ctipilot.ch

TA4922

actor · actor:ta4922

TA4922 — China-nexus financially-motivated cluster; Atlas RAT/RomulusLoader/SilentRunLoader, expands to DE/UK/IT

Coverage timeline
4
first 2026-06-01 → last 2026-07-21
Peak priority
high
1 high · 3 notable
Sources cited
6
6 hosts
Sections touched
2
active-threats, weekly-long-running
Co-occurring entities
1
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
6
pinned v19.1 · see below
2026-06-014 appearances2026-07-21

ATT&CK techniques

6 techniques observed across 2 entries — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/proofpoint-ta4922-a-china-nexus-cybercrime-cluster-expands-f · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1055Process Injection×1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/cruciferra-crypter-as-a-service-process-ghosting-byovd · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1027Obfuscated Files or Information×1

Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/cruciferra-crypter-as-a-service-process-ghosting-byovd · ATT&CK page ↗

T1027.002Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing×1

Adversaries may perform software packing or virtual machine software protection to conceal their code. Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory. Virtual machine software protection translates an executable's original code into a special format that only a special virtual machine can run. A virtual machine is then called to run this code.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/cruciferra-crypter-as-a-service-process-ghosting-byovd · ATT&CK page ↗

T1055Process Injection×1

Adversaries may inject code into processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/cruciferra-crypter-as-a-service-process-ghosting-byovd · ATT&CK page ↗

T1574.001Hijack Execution Flow: DLL×1

Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. DLLs are libraries that contain code and data that can be simultaneously utilized by multiple programs. While DLLs are not malicious by nature, they can be abused through mechanisms such as side-loading, hijacking search order, and phantom DLL hijacking.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/proofpoint-ta4922-a-china-nexus-cybercrime-cluster-expands-f · ATT&CK page ↗

Defense Impairment TA0112

T1685Disable or Modify Tools×1

Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.

Evidence: 2026-07-21/cruciferra-crypter-as-a-service-process-ghosting-byovd · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1555.003Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers×1

Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store; however, methods exist to extract plaintext credentials from web browsers.

Evidence: 2026-06-05/proofpoint-ta4922-a-china-nexus-cybercrime-cluster-expands-f · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-07-21Cruciferra: a crypter-as-a-service using kernel-aware process ghosting and BYOVD EDR termination, tied to China-nexus TA4922
    active-threatsProofpoint details Cruciferra, a commercial crypter that hides payloads with process ghosting and kills EDR via a vulnerable signed driver
  2. 2026-06-18China arrests 67 members of the Silver Fox (Winos/ValleyRAT) cybercrime network
    active-threats
  3. 2026-06-05Proofpoint TA4922: a China-nexus cybercrime cluster expands from Japan into Germany, the UK and Italy with native-language lures and DLL-side-loaded Atlas RAT
    active-threats
  4. 2026-06-01TA4922 — China-nexus cybercrime cluster expands from Japan into Germany, UK and Italy with native-language lures and Atlas RAT
    weekly-long-running

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry — each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

uses

Where this entity is cited

  • active-threats3
  • weekly-long-running1

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com1 (17%)
  • cert.org.cn1 (17%)
  • infosecurity-magazine.com1 (17%)
  • news.risky.biz1 (17%)
  • proofpoint.com1 (17%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (17%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Entries about TA4922 (4)

2026-07-21 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLENATOB2

Cruciferra: a crypter-as-a-service using kernel-aware process ghosting and BYOVD EDR termination, tied to China-nexus TA4922

