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STAC4924

campaign · campaign:stac4924

Sophos X-Ops designation for a Lorem Ipsum Loader campaign active since at least March 2026: trojanized Microsoft Teams installers distributed through SEO-poisoned sites in March and April, then, from late May, TerminalFix ClickFix lures leading to DLL sideloading, a Python WebSocket tunnel and Active Directory reconnaissance. Sophos observed no encryption and says its observations support BlueVoyant's attribution to Rapid Brigantine (Sophos GOLD VICTOR, linked to Vice Society and Rhysida) (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30).

Coverage
1
first 2026-08-31 → last 2026-10-05
Latest activity
2026-10-05
The fake-CAPTCHA lure now targets a console that can run multi-line scripts, not the one-line Run box
Peak priority
high
1 high
Targets
·
no sector or region stated
Sources cited
5
5 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about STAC4924 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-08-31HIGHThe fake-CAPTCHA lure now targets a console that can run multi-line scripts, not the one-line Run box

Triage

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

attributed to

uses

overlaps with

Story timeline

  1. 2026-08-31TerminalFix: a ClickFix variant that pastes into Terminal or PowerShell instead of Windows' Run dialog, then chains DLL sideloading, steganographic payload delivery and a custom reverse-tunnel implant
    active-threatsThe fake-CAPTCHA lure now targets a console that can run multi-line scripts, not the one-line Run box
ATT&CK techniques (23 across 8 tactics)

23 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.2 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Resource DevelopmentObtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates · Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning
  • Initial AccessDrive-by Compromise
  • ExecutionScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell · User Execution: Malicious File · User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • PersistenceScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • Privilege EscalationScheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task · Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
  • StealthObfuscated Files or Information: Steganography · Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location · Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories · Hijack Execution Flow: DLL
  • DiscoveryRemote System Discovery · Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups · System Information Discovery · Account Discovery: Domain Account · Domain Trust Discovery
  • Command and ControlData Obfuscation: Steganography · Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols · Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver · Ingress Tool Transfer · Protocol Tunneling

Resource Development TA0042

T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates×1

Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with. Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1608.006Stage Capabilities: SEO Poisoning×1

Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1189Drive-by Compromise×1

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.004User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste×1

An adversary may rely upon a user copying and pasting code in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to copy and paste code directly into a Command and Scripting Interpreter. One such strategy is "ClickFix," in which adversaries present users with seemingly helpful solutions (such as prompts to fix errors or complete CAPTCHAs) that instead instruct the user to copy and paste malicious code.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet `Invoke-CimMethod`, which leverages WMI class `PS_ScheduledTask` to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder×1

Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027.003Obfuscated Files or Information: Steganography×1

Adversaries may use steganography techniques in order to prevent the detection of hidden information. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital media such as images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded File×1

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as Software Packing, Steganography, and Embedded Payloads, share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) at the time of execution/use.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1

Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1564.001Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories×1

Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1018Remote System Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as Ping, <code>net view</code> using Net, or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1069.002Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups×1

Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1082System Information Discovery×1

An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use this information to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. This behavior is distinct from Local Storage Discovery which is an adversary's discovery of local drive, disks and/or volumes.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of domain accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on behavior such as targeting specific accounts which possess particular privileges.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1482Domain Trust Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to gather information on domain trust relationships that may be used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments. Domain trusts provide a mechanism for a domain to allow access to resources based on the authentication procedures of another domain. Domain trusts allow the users of the trusted domain to access resources in the trusting domain. The information discovered may help the adversary conduct SID-History Injection, Pass the Ticket, and Kerberoasting. Domain trusts can be enumerated using the `DSEnumerateDomainTrusts()` Win32 API call, .NET methods, and LDAP. The Windows utility Nltest is known to be used by adversaries to enumerate domain trusts.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1001.002Data Obfuscation: Steganography×1

Adversaries may use steganographic techniques to hide command and control traffic to make detection efforts more difficult. Steganographic techniques can be used to hide data in digital messages that are transferred between systems. This hidden information can be used for command and control of compromised systems. In some cases, the passing of files embedded using steganography, such as image or document files, can be used for command and control.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1105Ingress Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

T1572Protocol Tunneling×1

Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.

