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THORChain vault drain

incident · incident:thorchain-gg20-tss-vault-drain-11m-nine-chains-switzerland

THORChain vault drain: about $10.7M taken on 2026-05-15 from one of the Switzerland-based protocol's five vaults by its own count (TRM Labs: more than USD 11M across at least nine chains), by a validator churned in two days earlier that exploited THORChain's GG20 threshold-signature implementation (THORChain, 2026-05-20).

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-18 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-05-18
Switzerland-based THORChain lost about $10.7M when a newly joined validator broke its GG20 threshold signing
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
finance
sectors: finance · regions: switzerland
Sources cited
7
6 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about THORChain vault drain tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-18NOTABLESwitzerland-based THORChain lost about $10.7M when a newly joined validator broke its GG20 threshold signing

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-18THORChain vault drain, about $10.7M from one vault: a newly joined validator exploited GG20 threshold signing (Switzerland-based protocol)
    active-threatsSwitzerland-based THORChain lost about $10.7M when a newly joined validator broke its GG20 threshold signing
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 2 tactics)

2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Credential AccessExploitation for Credential Access
  • ImpactFinancial Theft

Credential Access TA0006

T1212Exploitation for Credential Access×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code.

Evidence: 2026-05-18/thorchain-gg20-threshold-signature-scheme-vault-drain-11m-ac · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1657Financial Theft×1

Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, "pig butchering," bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks.

Evidence: 2026-05-18/thorchain-gg20-threshold-signature-scheme-vault-drain-11m-ac · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about THORChain vault drain (1)

2026-05-18 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

THORChain vault drain, about $10.7M from one vault: a newly joined validator exploited GG20 threshold signing (Switzerland-based protocol)

On 2026-05-15 an attacker drained about $10.7M from one of THORChain's five vaults, and the other four were unaffected (THORChain, 2026-05-20); THORChain's post-mortem of 2026-07-03 puts the loss at about $10M (THORChain, 2026-07-03). The Record reported one of six vaults and about $10.7M (The Record, 2026-05-15), and TRM Labs more than USD 11M across nine chains (TRM Labs, 2026-05-15). THORChain, a cross-chain liquidity protocol founded in 2018 and based in Switzerland, said initial indications were that user funds were safe and only protocol-owned funds were affected (The Record, 2026-05-15).

THORChain confirmed on the evening of 2026-05-15 that the attack exploited its GG20 threshold-signature (TSS) implementation to leak key material progressively, and that the attacker was a node operator churned into the validator set two days earlier (THORChain, 2026-05-20). Its post-mortem describes the chain: at vault setup the attacker published a Paillier key built from several small primes instead of two large ones, which passed because the library only screened out a handful of tiny factors; it then deliberately failed the MTA step of signing 864 times over two and a half days, each failure looking like routine node flakiness while leaking a fragment of other validators' key shares, until it could sign outbound transactions alone (THORChain, 2026-07-03). Two further weaknesses made the leak deterministic, a range proof whose two halves were never tied together and a blinding value drawn from far too small a range; all three sat in THORChain's fork (v0.1.6) of Binance's tss-lib, which upstream had fixed as individually minor issues in v2.0.0 (August 2023) and v3.0.0 (2024) (THORChain, 2026-07-03). THORChain says only the Paillier-modulus condition matches public research, the class documented in 2023 as BitForge and TSSHOCK (THORChain, 2026-07-03); the 2023 disclosures include Fireblocks' CVE-2023-33241 on unchecked Paillier moduli (Fireblocks, 2023-08-09) and Verichains' TSSHOCK attacks on threshold-signing proofs and their encoding (Verichains, 2023-08-10).

The solvency checker halted signing and trading on several chains within about 52 minutes, but only after the funds had left, because the attacker signed with the reconstructed key (THORChain, 2026-05-20). Chainalysis traced attacker-linked funds through Monero, Hyperliquid and Arbitrum from late April, including the ETH that bonded the malicious validator, CryptoTimes reports (CryptoTimes, 2026-05-17). TRM Labs had not attributed the theft to any actor as of 2026-05-15, while calling THORChain the bridge of choice for laundering North Korea's largest thefts (TRM Labs, 2026-05-15). Every validator has since upgraded to v3.19.1, and THORChain plans to replace GG20 with DKLS or Schnorr-based signing (THORChain, 2026-07-03).

