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Payload

actor · actor:payload-ransomware single-source

Data-extortion group operating a leak site; on 2026-08-20 it listed a Zurich-area IT and data-centre provider, claiming roughly 490 GB and naming eight affected customer domains including that of HWZ Hochschule fuer Wirtschaft Zuerich, which separately confirmed to students that data was stolen through a service provider's infrastructure. The connection between the named provider and the school rests solely on the group's own listing (Ransomware.live listing, 2026-08-20; Inside Paradeplatz, 2026-08-22).

Coverage
2
first 2026-06-18 → last 2026-10-21
Latest activity
2026-10-08
FBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds ransomware…
Peak priority
high
1 high · 1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector, finance, telco · regions: europe, switzerland
Sources cited
15
12 hosts
2026-06-182 appearances2026-08-23

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about Payload, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

Defender insights

What each entry about Payload tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-06-18HIGHexploitedFBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds ransomware affiliates

Exposure · detection

2026-08-23NOTABLEHWZ confirms the theft and names no provider; the only source connecting a provider to it is the extortion group's own leak-site listing

Relationships explore in graph

Typed, source-stated connections from the entity registry; each edge cites the entry whose reporting establishes it.

related to

Story timeline

  1. 2026-08-23A Zurich business school tells students their bank details and sick-leave records were stolen, not from its own systems, but through the infrastructure of an IT service provider whose leak-site listing names seven other Swiss customers alongside it, and does not close the list
    active-threatsHWZ confirms the theft and names no provider; the only source connecting a provider to it is the extortion group's own leak-site listing
  2. 2026-06-18FortiBleed: an active credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls, now locking administrators out and supplying ransomware affiliates
    active-threatsFBI and Secret Service: FortiBleed is still active, locks admins out of FortiGates and feeds ransomware affiliates
ATT&CK techniques (13 across 10 tactics)

13 techniques observed across 2 entries about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning
  • Resource DevelopmentAcquire Infrastructure
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · External Remote Services · Trusted Relationship
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · External Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts
  • Credential AccessOS Credential Dumping · Brute Force: Password Cracking · Brute Force: Password Spraying · Brute Force: Credential Stuffing
  • DiscoveryAccount Discovery
  • ExfiltrationExfiltration Over C2 Channel
  • ImpactAccount Access Removal

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595Active Scanning×1

Adversaries may execute active reconnaissance scans to gather information that can be used during targeting. Active scans are those where the adversary probes victim infrastructure via network traffic, as opposed to other forms of reconnaissance that do not involve direct interaction.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Resource Development TA0042

T1583Acquire Infrastructure×1

Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost. Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1199Trusted Relationship×1

Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network.

Evidence: 2026-08-23/payload-zurich-it-provider-hwz-student-data · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Credential Access TA0006

T1003OS Credential Dumping×1

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures. Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.002Brute Force: Password Cracking×1

Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.003Brute Force: Password Spraying×1

Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

T1110.004Brute Force: Credential Stuffing×1

Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Discovery TA0007

T1087Account Discovery×1

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts).

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Exfiltration TA0010

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel×1

Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Impact TA0040

T1531Account Access Removal×1

Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials, revoked permissions for SaaS platforms such as Sharepoint) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place.

Evidence: 2026-06-18/fortibleed-73-932-internet-facing-fortigate-devices-exposed · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about Payload (2)

2026-06-18 · view entry permalink →

HIGHexploitedupdatedNATOA1

FortiBleed: an active credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls, now locking administrators out and supplying ransomware affiliates

A dataset branded "FortiBleed" was reported on 2026-06-18: researcher Bob Diachenko found a server holding what appeared to be valid Fortinet VPN credentials, Hudson Rock counted 73,932 unique firewall URLs across 194 countries affecting 21,632 unique domains, and Kevin Beaumont, who confirmed the authenticity of some of the admin logins and passwords, put the dataset at roughly 75,000 Fortinet devices (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). Fortinet's position is that this is not a new Fortinet vulnerability: it believes threat actors are reusing credentials from previous incidents and using brute force against devices with weak password hygiene and no multi-factor authentication (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19). BleepingComputer reports researcher Bob Diachenko's claim that a Russian-speaking multi-operator group harvested the credentials, cracked intercepted SSL VPN hashes on a 45-GPU cluster and moved laterally into internal Active Directory environments, with several organisations fully compromised; Diachenko says he drew this from files the attackers left exposed on the same server (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18); Arctic Wolf is separately tracking the FortiBleed campaign's reach across 194 countries (Arctic Wolf, 2026-06-17). The technique class is valid-account abuse following credential access, not exploitation of a fresh CVE.

which abuses FortiOS's built-in diagnose sniffer packet functionality to capture authentication traffic traversing compromised FortiGate devices

BleepingComputer

we believe the activity involves threat actors reusing credentials from previous incidents and employing brute-force techniques against devices with weak password hygiene and no multi-factor authentication (MFA)

SecurityWeek

The FBI says that in some incidents, the threat actor creates administrator accounts and uses their privileges to delete existing admin accounts or change their passwords, denying victims access to their devices.

Some groups benefiting from this are INC/Lynx ransomware and Payload ransomware.

BleepingComputer
Updaterun 2026-06-20-4cfd00efregionssourcestagsbody

The FortiBleed SSL VPN credential-harvesting campaign has grown from the 73,932 firewall URLs reported on 2026-06-18 (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18) to 86,644 confirmed compromised credentials across 194 countries, and CISA has published a hardening alert (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19; CISA, 2026-06-18).

