AOMEI Backupper ephemeral update-server tampering (2026)
incident · incident:aomei-backupper-ephemeral-update-tampering-2026
Short-burst tampering of AOMEI Technology's update and notification configuration files between April and July 2026 that delivered CROSSROAD and SHINYROAD to Backupper and AnyViewer clients polling during a window, disclosed by GTIG and ManageEngine METAL on 2026-10-16.
Aliases: AOMEI ephemeral supply chain tampering
Action items (1)
Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about AOMEI Backupper ephemeral update-server tampering (2026), newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.
- Inventory every Windows host that runs AOMEI Backupper or AnyViewer and check each for scheduled tasks named RadminComponentRuntime or NitroRuntime, a Radmin directory under the user's local application data and cached update files in the install tree's Tmphtml folder, searching proxy and firewall logs back to April 2026; isolate any host that matches and keep the cached files before any cleanup.2026-10-17GTIG: AOMEI update files were altered for minutes…
Defender insights
What each entry about AOMEI Backupper ephemeral update-server tampering (2026) tells a defender to do, newest first.
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
attributed to
- UNC7017GTIG attributes the activity to the cluster it tracks as UNC7017
Story timeline
ATT&CK techniques (29 across 9 tactics)
29 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure: Domains · Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services · Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
- Initial AccessSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python · Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Indicator Removal: File Deletion · Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information · Execution Guardrails · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
- Credential AccessForced Authentication
- DiscoverySystem Network Configuration Discovery · System Owner/User Discovery · System Information Discovery · Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery · System Location Discovery
- Command and ControlData Obfuscation: Junk Data · Ingress Tool Transfer · Remote Access Tools · Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software · Non-Standard Port · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Resource Development TA0042
T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains×1
Adversaries may acquire domains that can be used during targeting. Domain names are the human readable names used to represent one or more IP addresses. They can be purchased or, in some cases, acquired for free.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1583.006Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services×1
Adversaries may register for web services that can be used during targeting. A variety of popular websites exist for adversaries to register for a web-based service that can be abused during later stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control (Web Service), Exfiltration Over Web Service, or Phishing. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, GitHub, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. By utilizing a web service, adversaries can make it difficult to physically tie back operations to them.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1608.001Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware×1
Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable Ingress Tool Transfer by placing it on an Internet accessible web server.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Initial Access TA0001
T1195.002Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain×1
Adversaries may manipulate application software prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise of software can take place in a number of ways, including manipulation of the application source code, manipulation of the update/distribution mechanism for that software, or replacing compiled releases with a modified version.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Execution TA0002
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1
Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1059.006Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python×1
Adversaries may abuse Python commands and scripts for execution. Python is a very popular scripting/programming language, with capabilities to perform many functions. Python can be executed interactively from the command-line (via the <code>python.exe</code> interpreter) or via scripts (.py) that can be written and distributed to different systems. Python code can also be compiled into binary executables.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1559.001Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model×1
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1
Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1070.004Indicator Removal: File Deletion×1
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity. Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary (ex: Ingress Tool Transfer) may leave traces to indicate to what was done within a network and how. Removal of these files can occur during an intrusion, or as part of a post-intrusion process to minimize the adversary's footprint.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information×1
Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware or by using utilities present on the system.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1480Execution Guardrails×1
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target and reduces collateral damage from an adversary’s campaign. Values an adversary can provide about a target system or environment to use as guardrails may include specific network share names, attached physical devices, files, joined Active Directory (AD) domains, and local/external IP addresses.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1564.004Hide Artifacts: NTFS File Attributes×1
Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. Within MFT entries are file attributes, such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files).
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1
Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1187Forced Authentication×1
Adversaries may gather credential material by invoking or forcing a user to automatically provide authentication information through a mechanism in which they can intercept.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Discovery TA0007
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery×1
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1033System Owner/User Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using OS Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1082System Information Discovery×1
An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks×1
Adversaries may employ various system checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the adversary detects a VME, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for VME artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads. Adversaries may use the information learned from Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1614System Location Discovery×1
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1001.001Data Obfuscation: Junk Data×1
Adversaries may add junk data to protocols used for command and control to make detection more difficult. By adding random or meaningless data to the protocols used for command and control, adversaries can prevent trivial methods for decoding, deciphering, or otherwise analyzing the traffic. Examples may include appending/prepending data with junk characters or writing junk characters between significant characters.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219Remote Access Tools×1
An adversary may use legitimate remote access tools to establish an interactive command and control channel within a network. Remote access tools create a session between two trusted hosts through a graphical interface, a command line interaction, a protocol tunnel via development or management software, or hardware-level access such as KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) over IP solutions. Desktop support software (usually graphical interface) and remote management software (typically command line interface) allow a user to control a computer remotely as if they are a local user inheriting the user or software permissions. This software is commonly used for troubleshooting, software installation, and system management. Adversaries may similarly abuse response features included in EDR and other defensive tools that enable remote access.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1219.002Remote Access Tools: Remote Desktop Software×1
An adversary may use legitimate desktop support software to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. Desktop support software provides a graphical interface for remotely controlling another computer, transmitting the display output, keyboard input, and mouse control between devices using various protocols. Desktop support software, such as `VNC`, `Team Viewer`, `AnyDesk`, `ScreenConnect`, `LogMein`, `AmmyyAdmin`, and other remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, are commonly used as legitimate technical support software and may be allowed by application control within a target environment.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1571Non-Standard Port×1
Adversaries may communicate using a protocol and port pairing that are typically not associated. For example, HTTPS over port 8088 or port 587 as opposed to the traditional port 443. Adversaries may make changes to the standard port used by a protocol to bypass filtering or muddle analysis/parsing of network data.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Evidence: 2026-10-17/aomei-backupper-update-channel-tampering-unc7017-shinyroad · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about AOMEI Backupper ephemeral update-server tampering (2026) (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- cloud.google.com1 (33%)
- manageengine.com1 (33%)
- ubackup.com1 (33%)
All cited sources (3)
- cloud.google.comGoogle Threat Intelligence Group / Mandianthttps://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/investigating-ephemeral-supply-chain-tampering
- manageengine.comManageEngine Threat Analysis Lab (METAL)https://www.manageengine.com/threat-analysis-lab/aomei-backupper-supply-chain-compromise.html
- ubackup.comAOMEI Technologyhttps://www.ubackup.com/changelog.html