_path, or move the distribution Git to 2.56.1 or later) and, where that waits, limit who can create projects and sign up, because a user who can open a merge request reaches the flaw and code execution gives access to every repository on the Gitaly node.
    2026-11-14CVE-2026-105437 +1
  • In every GitHub organisation your teams or suppliers administer, private repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server included, search for branches named ci-sync- plus six random characters that add only the workflow file sync-check.yml, and for any workflow run on them; for every hit, rotate all repository, organisation and environment secrets that repository could read and revoke the token that pushed the commit, because deleting the run or the branch does not undo the exposure.
    2026-10-27Gheist abuses stolen GitHub tokens to dump secrets…

Defender insights

What each entry about GitHub Enterprise Server tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-14NOTABLEGitLab critical patch: a merge request can reach a Git heap overflow on Gitaly; update to 19.5.4, 19.4.6 or 19.3.8

Exposure · detection

2026-10-27NOTABLEGheist abuses stolen GitHub tokens to dump secrets through Actions; GitHub's hold covers public repositories only

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-14CVE-2026-105437, GitLab self-managed 19.5.4, 19.4.6 and 19.3.8 critical patch release: a heap overflow in Git's merge code that a user who can open a merge request can trigger for command execution as the git user on the Gitaly node; Git 2.56.1 also fixes CVE-2026-111760, code execution when a malicious repository is cloned with submodules; no exploitation reported
    trending-vulnerabilitiesGitLab critical patch: a merge request can reach a Git heap overflow on Gitaly; update to 19.5.4, 19.4.6 or 19.3.8
  2. 2026-10-27Gheist: stolen GitHub tokens plant a secret-dumping workflow in every repository they reach; GitHub's July approval hold stops it on public github.com repositories but not on private ones or GitHub Enterprise Server
    active-threatsGheist abuses stolen GitHub tokens to dump secrets through Actions; GitHub's hold covers public repositories only

Hunting pivots

Releases covered
GitHub Enterprise Server ×2
ATT&CK techniques (9 across 9 tactics)

9 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • ExecutionExploitation for Client Execution
  • PersistenceValid Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts · Escape to Host
  • StealthIndicator Removal · Valid Accounts
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials
  • Lateral MovementUse Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token
  • CollectionData from Information Repositories: Code Repositories
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over Web Service

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-14/gitlab-critical-patch-git-merge-overflow-cve-2026-105437 · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-11-14/gitlab-critical-patch-git-merge-overflow-cve-2026-105437 · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

T1611Escape to Host×1

Adversaries may break out of a container or virtualized environment to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized or virtualized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized / virtualized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070Indicator Removal×1

Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552Unsecured Credentials×1

Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Shell History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1550.001Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token×1

Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1213.003Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories×1

Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1567Exfiltration Over Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services.

Evidence: 2026-10-27/gheist-stolen-github-tokens-secret-dumping-workflows · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about GitHub Enterprise Server (2)

2026-11-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLECVE-2026-105437 +1NATOA2

CVE-2026-105437, GitLab self-managed 19.5.4, 19.4.6 and 19.3.8 critical patch release: a heap overflow in Git's merge code that a user who can open a merge request can trigger for command execution as the git user on the Gitaly node; Git 2.56.1 also fixes CVE-2026-111760, code execution when a malicious repository is cloned with submodules; no exploitation reported

GitLab shipped an ad-hoc critical patch release on 2026-11-10, 19.5.4, 19.4.6 and 19.3.8 for CE and EE, for CVE-2026-105437, a vulnerability in Git that under certain conditions gives out-of-bounds heap writes that could run arbitrary commands in Gitaly's environment; it affects all versions from 16.2 before 19.3.8, 19.4 before 19.4.6 and 19.5 before 19.5.4, while GitLab.com and Dedicated already run a patched version (GitLab, 2026-11-10). GitLab's detection page says any user who can create a project and open a merge request reaches the flaw, which gives command execution as the git operating-system user and read and write access to every repository on that Gitaly node (GitLab, 2026-11-12).

