ctipilot.ch

msaRAT

malware · malware:msarat single-source

Rust-based RAT deployed by the Chaos ransomware group that establishes C2 exclusively by driving a headless Chrome/Edge instance via the Chrome DevTools Protocol, tunnelling commands over a WebRTC DataChannel relayed through Cloudflare Workers (signalling) and a Twilio TURN server (media relay), double-encrypted with DTLS + ChaCha20-Poly1305; the RAT process itself never makes a direct network connection (Cisco Talos, 2026-07-23).

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-07-24 → last 2026-07-24
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
1
1 hosts
Sections touched
1
research
Co-occurring entities
1
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
4
pinned v19.1 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

4 techniques observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1059.007Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript×1

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.

Evidence: 2026-07-24/msarat-chaos-cdp-webrtc-covert-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-07-24/msarat-chaos-cdp-webrtc-covert-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1

Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.

Evidence: 2026-07-24/msarat-chaos-cdp-webrtc-covert-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1

Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.

Evidence: 2026-07-24/msarat-chaos-cdp-webrtc-covert-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-24msaRAT: Chaos ransomware's Rust RAT builds C2 through the Chrome DevTools Protocol so the malware process never opens a socket
    researchTalos dissects a RAT that offloads all C2 into a headless browser via CDP and WebRTC — process-to-socket attribution sees only Chrome

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

used by

Where this entity is cited

  • research1

Source distribution

  • blog.talosintelligence.com1 (100%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about msaRAT (1)

2026-07-24 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

msaRAT: Chaos ransomware's Rust RAT builds C2 through the Chrome DevTools Protocol so the malware process never opens a socket

Cisco Talos documented msaRAT, a Rust-based remote-access trojan deployed by the Chaos ransomware-as-a-service group, whose architecture is built to defeat the "which process opened this socket" heuristic that endpoint tooling relies on (Cisco Talos, 2026-07-23). The RAT process itself opens no external network connection. Instead it launches and controls a headless Chrome/Edge instance through the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a legitimate browser-debugging API: it connects to the browser's local CDP WebSocket (127.0.0.1 only), registers CDP bindings, and uses Runtime.evaluate to inject JavaScript that fetches STUN/TURN configuration from a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, negotiates a WebRTC PeerConnection/DataChannel (ICE plus SDP offer/answer over HTTP POST to the same Workers endpoint), and routes all subsequent C2 commands over that DataChannel through a Twilio TURN relay, double-encrypted with DTLS plus ChaCha20-Poly1305 (Cisco Talos, 2026-07-23). Because every externally-visible connection originates from the signed browser binary rather than the malware, network- and process-attribution telemetry shows only ordinary Chrome/Edge traffic to Cloudflare and Twilio infrastructure that most estates already allow.

msaRAT never touches the network directly — it controls its C2 communication channel exclusively through Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a browser debugging API.

The binary contains a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, but it never makes HTTP connections to that domain itself; it offloads that work entirely to the browser.

Cisco Talos 2026-07-23
research24 Jul 04:36Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗
Sources: Cisco Talos