CTIPilot
AI-generated · no human review · verify critical claims against the linked source. how it works →

Qbusoft Medyc healthcare-software breach (Poland, September 2026)

incident · incident:qbusoft-medyc-poland-breach-2026-09

Qbusoft Sp. z o.o.'s Medyc practice-management software, used by Polish medical clinics, was breached via SQL injection on 22-23 August 2026; the company discovered the intrusion on 8-9 September but made no public statement of its own, and the breach surfaced via a patient facility's own notice in late September. Zaufana Trzecia Strona attributes it to the same actor ('fingerprint') behind August's MyDr breach and reports Qbusoft never notified Poland's healthcare-sector CERT or CERT Polska (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-24/25).

Aliases: Medyc breach, Qbusoft breach

Coverage
1
first 2026-09-27 → last 2026-09-30
Latest activity
2026-09-27
A second Polish health-records vendor is breached by what Zaufana Trzecia Strona says is the MyDr actor
Peak priority
routine
1 routine
Targets
healthcare
sectors: healthcare · regions: europe
Sources cited
4
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Qbusoft Medyc healthcare-software breach (Poland, September 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed to

Story timeline

  1. 2026-09-27Qbusoft's Medyc practice-management software, used by Polish healthcare providers, is breached via SQL injection, and Zaufana Trzecia Strona attributes it to the actor behind August's MyDr leak
    active-threatsA second Polish health-records vendor is breached by what Zaufana Trzecia Strona says is the MyDr actor
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 2 tactics)

2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessExploit Public-Facing Application
  • CollectionData from Information Repositories

Initial Access TA0001

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-09-27/qbusoft-medyc-poland-healthcare-breach-fingerprint-actor · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1213Data from Information Repositories×1

Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, such as Credential Access, Lateral Movement, or Defense Evasion, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization (i.e., Transfer Data to Cloud Account).

Evidence: 2026-09-27/qbusoft-medyc-poland-healthcare-breach-fingerprint-actor · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Qbusoft Medyc healthcare-software breach (Poland, September 2026) (1)

2026-09-27 · view entry permalink →

ROUTINEupdatedNATOB2

Qbusoft's Medyc practice-management software, used by Polish healthcare providers, is breached via SQL injection, and Zaufana Trzecia Strona attributes it to the actor behind August's MyDr leak

Qbusoft, maker of the Medyc practice-management application used by Polish clinics, was breached through SQL injection on 22-23 August 2026 and an encrypted database archive was taken. The company learned of it only in the night of 8-9 September, and the breach surfaced through a patient notice from the Inowrocław addiction and psychiatric treatment centre. Name, surname and PESEL were stored encrypted, but the vendor told the facility the encryption was easy to break (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-24).

Zaufana Trzecia Strona attributes the intrusion to "fingerprint", the pseudonym of the actor behind August's MyDr breach (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-24), which exposed data on almost 19 million Poles (TVP World, 2026-09-25). DataBreaches.net notes that whether it is the same attacker has not been disclosed (DataBreaches.net, 2026-09-26). The attackers claim data on five million patients, against ZTS's own estimate of at least a million, and 8 million photos, a count ZTS could not confirm. Poland's digital affairs minister said Qbusoft reported the intrusion to the Central Office for Combating Cybercrime but not to the healthcare-sector CSIRT CEZ or to CERT Polska (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-25).

According to information we have, a new large leak of personal and medical data has occurred, this time from the systems of Qbusoft Sp. z o.o., the maker of the Medyc.pl practice application. The perpetrators of the leak are the same people who were behind the attack on the MyDr systems, from which the data of over 18 million Poles was stolen. (translated from Polish)

The Addiction and Psychiatric Treatment Center in Inowrocław reported having received information about a leak of its patients' data from the Medyc system (the same center had earlier reported a leak of its patients' data from the MyDr system, which is bad luck). (translated from Polish)

As we read in the Inowrocław facility's own notice, the attack on Qbusoft took place on 22-23 August of this year. The perpetrators, using an SQL Injection vulnerability, stole an "encrypted database archive." The company learned of the incident on the night of 8-9 September. (translated from Polish)

we ourselves assessed the scale of the incident at at least a million people; according to the perpetrators it is five million. The perpetrators also mention that they stole 8 million "very private" photos. (translated from Polish)

The incident at Qbusoft was also confirmed by Minister Gawkowski, who pointed out that although the victim of the attack informed the Central Office for Combating Cybercrime about it, it did not pass information to either the CSIRT CEZ team, established to handle incidents in the healthcare sector, or to the CERT Polska team, which coordinates the largest incidents and has the greatest experience in Poland in this regard (it handled, among others, the coordination of the incident at MyDr). (translated from Polish)

Zaufana Trzecia Strona 2026-09-24

Whether it’s the same attacker or whether any ransom demand has been involved has not been disclosed.

DataBreaches.net 2026-09-26
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0639Z-auditprioritysourcing_notetitleheadlinesummarybody

The link between the Medyc and MyDr breaches is Zaufana Trzecia Strona's attribution (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-24). DataBreaches.net notes that whether it is the same attacker has not been disclosed (DataBreaches.net, 2026-09-26). The earlier title and headline stated the link as fact. The earlier headline also said the vendor never told the national CERT. The minister's statement relayed by Zaufana Trzecia Strona says that, as of 2026-09-25, the information had not been passed to CSIRT CEZ or CERT Polska (Zaufana Trzecia Strona, 2026-09-25).

Builds on: A Polish health-records processor confirms an intrusion, and because it is not the data…

incident27 Sep 04:34Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • zaufanatrzeciastrona.pl2 (50%)
  • databreaches.net1 (25%)
  • tvpworld.com1 (25%)