Triage: failed signing rounds are routine, since validators go offline or miss timing windows; the discriminator is the aggregate, one recently admitted participant failing the same signing step far more often than its peers over days (THORChain, 2026-07-03).

THORChain officials said the investigation into the incident is ongoing but explained that one of their six vaults was compromised, leading to a loss of about $10.7 million.

The Record 2026-05-15

At the time of writing, TRM has not attributed the May 15 exploit to any specific actor.

TRM Labs 2026-05-15

the operator (or a compromised machine acting as the operator) exploited a vulnerability in the GG20 Threshold Signature Scheme implementation. Rather than a single dramatic key compromise, the attack appears to have involved the gradual leakage of vault key material during keygen or signing rounds, the kind of malformed-proof exploitation that the TSSHOCK class of CVEs first put on the industry's radar a few years ago.

CryptoTimes 2026-05-17

On May 15, 2026, THORChain was the victim of a targeted exploit that drained approximately $10.7M from a single vault (out of five).

The attacker was a newly churned node operator who entered the network two days prior and exploited a vulnerability in the GG20 Threshold Signature Scheme.

After 864 repetitions over two and a half days, the attacker had accumulated enough material to sign transactions unilaterally, bypassing TSS.

The only thing that reveals the pattern is the aggregate: a single validator responsible for a wildly disproportionate share of signing failures over a short period of time.

THORChain
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditsourcesbodyclassificationtechniquessummaryevidenceevent_dateprioritytitleheadline

The analysis above described CVE-2023-33241 as part of the TSSHOCK class. CVE-2023-33241 is Fireblocks' GG18/GG20 Paillier-key disclosure (Fireblocks, 2023-08-09), and TSSHOCK is Verichains' separate set of key-extraction attacks (Verichains, 2023-08-10). Fireblocks' flaw lies in an unchecked Paillier modulus, which it recommends detecting with a suitable zero-knowledge proof, while TSSHOCK exploits weak or insecurely implemented zero-knowledge proofs. Both let a single malicious participant extract key material (Fireblocks, 2023-08-09; Verichains, 2023-08-10).

The account of the attack above was also narrowed to its sources. The Record reports a compromised vault. The malicious validator node was the vector THORChain's first incident update confirmed, according to CryptoTimes, and the GG20 flaw was then the working theory CryptoTimes reported, supported by PeckShield, Cyvers and security teams working with THORChain rather than Chainalysis (CryptoTimes, 2026-05-17). TRM Labs calls THORChain the bridge of choice for laundering North Korea's largest thefts without naming the Lazarus Group or saying such activity dominates (TRM Labs, 2026-05-15).

Correctionrun 2026-10-20T0835Z-auditbodyevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

The loss came from one of THORChain's five vaults, not six, and THORChain puts it at about $10.7M (THORChain, 2026-05-20) and in its post-mortem at about $10M (THORChain, 2026-07-03); six vaults is The Record's figure (The Record, 2026-05-15) and more than USD 11M is TRM Labs' (TRM Labs, 2026-05-15), so the six vaults and about $11M stated earlier came from those outlets, not from THORChain. The GG20 flaw was not a suspicion: THORChain confirmed on 2026-05-15 that the attack exploited its GG20 TSS implementation to leak key material progressively (THORChain, 2026-05-20), and its post-mortem of 2026-07-03 sets out the exploit chain, a malformed multi-prime Paillier key and 864 deliberately failed signing rounds combined with two further weaknesses in its tss-lib fork (THORChain, 2026-07-03).

threat18 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • blog.thorchain.org2 (29%)
  • cryptotimes.io1 (14%)
  • fireblocks.com1 (14%)
  • therecord.media1 (14%)
  • trmlabs.com1 (14%)
  • verichains.io1 (14%)