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Fast16

campaign · campaign:fast16-symantec-carbon-black-contemporaneous-stuxnet-nuclea

Nuclear-simulation sabotage operation documented by Symantec and Carbon Black: an LS-DYNA and AUTODYN hook engine targeting a 30 g/cm3 density threshold; Kim Zetter argues it was contemporaneous with Stuxnet, while Broadcom still calls it pre-Stuxnet.

Coverage
1
first 2026-05-19 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-05-19
Symantec: fast16 corrupted LS-DYNA and AUTODYN simulations of uranium compression in nuclear detonations
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
defense
sectors: defense, energy · regions: middle-east
Sources cited
3
3 hosts

Defender insights

What each entry about Fast16 tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-05-19NOTABLESymantec: fast16 corrupted LS-DYNA and AUTODYN simulations of uranium compression in nuclear detonations

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-19Symantec and Carbon Black: the fast16 sabotage framework corrupted LS-DYNA and AUTODYN nuclear-detonation simulations; Kim Zetter argues it was contemporaneous with Stuxnet
    researchSymantec: fast16 corrupted LS-DYNA and AUTODYN simulations of uranium compression in nuclear detonations
ATT&CK techniques (10 across 7 tactics)

10 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter · System Services: Service Execution
  • PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection
  • Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service · Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection
  • StealthIndicator Removal: Timestomp
  • DiscoveryNetwork Share Discovery · Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
  • Lateral MovementRemote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares · Lateral Tool Transfer
  • ImpactData Manipulation: Runtime Data Manipulation

Execution TA0002

T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

T1569.002System Services: Service Execution×1

Adversaries may abuse the Windows service control manager to execute malicious commands or payloads. The Windows service control manager (<code>services.exe</code>) is an interface to manage and manipulate services. The service control manager is accessible to users via GUI components as well as system utilities such as <code>sc.exe</code> and Net.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.012Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe</code>).

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

T1546.012Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection×1

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debuggers. IFEOs enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, a debugger present in an application’s IFEO will be prepended to the application’s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., <code>C:\dbg\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe</code>).

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1070.006Indicator Removal: Timestomp×1

Adversaries may modify file time attributes to hide new files or changes to existing files. Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder and blend malicious files with legitimate files.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1135Network Share Discovery×1

Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement. Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

T1518.001Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as cloud monitoring agents and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Lateral Movement TA0008

T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares×1

Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to interact with a remote network share using Server Message Block (SMB). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer×1

Adversaries may transfer tools or other files between systems in a compromised environment. Once brought into the victim environment (i.e., Ingress Tool Transfer) files may then be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1565.003Data Manipulation: Runtime Data Manipulation×1

Adversaries may modify systems in order to manipulate the data as it is accessed and displayed to an end user, thus threatening the integrity of the data. By manipulating runtime data, adversaries may attempt to affect a business process, organizational understanding, and decision making.

Evidence: 2026-05-19/symantec-carbon-black-document-fast16-hook-engine-targeting · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Fast16 (1)

2026-05-19 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOB1

Symantec and Carbon Black: the fast16 sabotage framework corrupted LS-DYNA and AUTODYN nuclear-detonation simulations; Kim Zetter argues it was contemporaneous with Stuxnet

Broadcom's Symantec and Carbon Black teams published on 2026-05-16 an analysis of fast16, the sabotage framework that SentinelOne first analyzed in April 2026 and whose oldest components date from around 2005, and confirm that its hook engine targets LS-DYNA and AUTODYN, applications used to simulate problems such as vehicle crashworthiness, material modelling and explosive simulation (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16; The Hacker News, 2026-05-18). The framework combines a service binary that embeds a Lua 5.0 virtual machine, a boot-start filesystem filter driver that patches Intel-compiled executables on the fly as they are read from disk, and 101 byte-pattern rules in nine or ten groups for different builds of the two programs (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16). Its hooks act only in high-explosive simulations and scale down outputs such as pressure or stress once the simulated material density passes 30 g/cm³, the threshold Broadcom says uranium reaches only under the shock compression of an implosion device, which it reads as sabotage of nuclear weapons research (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16).

Before installing, fast16 checks for 18 endpoint-security registry keys and refuses to spread if any is present; it then registers itself as a service whose file takes the creation dates and permissions of a system binary, loads its driver as a SCSI-class filter at the next boot, and persists by hijacking a chosen application through the Image File Execution Options Debugger value (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16). It spreads only inside its own network, enumerating domains, servers and shares and, for hosts in local address ranges, copying itself to their admin share under the logged-on user's credentials and creating a remote service (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16). Kim Zetter, citing Symantec researchers and nuclear experts, argues that if fast16 targeted Iran in 2005 it was contemporaneous with Stuxnet rather than its predecessor, and that it fed false simulation data to engineers rather than altering weapons (Kim Zetter / ZERO DAY, 2026-05-16); Broadcom still calls it a pre-Stuxnet tool (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16).

The malware checks for the density of the material being simulated and only acts when that value passes 30 g/cm³, the threshold uranium can only reach under the shock compression of an implosion device.

Broadcom Security 2026-05-16

Fast16 didn't predate Stuxnet but was contemporaneous with it. It also wasn't aimed at altering nuclear weapons but was simply feeding false data to engineers about the nuclear detonation tests they were conducting, in order to trick them into believing the tests were failing.

Kim Zetter / ZERO DAY 2026-05-16

Organizations concerned about similar threats capable of sabotage should iterate regularly across their endpoints to inventory loaded drivers, flagging any that are unsigned or unfamiliar.

Broadcom Security 2026-05-16
Correctionrun 2026-10-21T1148Z-auditaffected_productsbodyclassificationevent_dateevidenceheadlinesourcessourcing_notesummarytechniquestitle

SentinelOne's first public analysis of fast16 appeared in April 2026 and dated its oldest components to around 2005, about two years before Stuxnet first became active (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16); no source places that disclosure at LABScon or reports earlier speculation that fast16 attacked centrifuges. The two framings are not settled: Kim Zetter argues that if fast16 targeted Iran in 2005 it was contemporaneous with Stuxnet rather than its predecessor (Kim Zetter / ZERO DAY, 2026-05-16), while Broadcom's analysis, published on 2026-05-16 rather than 2026-05-18, still calls it a pre-Stuxnet tool (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16). LS-DYNA and AUTODYN are applications for simulating problems such as vehicle crashworthiness, material modelling and explosive simulation, not weapons-design codes as such, and Broadcom does not claim the hook engine is the first documented technique of its kind; the detection it supports rests on the install artifacts it documents and on inventorying unsigned or unfamiliar drivers (Broadcom Security, 2026-05-16).

research19 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

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Where this entity is cited

  • Research1

Source distribution

  • security.com1 (33%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (33%)
  • zetter-zeroday.com1 (33%)