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OVHcloud CLI release-asset compromise (October 2026)

incident · incident:ovhcloud-cli-release-asset-compromise-2026-10

On 2026-10-19 the release binaries of already-published versions of OVHcloud's command-line tool (OVHcloud: v0.11.0 to v0.15.0) were replaced with a build meant to collect secrets from the disk, uploaded through a developer's GitHub account; a customer's pinned SHA-256 exposed it and OVHcloud deleted the files at 14:21 UTC (GitHub issue ovh/ovhcloud-cli #300 and OVHcloud, 2026-10-19).

Aliases: ovhcloud-cli supply chain attack, OVHcloud CLI compromise

Coverage
1
first 2026-10-20 → last 2026-10-20
Latest activity
2026-10-20
OVHcloud CLI release binaries carried a secret-stealing build for about 90 minutes; a pinned hash caught it
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
technology
sectors: technology
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about OVHcloud CLI release-asset compromise (October 2026), newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • Find every workstation, build agent and container image build that installed or updated the OVHcloud CLI from a release asset (install script, Homebrew cask, direct download or a CI step fetching the release tarball) between 12:47 and 14:21 UTC on 2026-10-19, and rotate every secret readable on each of those hosts before installing v0.16.0 or later.
    2026-10-20OVHcloud CLI release binaries carried a…

Defender insights

What each entry about OVHcloud CLI release-asset compromise (October 2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-10-20NOTABLEOVHcloud CLI release binaries carried a secret-stealing build for about 90 minutes; a pinned hash caught it

Exposure · triage · detection

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

affects

Story timeline

  1. 2026-10-20OVHcloud CLI: release binaries of already-published versions were replaced on 2026-10-19 with a build that steals secrets from disk, uploaded through a developer's GitHub account
    active-threatsOVHcloud CLI release binaries carried a secret-stealing build for about 90 minutes; a pinned hash caught it

Hunting pivots

Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 5 tactics)

3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1

Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-10-20/ovhcloud-cli-release-assets-replaced-secret-stealing-build · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about OVHcloud CLI release-asset compromise (October 2026) (1)

2026-10-20 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOA2

OVHcloud CLI: release binaries of already-published versions were replaced on 2026-10-19 with a build that steals secrets from disk, uploaded through a developer's GitHub account

OVHcloud's founder says a hacker used the GitHub account of one of its developers to add to the official command-line tool's releases a binary whose job is to retrieve secrets from the disk, that versions v0.11.0 to v0.15.0 are compromised, and that v0.10.0 and v0.16.0 are clean (Octave Klaba, 2026-10-19). A user whose CI pins a SHA-256 reported on GitHub that the assets of v0.13.0 to v0.15.0 were replaced between about 12:47 and 13:12 UTC, weeks after publication, by an uploader who is not a public member of the ovh organisation, with a local build of a later commit that has uncommitted changes and no release version flag, while the v0.15.0 tag and the Go module proxy still point at the original commit (GitHub issue #300, 2026-10-19). An OVHcloud maintainer replied that all the binaries involved were deleted at 16:21 (GMT+2) and that v0.16.0, with a signed tag, is an immutable release (GitHub issue #300, 2026-10-19). OpenSourceMalware, working from GitHub's server-side records, says no tag was pushed and no release workflow ran, ties the same account's earlier force-pushes carrying a hidden loader (from 2026-03-05) to the GlassWorm campaign while saying that whether the same actor did both is its inference, notes that the project's release tooling replaces existing assets as normal behaviour, and says it has not analysed the payload because the files were deleted before anyone archived them (OpenSourceMalware, 2026-10-19). How the account was taken over, whether any secret was stolen and the actor are not public.

Triage: a replaced asset alone is not proof, since the project's release tooling replaces assets routinely; the discriminators are an uploader who is not the original publisher, a modified-tree build without the release version, and a digest that changed without a version bump (OpenSourceMalware, 2026-10-19; GitHub issue #300, 2026-10-19).

The release assets of v0.13.0, v0.14.0 and v0.15.0 were replaced today

All binaries involved have been deleted at 16:21 GMT+2.

This release is immutable, so the assets attached to it can be trusted.

GitHub issue ovh/ovhcloud-cli #300 (external reporter, with OVHcloud maintainer replies) 2026-10-19

The compromised versions are v0.11.0, v0.12.0, v0.13.0, v0.14.0 and v0.15.0. (translated from French)

The hacker used the GitHub account of one of the developers and added a binary whose job is to retrieve the secrets on the disk. (translated from French)

If you are concerned, please change all the secrets on your disk. (translated from French)

Octave Klaba, OVHcloud founder (post on X) 2026-10-19

No tag was pushed and no GitHub Actions workflow ran.

Whether the same actor did both is our inference

OVHcloud deleted the replaced binaries before anyone archived them, so we have not analyzed the payload

OpenSourceMalware 2026-10-19

Builds on: CrowdStrike, Google and Shadowserver simultaneously sever all four C2 channels of the GlassWorm…

incident20 Oct 03:36Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • github.com1 (33%)
  • opensourcemalware.com1 (33%)
  • x.com1 (33%)