2026-07-26NOTABLEAn espionage toolkit that only decrypts its final implant on the target machine, and talks C2 through the Telegram Bot API
OctLurk
malware · malware:octlurk single-source
Plugin-based Windows backdoor deployed against government, healthcare, research, law-enforcement and education organisations in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Syria since at least January 2025. Delivered by a malicious loader DLL invoked through a repointed Windows service ServiceMain value, which decrypts its payload with a hard-coded key plus a second key derived from the victim machine's C: drive serial number and loads it reflectively into memory. Pulls File Manager, Command Shell and Interaction Manager plugins directly from its command server into memory (Kaspersky GReAT, 2026-07-30).
Coverage
2
first 2026-07-26 → last 2026-08-10
Latest activity
2026-08-10
An espionage toolkit that only decrypts its final implant on the target machine, and talks C2 through the…
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, energy, healthcare · regions: middle-east, apac, russia-cis
Sources cited
3
2 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about OctLurk tells a defender to do, newest first.
Latest update · triage
Triage · detection
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
overlaps with
- SilkLurkKaspersky assesses with medium confidence that the same unattributed Chinese-speaking actor is behind both, on shared loader architecture and overlapping victims.
has variant
- BINDCLOAKZscaler ThreatLabz assesses with high confidence that BINDCLOAK is a variant of OctLurk, an assessment of family relationship, carried at the confidence the source states and never upgraded to an identity claim
Story timeline
- 2026-07-31OctLurk and SilkLurk, sibling plugin backdoors whose loaders key their payload decryption to the victim machine itself, deployed against Central Asian and Syrian government bodies
- 2026-07-26TELESHIM / MIXEDKEY / BINDCLOAK, DLL side-loading under a legitimate vendor binary, Telegram-API C2 and volume-serial environmental keying against government networks
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (23 across 8 tactics)
23 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token · Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Indicator Removal: Timestomp · Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft · Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token · Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL · Reflective Code Loading
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · Input Capture: Keylogging · Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- DiscoveryNetwork Service Discovery · Process Discovery · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
- CollectionInput Capture: Keylogging · Screen Capture · Email Collection · Clipboard Data
- Command and ControlNon-Application Layer Protocol · Web Service: Bidirectional Communication · Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding · Remote Access Tools
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. The Windows command shell (cmd) is the primary command prompt on Windows systems. The Windows command prompt can be used to control almost any aspect of a system, with various permission levels required for different subsets of commands. The command prompt can be invoked remotely via Remote Services such as SSH.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1134.003Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token×1
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×2
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1
Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1134.001Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft×1
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using `DuplicateToken` or `DuplicateTokenEx`. The token can then be used with `ImpersonateLoggedOnUser` to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with `SetThreadToken` to assign the impersonated token to a thread.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1134.003Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate Token×1
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1480.001Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying×1
Adversaries may environmentally key payloads or other features of malware to evade defenses and constraint execution to a specific target environment. Environmental keying uses cryptography to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Environmental keying is an implementation of Execution Guardrails that utilizes cryptographic techniques for deriving encryption/decryption keys from specific types of values in a given computing environment.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1620Reflective Code Loading×2
Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003OS Credential Dumping×1
Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1046Network Service Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port, vulnerability, and/or wordlist scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1057Process Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging×1
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1113Screen Capture×1
Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1114Email Collection×1
Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
T1115Clipboard Data×1
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol×1
Adversaries may use an OSI non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network. The list of possible protocols is extensive. Specific examples include use of network layer protocols, such as the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), transport layer protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), session layer protocols, such as Socket Secure (SOCKS), as well as redirected/tunneled protocols, such as Serial over LAN (SOL).
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication×1
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1132.002Data Encoding: Non-Standard Encoding×1
Adversaries may encode data with a non-standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a non-standard data encoding system that diverges from existing protocol specifications. Non-standard data encoding schemes may be based on or related to standard data encoding schemes, such as a modified Base64 encoding for the message body of an HTTP request.
Evidence: 2026-07-26/teleshim-bindcloak-volume-serial-keying-government-espionage · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-07-31/octlurk-silklurk-service-dll-plugin-backdoors-government · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about OctLurk (2)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- zscaler.com2 (67%)
- securelist.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- securelist.comKaspersky GReAThttps://securelist.com/octlurk-silklurk-backdoors-central-asia/120840/
- zscaler.comZscaler ThreatLabzhttps://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/targeted-attack-government-entities-middle-east-part-1
- zscaler.comZscaler ThreatLabzhttps://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/targeted-attack-government-entities-middle-east-part-2