Evidence: 2026-08-31/microsoft-terminalfix-clickfix-reverse-tunnel-campaign · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about STAC4924 (1)

2026-08-31 · view entry permalink →

HIGHupdatedNATOA1

TerminalFix: a ClickFix variant that pastes into Terminal or PowerShell instead of Windows' Run dialog, then chains DLL sideloading, steganographic payload delivery and a custom reverse-tunnel implant

Microsoft Threat Intelligence documents TerminalFix, a ClickFix variant targeting organizations across multiple industries (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28). A compromised website displays a fake Cloudflare Turnstile verification overlay that silently copies a malicious PowerShell command to the clipboard and instructs the user to paste it into Windows Terminal or PowerShell rather than Windows' Run dialog, which traditional ClickFix lures use; a console runs complex, multi-line scripts far more reliably (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28). Once pasted, the command downloads a ZIP archive containing a legitimate signed binary (LockScreenContentServer.exe) alongside a malicious dui70.dll masquerading as the Windows DirectUI Engine; the signed binary's static import dependency loads the planted DLL from its own working directory instead of System32, a DLL side-loading technique that starts execution inside a trusted, signed process (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28).

The sideloaded DLL runs an elaborate second stage: PowerShell downloads three PNG images from attacker domains, extracts binary data hidden in their pixel channels (the first eight bytes of each embedded payload encode its length) and reassembles an executable and a DLL split across two of the images, deleting the source images afterward to reduce forensic artifacts (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28). Persistence lands through both an HKCU\...\Run registry key and a scheduled task re-executing every 60 minutes, both under a masquerading name chosen to blend with the abused Lock Screen component, with the payload directory hidden via system and hidden file attributes (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28). The malware then conducts extensive Active Directory reconnaissance: domain trust enumeration, domain admin group membership, user and computer discovery, and targeted pings of named infrastructure roles (domain controllers, databases, backup, gateways, mail), with the system-information-collection step run in English, Spanish and German locale variants, consistent with an operator or automated pre-assessment scoring whether the compromised host sits near high-value, domain-joined infrastructure (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28).

The most significant capability is the final stage: an unmodified, signed embeddable Python 3.14.5 runtime pulled directly from python.org, launched with no visible window via pythonw.exe, running a custom client.py tunneling implant that dials out over TLS on port 443, upgrades to a WebSocket, and relays arbitrary TCP connections to any internal host and port the operator specifies: SOCKS5-style addressing over a custom 7-byte multiplexed protocol, indistinguishable on the wire from an ordinary encrypted web session (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28). Combined with the reconnaissance data already gathered, this turns the compromised host into a full network pivot point. Microsoft states it did not observe the downstream hands-on-keyboard actions this access typically enables (privilege escalation, security-control tampering, data exfiltration, ransomware deployment) in the analyzed chain, but assesses the access itself makes those the expected next step (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 2026-08-28).

While traditional ClickFix campaigns direct victims to the Windows Run dialog, TerminalFix campaigns apply the same technique but direct users to Windows Terminal or PowerShell instead, increasing the likelihood that complex, multi-line scripts execute successfully.

The client.py script is a compact but full-featured reverse tunnel. It dials outbound to the C2 over TLS/443, upgrades the session to a WebSocket, and uses that channel to relay arbitrary TCP connections on behalf of the operator. On the wire, the traffic is indistinguishable from an ordinary encrypted web session to a single destination

Organizations should treat affected devices as potential network pivot points and investigate for lateral movement and credential exposure.

Microsoft Threat Intelligence 2026-08-28

To the BSI's knowledge, this malware is attributed to the same financially motivated group responsible for the Rhysida ransomware and leak site. (translated from German)

BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik), BITS-2026-287419-1032, v1.0 2026-09-04

TerminalFix is not linked to a specific threat group or a single campaign.

