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MovieReaper

malware · malware:moviereaper single-source

Modular multi-stage Windows crimeware framework active since at least October 2025, distributed via a supply-chain compromise of the shared public torrent-file repository itorrents.org; uses the Solana blockchain as a dead-drop resolver for second-stage C2 and an ETW-thread-creation technique for in-memory shellcode execution (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-09-17).

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-09-18 → last 2026-09-18
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Sources cited
1
1 hosts
Sections touched
1
active-threats
Co-occurring entities
0
no co-occurrence
ATT&CK techniques
8
pinned v19.2 · see below

ATT&CK techniques

8 techniques observed across 1 entry, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1106Native API×1

Adversaries may interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to execute behaviors. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and processes. These native APIs are leveraged by the OS during system boot (when other system components are not yet initialized) as well as carrying out tasks and requests during routine operations.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1548.002Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control×1

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1

Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

T1620Reflective Code Loading×1

Adversaries may reflectively load code into a process in order to conceal the execution of malicious payloads. Reflective loading involves allocating then executing payloads directly within the memory of the process, vice creating a thread or process backed by a file path on disk (e.g., Shared Modules).

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-09-18/moviereaper-torrent-supply-chain-solana-c2 · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-18MovieReaper: a modular crimeware framework distributed via a torrent-file-repository supply-chain compromise, using the Solana blockchain as a C2 dead-drop resolver
    active-threatsKaspersky: a single compromised torrent-file repository silently poisoned magnet-link resolutions across many unrelated tracker sites

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • securelist.com1 (100%)

explore in graph

Entries about MovieReaper (1)

2026-09-18 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

MovieReaper: a modular crimeware framework distributed via a torrent-file-repository supply-chain compromise, using the Solana blockchain as a C2 dead-drop resolver

Kaspersky documents MovieReaper, a previously undocumented modular Windows crimeware framework active since at least October 2025, distributed through a supply-chain compromise of itorrents.org (a shared public repository many independent torrent trackers rely on to resolve magnet links) rather than trojanized installers on individual sites, so a single compromise reaches users across many unrelated tracker sites simultaneously (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-09-17). Several hundred victims are confirmed across enterprise, government, IT, consulting, retail, transportation and agriculture sectors, spanning Russia, Spain, Germany, Finland, Türkiye, Japan, Nepal, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana and others across Europe, Asia and Africa (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-09-17). After a user manually runs a first-stage loader disguised under a film-referencing filename, the loader resolves Windows API addresses by manually walking the PEB's loaded-module list rather than calling LoadLibrary or GetProcAddress, then registers a vectored exception handler that triggers a deliberate debug break to redirect control flow into a manually located raw syscall instruction inside ntdll and call NtProtectVirtualMemory directly, before invoking the undocumented ntdll export EtwpCreateEtwThread, which Kaspersky describes as a popular alternative to CreateThread, to execute the mapped shellcode (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-09-17). The second stage queries the legitimate Solana blockchain's public getAccountInfo RPC endpoint to retrieve an XOR-encrypted C2 address, a dead-drop pattern that lets operators rotate infrastructure without touching the malware itself. A third stage performs a UAC bypass and persistence, masquerades as a Windows Telemetry executable, and hands off to a final remote-file-manager module exposing 21 filesystem commands, including preview commands Kaspersky reads as built for pre-exfiltration triage of image and document contents.

we have discovered a previously unknown modular, multi-stage framework that we dubbed MovieReaper

the threat actors did not compromise the torrent trackers themselves. Instead, they compromised a widely used public repository of torrent files

By using Solana blockchain network as a distribution layer of endpoints for a next stage attackers may increase stability of their campaign and resist takedown efforts of defenders.

Kaspersky (Securelist) 2026-09-17
threat18 Sep 04:58Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