FunnelKit Magecart injection

FunnelKit "Funnel Builder for WooCommerce" actively exploited as Magecart skimmer on 40,000+ WordPress stores — no CVE assigned

Sansec published primary research on 2026-05-14 documenting active exploitation of an unauthenticated code-injection flaw in FunnelKit's Funnel Builder for WooCommerce plugin, with BleepingComputer corroborating on 2026-05-15 and The Hacker News expanding on 2026-05-16 (Sansec, 2026-05-14; BleepingComputer, 2026-05-15; The Hacker News, 2026-05-16). The vulnerable component is a publicly-exposed POST endpoint for checkout-funnel session management that fails to validate caller permissions — per The Hacker News's coverage of Sansec's research, "Funnel Builder includes a publicly exposed checkout endpoint that allows an incoming request to choose the type of internal method to run". An unauthenticated request can invoke the internal method responsible for writing the plugin's global settings and inject arbitrary content into the External Scripts field (Settings > Checkout > External Scripts), which then executes on every checkout page site-wide. Mapped to T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application + T1505.003 Web-Shell-equivalent (Magecart variant). Sansec observed the live payload masquerading as a Google Tag Manager initialiser; the fake GTM loader pulls JavaScript from an attacker-controlled domain, opens a WebSocket to attacker C2, and retrieves a storefront-tailored skimmer that harvests credit-card numbers, CVVs, and billing data in real time during checkout. No CVE has been assigned. Affected: all FunnelKit Funnel Builder for WooCommerce versions before v3.15.0.3. Why it matters to us: the unauthenticated-write-to-plugin-settings pattern is increasingly common across WordPress commerce plugins and is reachable by any internet scanner — Swiss/EU cantonal e-service portals, healthcare patient-payment systems, and university e-commerce instances running WooCommerce are exposed without operator action. The WebSocket-to-attacker-C2 channel makes the skimmer payload polymorphic per victim, so static-IOC scanning of checkout HTML will miss it; defenders should audit wp_options for unrecognised funnel-builder external-script entries and alert on any WebSocket (wss://) connection initiated from a WordPress PHP process or visible in browser checkout traffic to non-CDN endpoints. Hardening: update to v3.15.0.3+ immediately; manually purge the External Scripts setting; deploy a server-side malware scanner against the plugin install path. Three independent corroborating sources clear the SINGLE-SOURCE rule.