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CISA/Nightwing GovCloud key exposure

incident · incident:cisa-nightwing-contractor-aws-govcloud-keys-exposed-github

CISA contractor Nightwing exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys, plaintext credentials and Artifactory access in a public GitHub repository for roughly six months.

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-19 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-19
CISA contractor's public GitHub repo exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys and plaintext passwords for internal…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: us
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about CISA/Nightwing GovCloud key exposure tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-19NOTABLECISA contractor's public GitHub repo exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys and plaintext passwords for internal systems

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-19CISA contractor's public GitHub repository exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys and plaintext passwords for internal CISA systems for up to six months
    active-threatsCISA contractor's public GitHub repo exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys and plaintext passwords for internal systems
ATT&CK techniques (2 across 5 tactics)

2 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Credential AccessUnsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/cisa-contractor-nightwing-exposed-aws-govcloud-admin-keys-an · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/cisa-contractor-nightwing-exposed-aws-govcloud-admin-keys-an · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/cisa-contractor-nightwing-exposed-aws-govcloud-admin-keys-an · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/cisa-contractor-nightwing-exposed-aws-govcloud-admin-keys-an · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files×1

Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/cisa-contractor-nightwing-exposed-aws-govcloud-admin-keys-an · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about CISA/Nightwing GovCloud key exposure (1)

2026-05-19 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB2

CISA contractor's public GitHub repository exposed AWS GovCloud admin keys and plaintext passwords for internal CISA systems for up to six months

GitGuardian researcher Guillaume Valadon alerted KrebsOnSecurity on 2026-05-15 to a public GitHub repository named Private-CISA, kept by an employee of the government contractor Nightwing, that held cloud keys, tokens, plaintext passwords, logs and files describing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). One file held administrative credentials to three AWS GovCloud servers, which Philippe Caturegli of Seralys validated as authenticating to three GovCloud accounts at a high privilege level; a CSV of browser-saved passwords listed plaintext credentials for dozens of internal CISA systems, among them LZ-DSO (Landing Zone DevSecOps), the agency's secure code development environment; and the archive also held plaintext credentials to CISA's internal Artifactory package repository (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). The commit logs show the administrator had disabled GitHub's default setting that blocks publishing SSH keys or other secrets, and many passwords were each platform's name followed by the current year (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18).

The repository was created on 2025-11-13 and taken offline shortly after KrebsOnSecurity and Seralys notified CISA, but the AWS keys stayed valid for another 48 hours (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18); Gizmodo puts the exposure at about six months, possibly much shorter depending on when each item was added (Gizmodo, 2026-05-19). Caturegli suspects the contractor used the repository to synchronize files between a work laptop and a home computer, and calls the Artifactory credentials a prime place to move laterally and backdoor software packages (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). CISA said it was investigating, that there was no indication any sensitive data was compromised, and that it was adding safeguards (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). For public bodies the case is a transferable pattern: a contractor's own repository holding an agency's privileged cloud and build-system credentials.

Valadon said the exposed CISA credentials represent a textbook example of poor security hygiene, noting that the commit logs in the offending GitHub account show that the CISA administrator disabled the default setting in GitHub that blocks users from publishing SSH keys or other secrets in public code repositories.

Caturegli said he validated that the exposed credentials could authenticate to three AWS GovCloud accounts at a high privilege level.

But Caturegli said the exposed AWS keys inexplicably continued to remain valid for another 48 hours.

Krebs on Security 2026-05-18
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationentitiesevent_dateevidenceheadlineregionssectorssourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitlepriority

LZ-DSO, which appears to stand for Landing Zone DevSecOps, the agency's secure code development environment, was one of the dozens of internal systems whose passwords sat in the exposed CSV; the plaintext credentials to CISA's internal Artifactory package repository were a separate item in the archive (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). CISA did not link the exposure to staffing: it said there was no indication that any sensitive data was compromised and that it was working to add safeguards, while the loss of nearly a third of its workforce is Krebs's own context (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). That the repository synchronized files between a work laptop and a home computer is Caturegli's suspicion, and his point about the Artifactory credentials is a risk he describes, a prime place to move laterally and backdoor software packages, rather than an established write access (Krebs on Security, 2026-05-18). The exposure ran from the repository's creation on 2025-11-13 until it was taken offline in mid-May 2026, up to about six months (Gizmodo, 2026-05-19).

incident19 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • gizmodo.com1 (50%)
  • krebsonsecurity.com1 (50%)