Table 1 lists the sideload pairings that Sophos analysts observed between March and September.

This loader attempts to evade entropy-based detections by storing shellcode bytes as English words rather than raw binary data.

However, Sophos analysts have not observed encryption in the STAC4924 campaign.

Sophos X-Ops 2026-09-30
Updaterun 2026-09-08T0411Z-intelupdated_atentitiestagssourcesevidenceverificationclassificationsourcing_notebody

Germany's BSI published an advisory on 2026-09-04 describing the compromise of an anonymized "state institution" whose technique matches this campaign; the advisory itself never names Berlin (BSI, BITS-2026-287419-1032, 2026-09-04). The same day, BSI posted on its official Mastodon account that it was intensively involved in handling the Berlin incident and separately linked to its detailed TerminalFix security notice (BSI on Mastodon, 2026-09-04); heise reports that juxtaposition as confirmation that TerminalFix is specifically the vector Rhysida's operators used against Berlin's two affected Senate administrations (heise online, citing BSI, 2026-09-07), the first independent confirmation of this campaign beyond Microsoft's own telemetry, and its first named-actor attribution. BSI attributes the campaign, via a malware family it names LoremIpsumLoader (also known as AxolotLoader) observed in incident reports, to a financially motivated group it tracks as Vice Spider, the same group responsible for the Rhysida ransomware and leak site, cross-referenced against the aliases Vice Society, WhiteNefas, White Hekate, DEV-0832 and Vanilla Tempest (BSI, BITS-2026-287419-1032, 2026-09-04). BSI assesses the campaign as opportunistic, purely financially motivated cybercrime with no established state or political link, and notes the CAPTCHA lure's own JavaScript has been observed on several hundred historical websites, evidence of a reusable watering-hole kit rather than one-off, victim-specific infrastructure (BSI, BITS-2026-287419-1032, 2026-09-04).

Updaterun 2026-10-05T0404Z-intelupdated_atsummaryentitiestechniquessourcesevidencesourcing_notebody

Sophos X-Ops reports a campaign it tracks as STAC4924, active since at least March, in two phases, whose tooling and tradecraft closely align with this chain (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30). The first, in March and April, used SEO-poisoned websites distributing trojanized Microsoft Teams installer packages; from late May the campaign moved to TerminalFix lures, a shift Sophos says coincided with Microsoft's takedown of the malware-signing service that supplied the fraudulently obtained certificates (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30). Sophos assesses with moderate confidence that the two phases are linked to the same group or closely associated actors, on the shared per-victim identifier callback and the use of a legitimate community platform as a dead-drop resolver for C2 addresses, and adds that the TerminalFix lure itself is not linked to a specific threat group or a single campaign, since several 2026 campaigns have used it (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30).

Sophos lists 19 pairings of a legitimate executable and a malicious DLL observed between March and September, not only the lock-screen binary with dui70.dll: they include changepk.exe, werfaultsecure.exe, wuauclt.exe and embeddedapplauncher.exe, and helper executables named after Microsoft Edge and Teams (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30). The loader stores shellcode bytes as English words with a separate lookup table to evade entropy-based detections, reads an attacker-controlled profile on the community platform to decode the current C2 server list, and then talks to C2 over HTTP POST requests that appear to carry JPEG images but hold encoded data (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30).

BlueVoyant attributed the loader to the Rapid Brigantine group, which Sophos tracks as GOLD VICTOR (also known as Vanilla Tempest, DEV-0832, VICE SPIDER and Vice Society) and which has been linked to the Vice Society and Rhysida ransomware families; Sophos says its STAC4924 observations support that attribution but that it has not observed encryption in the campaign (Sophos X-Ops, 2026-09-30).

threat31 Aug 05:10Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • bsi.bund.de1 (20%)
  • heise.de1 (20%)
  • microsoft.com1 (20%)
  • social.bund.de1 (20%)
  • sophos.com1 (20%)