Git 2.56.1 and the backports 2.55.1, 2.54.1, 2.53.1, 2.52.1, 2.51.3 and 2.50.2 of 2026-11-10 fix the same flaw and five others (GitHub Blog, 2026-11-10). The one that matters on workstations and CI runners is CVE-2026-111760: a long path that passes validation is written as .git and replaces a freshly cloned submodule's .git file with a symlink to a directory that holds attacker hooks or configuration, which GitHub says can execute attacker-controlled code during a recursive clone (oss-security, 2026-11-11; GitHub Blog, 2026-11-10). The maintainers believe it is only triggerable with --recurse-submodules and note that such a repository fails fsck, which does not protect downstream users, since an innocuous-looking .gitmodules pointing at it suffices (oss-security, 2026-11-11). GitHub Enterprise Server fixes are in 3.19.15, 3.20.11, 3.21.9 and 3.22.4, and GitHub is coordinating releases of GitHub Desktop and the Copilot app with patched Git (GitHub Blog, 2026-11-10); Git for Windows 2.56.1.windows.1 addresses the issue (Git for Windows, 2026-11-10). No source reports exploitation; GitLab documents a lab reproduction in which opening one merge request left a crash entry within a second and a half (GitLab, 2026-11-12).

In GitLab, under certain conditions, this vulnerability in git can result in out-of-bounds heap writes, which could be used to execute arbitrary commands within GitLab’s Gitaly environment.

Arbitrary command execution in the Gitaly environment, as the git operating system user, by any authenticated user who can create a project.

GitLab
vulnerability14 Nov 04:12Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-10-27 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Gheist: stolen GitHub tokens plant a secret-dumping workflow in every repository they reach; GitHub's July approval hold stops it on public github.com repositories but not on private ones or GitHub Enterprise Server

Wiz Research has tracked since 2026-09-15 a campaign it calls Gheist, after the user agent on its API calls, that uses stolen GitHub access tokens to create a branch and commit a workflow named sync-check in every repository each token can reach: more than 13,500 planted branches from more than 850 compromised accounts, from personal projects to private enterprise repositories (Wiz, 2026-10-25). Wiz traces the tokens to infostealer logs and earlier supply-chain compromises (Wiz, 2026-10-25). The push triggers the workflow, which prints the repository's secrets, and those of any deployment environment, into its own run log; GitHub masks secret values only when they appear verbatim, so a base32-encoded value prints in full, the tool downloads the log through the GitHub API and deletes the run seconds later, and because the secrets leave through GitHub's own API there is no attacker domain or connection to block (Wiz, 2026-10-25). In enterprise organizations the tool cycled through the tokens of several users and automation accounts within minutes and cloned private repositories before planting the workflow; hours later cloud credentials from the same organization were used to enumerate AWS Secrets Manager (Wiz, 2026-10-25). Around 2026-10-19 the second variant added a job for repositories with a self-hosted runner that searches the host, and through the Docker socket its root filesystem, for tokens, private keys, environment files and Terraform state; Wiz calls the job buggy (Wiz, 2026-10-25).

Since 2026-07-28 GitHub holds potentially malicious workflow runs in public repositories until a collaborator approves them, and every public Gheist run Wiz checked stayed held; the hold applies to public repositories on github.com only and not to GitHub Enterprise Server (Wiz, 2026-10-25; GitHub, 2026-07-28). In private repositories and GitHub Enterprise environments Wiz saw runs on the attacker branches complete and be deleted, and cloud audit logs showed the organizations' own workflows running on those branches and assuming AWS roles (Wiz, 2026-10-25). As of 2026-10-24 Wiz called the attack ongoing and distinct from the earlier GhostAction campaign (Wiz, 2026-10-25).

Triage: the planted commit is unsigned but authored as the token's owner, so the author name alone proves nothing; one new workflow file with a fixed commit message on a branch the owner did not create is the pattern (Wiz, 2026-10-25).

We have recovered more than 13,500 planted branches from more than 850 compromised accounts, ranging from personal projects to enterprise organizations' private repositories.

GitHub masks secret values in logs only when they appear verbatim.

Unfortunately, that hold doesn't apply to private repositories or GitHub Enterprise Server.

Wiz Research 2026-10-25

This protection currently applies to public repositories on github.com only.

GitHub (changelog) 2026-07-28

Builds on: GhostAction: fake security workflows now harvest whole git histories; rotating Actions secrets…

threat27 Oct 03:54Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1
  • Vulns1

Source distribution

  • github.blog2 (25%)
  • docs.gitlab.com1 (12%)
  • github.com1 (12%)
  • gitlab.com1 (12%)
  • openwall.com1 (12%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (12%)
  • wiz.io1 (12%)