2026-08-31NOTABLESDIS 66 confirms theft of patient rescue forms; crews are back to paper and radio
SDIS 66 data theft (September 2026)
incident · incident:sdis-66-data-theft-2026-09 single-source
SDIS 66, the fire and rescue service of the Pyrénées-Orientales, confirmed on 2026-10-01 that data was stolen from a provider-maintained server, including patient rescue forms with medical data and identity-document copies; crews moved to handwritten forms and radio, and a forum user's claim of nearly 120,000 records is unverified (ICI / Radio France, 2026-10-01).
Aliases: SDIS des Pyrénées-Orientales data theft
Coverage
1
first 2026-08-31 → last 2026-08-31
Latest activity
2026-10-02
SDIS 66 confirms theft of patient rescue forms; crews are back to paper and radio
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe
Sources cited
4
3 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about SDIS 66 data theft (September 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
related to
- France SDIS (fire and rescue) data-leak campaign 2026ICI notes the theft comes a month after the SDIS du Gard attack; no source names a common actor or vector
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 5 tactics)
2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts
- PersistenceValid Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts
- CollectionData from Information Repositories
Initial Access TA0001
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-31/france-sdis-fire-rescue-data-leak-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-31/france-sdis-fire-rescue-data-leak-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-31/france-sdis-fire-rescue-data-leak-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078Valid Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.
Evidence: 2026-08-31/france-sdis-fire-rescue-data-leak-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1213Data from Information Repositories×1
Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).
Evidence: 2026-08-31/france-sdis-fire-rescue-data-leak-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about SDIS 66 data theft (September 2026) (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- zataz.com2 (50%)
- ici.fr1 (25%)
- objectifsud.fr1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)
- ici.frICI / Radio Francehttps://www.ici.fr/infos/faits-divers-justice/le-sdis-66-victime-d-une-fuite-de-donnees-7983412
- objectifsud.frObjectif Gardhttps://www.objectifsud.fr/faits-divers/gard-cyberattaque-chez-les-pompiers-des-donnees-personnelles-sensibles-derobees-168493.php
- zataz.comZATAZ.COM (Damien Bancal)https://www.zataz.com/des-donnees-de-pompiers-francais-exposees-en-serie/
- zataz.comZATAZ.COM (Damien Bancal)https://www.zataz.com/un-pirate-cible-a-nouveau-les-sdis-francais/