ctipilot.ch

VerdantBamboo

actor · actor:verdantbamboo single-source

China-nexus APT deploying BRICKSTORM on edge devices, running MSP supply-chain intrusions, bypassing M365 conditional access, and using the AGENTPSD/PLENET tooling.

Aliases: UNC5221, WARP PANDA

Coverage timeline
9
first 2026-05-25 → last 2026-06-14
Peak priority
high
5 high · 4 notable
Sources cited
17
11 hosts
Sections touched
6
active-threats, deep-dive, research
Co-occurring entities
1
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
12
pinned v19.1 · see below
2026-05-259 appearances2026-06-14

ATT&CK techniques

12 techniques observed across 2 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/verdantbamboo-unc5221-warp-panda-an-18-month-china-nexus-int · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566Phishing×1

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1

Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/verdantbamboo-unc5221-warp-panda-an-18-month-china-nexus-int · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/verdantbamboo-unc5221-warp-panda-an-18-month-china-nexus-int · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts×1

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/verdantbamboo-unc5221-warp-panda-an-18-month-china-nexus-int · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574Hijack Execution Flow×1

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

Command and Control TA0011

T1071Application Layer Protocol×1

Adversaries may communicate using OSI application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols×1

Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols associated with web traffic to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1090Proxy×1

Adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion. Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to further disguise the source of malicious traffic.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/verdantbamboo-unc5221-warp-panda-an-18-month-china-nexus-int · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102Web Service×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for relaying data to/from a compromised system. Popular websites, cloud services, and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google, Microsoft, or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

T1102.001Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver×1

Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.

Evidence: 2026-06-02/operation-dragon-weave-china-nexus-espionage-against-czech-g · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-14VerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA) — BSD-compiled BRICKSTORM confirmed on pfSense, plus a new PLENET backdoor
    weekly-long-running
  2. 2026-06-14Velvet Ant "Operation Highland" — Sygnia documents decade-long Linux PAM/sshd subversion
    weekly-long-running
  3. 2026-06-11CrowdStrike 2026 Technology Threat Landscape Report: technology is now the most-targeted sector
    research
  4. 2026-06-05VerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA): an 18-month China-nexus intrusion that lived entirely on EDR-blind edge appliances and proxied into Microsoft 365 past Conditional Access
    active-threatsVerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA): an 18-month China-nexus intrusion that lived entirely on EDR-blind edge appliances and proxied into Microsoft 365 past
  5. 2026-06-02Operation Dragon Weave: China-nexus espionage against Czech government with Azure Blob Storage dead-drop C2
    deep-dive
  6. 2026-06-01VerdantBamboo / UNC5221 / WARP PANDA — 18-month undetected China-nexus intrusion through MSP pfSense
    weekly-long-running
  7. 2026-06-01Public sector — most-targeted sector this week by volume and by operational severity
    weekly-sector-patterns
  8. 2026-05-30ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolset
    research
  9. 2026-05-25ESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026 — three state programmes converging on EU energy, defence and edge appliances
    weekly-annual-reports

Where this entity is cited

  • weekly-long-running3
  • research2
  • weekly-annual-reports1
  • weekly-sector-patterns1
  • deep-dive1
  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • attack.mitre.org5 (29%)
  • thehackernews.com3 (18%)
  • cisa.gov1 (6%)
  • crowdstrike.com1 (6%)
  • enisa.europa.eu1 (6%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (6%)
  • securityaffairs.com1 (6%)
  • seqrite.com1 (6%)
  • other3 (18%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

All cited sources (17)

Entries about VerdantBamboo (9)

2026-06-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

Velvet Ant "Operation Highland" — Sygnia documents decade-long Linux PAM/sshd subversion

key: campaign:velvet-ant-operation-highland-2026. Sygnia's "Operation Highland" report, relayed in detail by The Hacker News on 12 June and deep-dived in the 06-13 daily, documents a China-nexus intrusion set that held covert access to an air-gapped network for nearly a decade (earliest traces ~2016) by subverting the Linux authentication stack: nine distinct backdoored pam_unix.so variants and credential-logging sshd/ssh binaries that suppress their own logging during operator sessions (The Hacker News; Sygnia — Operation Highland). The horizon framing the dailies could not give: this is the same tradecraft class as VerdantBamboo's edge-appliance persistence — long-dwell, identity/auth-layer implants on systems outside EDR coverage. The two together describe a sustained China-nexus investment in living below the endpoint-detection line. Defender watch-item: integrity-monitor PAM modules and sshd/ssh binaries against package checksums (rpm -V / dpkg --verify, AIDE/Tripwire), and treat air-gap as a latency control, not an isolation guarantee.

synthesis14 Jun 23:57Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-14 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

VerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA) — BSD-compiled BRICKSTORM confirmed on pfSense, plus a new PLENET backdoor

key: actor:VerdantBamboo. The W23 weekly first carried Volexity's IR disclosure of this China-nexus operator; follow-up reporting this week fills in the technical chain. Volexity's case describes a BSD-compiled variant of the BRICKSTORM Golang backdoor on an MSP customer's pfSense firewall, reached after compromising an Egnyte Storage Sync appliance (local privilege escalation via default egnyteservice sudo permissions, fixed in Storage Sync v13.13), plus a previously-undocumented .NET Native AOT backdoor named PLENET on a Synology NAS and an AGENTPSD dropper (Volexity; The Hacker News). The BSD variant is the status-changing detail: it confirms VerdantBamboo can operate on FreeBSD-based appliances, beyond the Linux-only model where enterprise EDR is already blind. The intrusion ran ~18 months undetected and was used to proxy through the MSP into customer Microsoft 365 tenants via Conditional Access bypass. Outstanding question for defenders: edge appliances (firewalls, NAS, sync gateways) remain the EDR dead zone — the hunt has to move to network-flow anomalies and appliance-integrity baselining, not endpoint telemetry.

synthesis14 Jun 23:57Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-11 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

CrowdStrike 2026 Technology Threat Landscape Report: technology is now the most-targeted sector

CrowdStrike published its 2026 Technology Threat Landscape Report on 9 June 2026 (CrowdStrike, 2026-06-09). The findings most relevant to a Swiss/EU public-sector SOC running AI and cloud DevOps infrastructure: China-nexus adversaries (named clusters include MURKY PANDA, MUSTANG PANDA and WARP PANDA) drove more than 58% of state-sponsored intrusions against the technology sector, focused on AI capabilities, training data, ML infrastructure and semiconductor IP; and DPRK-nexus FAMOUS CHOLLIMA accounted for 47% of state-sponsored hands-on-keyboard activity through IT-worker infiltration using AI-enhanced personas and front companies across North America, Europe and Asia. The report frames AI/ML development pipelines and model weights as espionage targets warranting the same protection as source code and credentials. CrowdStrike also names a compromise of the axios npm package as part of a DPRK-linked supply-chain operation — a notable claim, but in this run only CrowdStrike asserts it, so treat the axios element as single-source pending independent corroboration.

annual-report11 Jun 05:00Zsingle-sourceOpen finding ↗
Sources: CrowdStrike

Earlier coverage (6)

2026-06-05HIGHVerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA): an 18-month China-nexus intrusion that lived entirely on EDR-blind edge appliances and proxied into Microsoft 365 past Conditional AccessVolexity names VerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA), an 18-month China-nexus espionage intrusion that entered a European organisation through its MSP and lived exclusively on EDR-blind edge devices — pfSense firewall, a Synology NAS, and an Egnyte Storage Sync VM whose egress IP was proxied to slip into the victim's Microsoft 365 tenant past Conditional Access. Two new implants (AGENTPSD, PLENET/GRIMBOLT) joined BRICKSTORM (Volexity, 2026-06-04).2026-06-02HIGHOperation Dragon Weave: China-nexus espionage against Czech government with Azure Blob Storage dead-drop C2China-nexus Operation Dragon Weave targets Czech and Taiwanese government, academic and financial organisations with a Rust loader and an AdaptixC2 agent that routes C2 through Microsoft Azure Blob Storage as a dead-drop — today's deep dive (Seqrite Labs, 2026-06-01).2026-06-01HIGHVerdantBamboo / UNC5221 / WARP PANDA — 18-month undetected China-nexus intrusion through MSP pfSenseVerdantBamboo (UNC5221 / WARP PANDA): 18-month undetected China-nexus espionage through an MSP's pfSense, living on EDR-blind edge appliances and proxying into M365 past Conditional Access. (daily, Volexity)2026-06-01HIGHexploitedPublic sector — most-targeted sector this week by volume and by operational severityENISA NIS360 2026: public administration receives nearly 63% of all EU hacktivist attacks yet remains structurally under-mature relative to its criticality. Seven sectors in the persistent "risk zone" where criticality exceeds maturity. (ENISA)2026-05-30HIGHESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm strikes NATO energy, Lazarus targets EU drone sector, UNC5221 pivots to Ivanti SPAWN toolsetESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026: Sandworm wiper targets Polish NATO energy company; Lazarus targets European drone manufacturers; UNC5221 deploys a new SPAWN toolset implant against Ivanti VPN appliances (ESET WeLiveSecurity, 2026-05-28).2026-05-25NOTABLEESET APT Activity Report Q4 2025–Q1 2026 — three state programmes converging on EU energy, defence and edge appliancesESET's APT Activity Report covering Q4 2025–Q1 2026 landed mid-window (first covered 2026-05-30).