2026-08-05HIGHThe actor who wiped Romania's cadastre reaches a second EU government body through legacy WebLogic
Hungarian State Treasury (MVH) breach
incident · incident:hungary-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-2026-08
Late-July 2026 intrusion into Hungary's Magyar Államkincstár (State Treasury), specifically its Agricultural and Rural Development Office (MVH), attributed by Hungarian reporting to the actor ByteToBreach. Cybersecurity experts consulted by Telex.hu on attacker-leaked screenshots describe entry through an unpatched Oracle WebLogic Server carrying fixes from an October 2017 patch cycle, escalation to Windows domain-administrator privileges across a reported 116 virtual machines, and ransomware encryption of employee workstation files; Treasury officials state citizen data was unaffected (Telex.hu, 2026-08-03; Risky Bulletin, 2026-08-05).
Aliases: Magyar Államkincstár kibertámadás, MVH breach
Coverage
1
first 2026-08-05 → last 2026-08-05
Latest activity
2026-08-05
The actor who wiped Romania's cadastre reaches a second EU government body through legacy WebLogic
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance · regions: europe
Sources cited
4
3 hosts
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Hungarian State Treasury (MVH) breach, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Enumerate internet-reachable Oracle WebLogic Server instances (including ones surviving inside legacy integrations and shadow IT) and confirm each carries Critical Patch Update levels later than October 2017; an instance that does not should be treated as already compromised rather than merely unpatched.2026-08-05The actor who wiped Romania's cadastre reaches a…
Defender insights
What each entry about Hungarian State Treasury (MVH) breach tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
attributed to
- ByteToBreachTelex.hu names the actor by handle; Risky Bulletin identifies it as the same operator as the Romanian land-registry attack
related to
- ANCPI Romania cadastre cyberattackRisky Bulletin states the same actor carried out both intrusions
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
Affected products
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 5 tactics)
3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessValid Accounts: Domain Accounts · Exploit Public-Facing Application
- PersistenceValid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- StealthValid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- ImpactData Encrypted for Impact
Initial Access TA0001
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1
Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1078.002Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts×1
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a domain account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Domain accounts are those managed by Active Directory Domain Services where access and permissions are configured across systems and services that are part of that domain. Domain accounts can cover users, administrators, and services.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
Impact TA0040
T1486Data Encrypted for Impact×1
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted.
Evidence: 2026-08-05/hungary-state-treasury-mvh-bytetobreach-weblogic · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Hungarian State Treasury (MVH) breach (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- telex.hu2 (50%)
- kelacyber.com1 (25%)
- news.risky.biz1 (25%)
All cited sources (4)
- kelacyber.comKELAhttps://www.kelacyber.com/blog/bytetobreach-a-deep-dive-into-a-persistent-data-leak-operator/
- news.risky.bizRisky Bulletin (Risky Business Media)https://news.risky.biz/risky-bulletin-hacker-breaches-hungarys-state-treasury/
- telex.huTelex.huhttps://telex.hu/techtud/2026/08/02/magyar-allamkincstar-nemzeti-kifizeto-ugynokseg-kibertamadas-orosz-szerver-titkositott-allomanyok
- telex.huTelex.huhttps://telex.hu/techtud/2026/08/03/magyar-allamkincstar-nki-kiberbiztonsag-kibertamadas-naih-bytetobreach