Proofpoint's analysis details Cruciferra, a Mono/.NET-based crypter-as-a-service advertised on underground forums since late 2025 and used by several unrelated criminal groups to pack commodity payloads (AsyncRAT/DCRAT, Agent Tesla, XWorm, Formbook/XLoader, Remcos, Snake Keylogger and others). Its distinguishing feature is an evasion stack aimed squarely at endpoint defenses (Proofpoint, 2026-07-20). Payloads are encrypted with one of over 90 polymorphic cipher routines assembled from primitives such as Keccak, Feistel, SPECK and Threefish and stored Base16-encoded in the PE's .reloc section, so no two samples share an identical routine. Execution uses a variant of process ghosting: a temporary file is marked for deletion, then mapped as a PE image section (NtCreateSection with SEC_IMAGE) before the delete completes, leaving a running process whose backing image is never scannable on disk. Cruciferra hardens that trick with two anti-EDR steps — patching ZwQueryVirtualMemory so endpoint tools misread mapped memory, and neutering NtManageHotPatch to defeat image-integrity validation — alongside Import Address Table unhooking and indirect syscalls: per Proofpoint, "the malware reads a clean copy of ntdll.dll on disk and stores all stub pointers in a global structure for later usage." For EDR/AV termination it loads a legitimate-but-vulnerable signed driver (Proofpoint names GoFlyDrv.sys among the alternates) and issues control codes to kill security processes — classic BYOVD.

Attribution matters here: "Proofpoint observed four campaigns attributed to Chinese-speaking cybercrime actor TA4922 using Cruciferra to ultimately deliver AsyncRAT," behind landing pages mimicking government tax portals, against finance, healthcare and government targets.

the malware reads a clean copy of ntdll.dll on disk and stores all stub pointers in a global structure for later usage.

Proofpoint observed four campaigns attributed to Chinese-speaking cybercrime actor TA4922 using Cruciferra to ultimately deliver AsyncRAT.

Proofpoint Threat Insight 2026-07-20
threat21 Jul 04:41Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-18 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

China arrests 67 members of the Silver Fox (Winos/ValleyRAT) cybercrime network

Chinese police arrested 67 suspects across five provinces in a June 2026 operation against Silver Fox — also tracked as Void Arachne, UTG-Q-1000 and TA4922 — assessed as one of the most active crimeware operations targeting Chinese-speaking users (Risky Biz News, 2026-06-17). The arrests reportedly span the full criminal supply chain: the primary developer/seller of the Silver Fox (Winos) trojan, a variant developer, phishing-site operators, and fake-app download-site operators, with secondary RATs including ValleyRAT used for credential theft. A CNCERT/CC security alert issued on 2026-05-22 preceded the operation (CNCERT/CC, 2026-05-22).

threat18 Jun 05:10Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-06-05 · view entry permalink →

HIGH

Proofpoint TA4922: a China-nexus cybercrime cluster expands from Japan into Germany, the UK and Italy with native-language lures and DLL-side-loaded Atlas RAT

Proofpoint reports that TA4922, a Chinese-speaking, financially-motivated cluster it assesses as running the highest campaign tempo of any cybercrime actor it tracks, expanded in March–April 2026 from its historical Japanese focus to localised campaigns against UK, German, Italian and South African organisations (The Hacker News, 2026-06-04; BleepingComputer, 2026-06-04). Lures are carefully tailored in the target's native language — tax-authority, HR/payroll and invoice themes — and the toolkit now pairs the known ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) with newly observed families: Atlas RAT (a C-based RAT) and RomulusLoader, which DLL-side-loads (T1574.002) AnyDesk and SyncFuture, plus SilentRunLoader, a Python infostealer pulling Chrome credentials and cookies (T1555.003). A notable TTP shift is the deliberate move of conversations to LINE, WhatsApp and Microsoft Teams to pull targets off enterprise email controls before payload delivery.

Why it matters to us: German and UK targeting with native-language tax/payroll lures puts DACH public-sector and finance staff squarely in scope. Hunt for DLL side-loading chains where trusted binaries (AnyDesk, SyncFuture) load from unexpected working directories, for Python processes reaching DPAPI / Chrome credential stores, and for unsolicited inbound contact on LINE/WhatsApp/Teams that pivots to a "document" — the out-of-band channel is where the email gateway loses visibility.

threat05 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

Earlier coverage (1)