Coder module-registry Cloudflare infrastructure compromise
incident · incident:coder-registry-cloudflare-compromise-2026-08 single-source-victim
An unidentified actor gained access to the Cloudflare infrastructure fronting Coder's Terraform module registry (registry.coder.com) and added unauthorized origin servers, causing a roughly 14-hour window (2026-08-31, 07:35-21:45 UTC) in which some registry requests were served trojanized, credential-stealing Terraform modules (Coder GHSA-vx42-ghc9-gw65, 2026-09-01).
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Coder module-registry Cloudflare infrastructure compromise, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- For any Coder deployment that created or updated a workspace template, ran a template-build dry run, or built a workspace without module caching disabled (module caching is on by default) between 2026-08-31 07:35 and 21:45 UTC: rotate every credential a provisioner job in that window could have accessed, cloud/AI-tooling API keys, CI/CD credentials, OIDC tokens, configured SSH keys, and, where the provisioner ran inside coderd itself, the Coder deployment's own database password.2026-09-04An attacker who never touched Coder's source code…
Defender insights
What each entry about Coder module-registry Cloudflare infrastructure compromise tells a defender to do, newest first.
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (3 across 3 tactics)
3 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- Command and ControlApplication Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/coder-terraform-registry-cloudflare-compromise · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1
Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/coder-terraform-registry-cloudflare-compromise · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1
Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Evidence: 2026-09-04/coder-terraform-registry-cloudflare-compromise · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about Coder module-registry Cloudflare infrastructure compromise (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- bleepingcomputer.com1 (50%)
- github.com1 (50%)