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M365 voicemail-phishing wave (CH)

campaign · campaign:ncsc-ch-m365-voicemail-phishing-week25 single-source-national-cert

NCSC-CH Week 25: a Microsoft 365 voicemail-phishing wave reported to NCSC, with a ZIP attachment that installs malware such as an infostealer or a fake login page that steals M365 credentials (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-23).

Coverage
1
first 2026-06-25 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-06-25
NCSC-CH: Microsoft 365 "voicemail" phishing wave delivers malware such as infostealers and harvests M365…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
·
regions: switzerland
Sources cited
1
1 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about M365 voicemail-phishing wave (CH) tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-06-25NOTABLENCSC-CH: Microsoft 365 "voicemail" phishing wave delivers malware such as infostealers and harvests M365 credentials

Exposure · triage · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-25NCSC-CH: Microsoft 365 "voicemail" phishing wave delivers malware such as infostealers and harvests M365 credentials
    active-threats
ATT&CK techniques (8 across 7 tactics)

8 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • Initial AccessValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment · Phishing: Spearphishing Link
  • ExecutionUser Execution: Malicious File
  • PersistenceValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts: Cloud Accounts · Social Engineering: Impersonation
  • Credential AccessSteal Web Session Cookie · Credentials from Password Stores
  • CollectionEmail Collection: Remote Email Collection

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File×1

An adversary may rely upon a user opening a malicious file in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to open a file that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Attachment. Adversaries may use several types of files that require a user to execute them, including .doc, .pdf, .xls, .rtf, .scr, .exe, .lnk, .pif, .cpl, .reg, and .iso.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1684.001Social Engineering: Impersonation×1

Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary’s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1539Steal Web Session Cookie×1

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

T1555Credentials from Password Stores×1

Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1114.002Email Collection: Remote Email Collection×1

Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.

Evidence: 2026-06-25/ncsc-ch-active-microsoft-365-voicemail-phishing-wave-in-swit · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about M365 voicemail-phishing wave (CH) (1)

2026-06-25 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOA2

NCSC-CH: Microsoft 365 "voicemail" phishing wave delivers malware such as infostealers and harvests M365 credentials

Switzerland's National Cyber Security Centre received a higher-than-usual number of reports about a dual-path Microsoft 365 / OneDrive-for-Business phishing campaign, its Week 25 review says (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-23). In the malware-delivery variant the email carries a ZIP "audio" attachment, and running its contents installs malware, such as an infostealer, that can harvest login details, cookies or wallet information. In the credential-harvest variant a fake Microsoft login page with a simulated audio player ("Play voicemail as guest") captures the M365 username and password. The link in the notification, or an HTML file attached to it, leads to that page. NCSC-CH notes that a compromised mailbox is then often used to send phishing to all of the victim's contacts ("chain phishing"), that the attackers read business communications to prepare CEO fraud and business email compromise from a real employee's address, and that data an infostealer harvests may also be resold and in some cases resurfaces weeks or months later.

Triage: genuine voicemails from telephone systems usually arrive as audio files such as .wav or .mp3, not as ZIP archives, and NCSC advises checking voice messages in the official app rather than through an email notification (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-23); a notification whose message plays only through an attachment or a "Play voicemail as guest" sign-in page is the lure.

In one version of the scam, the attackers try to trick the victim into running malware.

The email has a compressed file attached to it

Stolen Microsoft 365 login details give attackers access to emails, OneDrive, SharePoint and Teams

The compromised mailbox is then often used to send phishing emails to all of the victim’s contacts ("chain phishing").

NCSC-CH
Correctionrun 2026-09-30T0634Z-auditsourcesevidencetechniquesclassificationtitleheadlinesummaryprioritysectorsentitiesbody

NCSC Switzerland's Week 25 review describes what attackers do with a compromised mailbox: they send phishing to the victim's contacts ("chain phishing") and read business communications to prepare CEO fraud and business email compromise (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-23). It does not describe forwarding rules or account manipulation, which the analysis had mapped. It also says genuine voicemails are usually sent as audio files rather than ZIP archives, and that data an infostealer harvests may be resold, where the analysis had said never and frequently. The analysis now follows the page, and the hunt for inbox and forwarding rules is marked as an inference from the mailbox monitoring NCSC describes. NCSC gives the infostealer only as an example of the malware the ZIP installs, and it names no sector and no Swiss public-sector recipients, so the title and analysis now say so and the entry's priority is notable rather than high. The citation now points at the page's new address on bacs.admin.ch, after the old ncsc.admin.ch page went dead.

Improvementrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditbodytechniques

NCSC advises checking voice messages in the official app rather than through an email notification, and it warns that login details, cookies and wallet information an infostealer harvests may be resold and resurface weeks or months later in targeted follow-up attacks (NCSC-CH, 2026-06-23). A host where the ZIP's contents ran therefore needs its credentials reset and its sessions revoked, not only cleaning.

threat25 Jun 04:59Zsingle-source · national CERTOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • bacs.admin.ch1 (100%)