TetrisPhantom
actor · actor:tetrisphantom single-source
Threat actor Kaspersky GReAT names as potentially linked to the GoSerpent campaign against Southeast Asian government and diplomatic entities, on the basis of shared victim targeting, technical capabilities and operational methodology; the connection is explicitly hedged as 'indications of a potential link', not attribution (Kaspersky Securelist, 2026-07-16).
Coverage
1
first 2026-07-18 → last 2026-07-18
Latest activity
2026-07-18
Kaspersky details GoSerpent's re-tooled chain, ChaCha20 C2, a file-harvesting Windows service, and a…
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: apac
Sources cited
1
1 hosts
Defender insights
What each entry about TetrisPhantom tells a defender to do, newest first.
Triage
Relationships explore in graph
Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.
overlaps with
- GoSerpentKaspersky GReAT: 'indications of a potential link to the TetrisPhantom threat actor' from similarities in victim targeting, technical capabilities and operational methodology, hedged, short of attribution
Story timeline
Hunting pivots
ATT&CK techniques (11 across 7 tactics)
11 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.0 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)
- ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter
- PersistenceCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- Privilege EscalationCreate or Modify System Process: Windows Service
- StealthObfuscated Files or Information · Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
- Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory · OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager
- CollectionData from Local System · Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility
- Command and ControlProxy: Internal Proxy · Proxy: External Proxy · Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
Execution TA0002
T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter×1
Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Persistence TA0003
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Privilege Escalation TA0004
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service×1
Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Stealth TA0005
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1
Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location×1
Adversaries may match or approximate the name or location of legitimate files, Registry keys, or other resources when naming/placing them. This is done for the sake of evading defenses and observation.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Credential Access TA0006
T1003.001OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory×1
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct Lateral Movement using Use Alternate Authentication Material.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1003.002OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager×1
Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Collection TA0009
T1005Data from Local System×1
Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1560.001Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility×1
Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Command and Control TA0011
T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy×1
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use internal proxies to manage command and control communications inside a compromised environment, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between infected systems to avoid suspicion. Internal proxy connections may use common peer-to-peer (p2p) networking protocols, such as SMB, to better blend in with the environment.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy×1
Adversaries may use an external proxy to act as an intermediary for network communications to a command and control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. Adversaries use these types of proxies to manage command and control communications, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths to avoid suspicion.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography×1
Adversaries may employ a known symmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for plaintext encryption and ciphertext decryption. Common symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, 3DES, Blowfish, and RC4.
Evidence: 2026-07-18/goserpent-backdoor-evolution-sea-government-diplomatic · ATT&CK page ↗
Entries about TetrisPhantom (1)
Co-occurring entities
Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.
Where this entity is cited
Source distribution
- securelist.com1 (100%)