The new detail is methodology and impact, as researcher Bob Diachenko claims it: the operators intercept SSL VPN authentication, crack the hashes on a 45-GPU cluster managed through Hashtopolis and pivot into internal Active Directory environments (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19; BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). CISA's alert urges terminating active sessions and resetting credentials, storing administrator logins with PBKDF2, reviewing logs, enabling phishing-resistant MFA and locking down management access (SecurityWeek, 2026-06-19). Fortinet advises checking for unexpected administrator access from an unknown IP and reviewing domain controller logs for lateral movement (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19).

Updaterun 2026-06-23-165387f6evidencesectorssourcesbody

New analysis published 2026-06-22 gives a more detailed description of the tool chain behind the FortiBleed credential-harvesting campaign. SOCRadar's report, as BleepingComputer describes it, alleges a purpose-built Golang tool, FortigateSniffer, that abuses FortiOS's built-in diagnose sniffer packet command to capture authentication traffic on a compromised FortiGate, with a component named SNIFTRAN reconstructing the captured traffic into PCAP files and a Python toolkit extracting cleartext credentials, password hashes, Kerberos tickets and NTLM authentication material from them, across 24 protocols (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22).

Fortinet's PSIRT response confirms the campaign uses no new vulnerability: it reuses credentials from the previously-disclosed CVE-2026-24858, CVE-2025-59718 and CVE-2025-59719 plus brute force against devices lacking strong passwords and MFA (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19; SecurityWeek, 2026-06-22). Reported tradecraft includes a distributed 36-GPU cluster rented from a GenAI company for offline cracking of the harvested hashes, according to researcher Kevin Beaumont (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22), where Diachenko's earlier claim was a 45-GPU cluster managed through Hashtopolis (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18); SOCRadar characterises the operators as Russian-speaking (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16).

The delta for defenders is a concrete detection surface that earlier coverage lacked: the tool connects to the FortiGate over SSH and launches the diagnose sniffer packet command (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-22), so hunt for unexpected invocations of that command on the appliance; because harvested Active Directory credentials are the downstream prize, any directory account a FortiBleed-corpus device authenticated against deserves to be treated as exposed, with domain controller logs reviewed for unusual access by those accounts (Fortinet PSIRT, 2026-06-19). Upgrade to firmware with PBKDF2 password hashing to make offline cracking expensive, terminate active sessions, enable MFA and disable external management access.

Updaterun 2026-10-08T0404Z-inteltitleheadlinesummarytagsentitiestechniquesaffected_productsclassificationsourcesevidencesourcing_noteactionsbody

A joint advisory of the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service (JCSA-20261006-01, 2026-10-06) calls FortiBleed an active, global credential-compromise campaign against internet-facing FortiGate firewalls and SSL VPN gateways, cites SOCRadar for more than 86,644 compromised devices in 194 countries, and says attackers are continuing to scan exposed devices with previously obtained credentials (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). The operators scan exposed SSL VPN portals, run credential stuffing and password spraying from earlier Fortinet leak dumps and infostealer logs, pull password hashes and session tokens from compromised devices and crack the hashes offline with Hashcat and Hashtopolis on a rented GPU cluster; the advisory ties the success to reused or leaked credentials and a legacy SHA-256 password storage (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06).

What the advisory adds is the lockout. On a compromised firewall the actors create administrator accounts that were not there before and, in some cases, delete existing accounts or change their passwords, so the owners cannot log in and recovery needs steps beyond patching and password resets (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06; BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07). Cracked credentials are enriched and validated by scripts that filter out honeypots and rank targets by revenue and network structure; with verified credentials the attackers enumerate Active Directory accounts and spray passwords to find privileged users, and the operation packages working VPN configurations and target lists for sale, the role of an initial-access broker (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). The advisory says the chain has been an initial entry point for ransomware affiliates, currently INC/Lynx and Payload (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06); SOCRadar had attributed FortiBleed to the Lynx / INC ransomware group in a 29 June update to its report (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16), after reaching both groups' negotiation panels on a server used in the campaign (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07).

The advisory's measures: restrict external management through trusted hosts, a local-in policy or no internet administration at all; terminate all administrative and VPN sessions and reset all Fortinet VPN and administrator passwords; require phishing-resistant MFA on remote access and administrator accounts; review users, configuration and REST API keys for entries nobody created, removing unknown keys and refreshing the legitimate ones; enforce PBKDF2 for administrator password storage per Fortinet's guidance for FortiOS 7.2.11 and later; and review firewall, VPN, authentication and domain controller logs for lateral movement (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06). On the FortiGate itself, in analyst judgement, the administrator accounts, passwords and REST API keys the advisory says to review are recorded in the device's configuration and administrator audit log, which is where an unexpected change shows.

Correctionrun 2026-10-11T1307Z-auditactionsbody

The FBI and Secret Service advisory tells operators to review firewall, VPN, authentication and domain controller logs and to check users, configuration and REST API keys for entries nobody created (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06); it does not name specific Windows event ids or a domain-wide credential rotation, which earlier hunting guidance here attached to the campaign. The mapping of those checks to the FortiGate's own configuration and administrator audit log is a reading of the advisory, not part of it.

Correctionrun 2026-10-21T0800Z-auditbody

The first FortiBleed figures come from three researchers. Bob Diachenko found a server holding what appeared to be valid Fortinet VPN credentials, Hudson Rock counted 73,932 unique firewall URLs across 194 countries affecting 21,632 unique domains, and Kevin Beaumont, who confirmed the authenticity of some of the admin logins and passwords, put the dataset at roughly 75,000 Fortinet devices (BleepingComputer, 2026-06-18). SOCRadar's attribution of the campaign to the Lynx / INC ransomware group dates from a 29 June update to its report (SOCRadar, 2026-06-16). Contradiction: BleepingComputer's October recap dates that link to July (BleepingComputer, 2026-10-07). The FBI and Secret Service advise reviewing firewall and VPN users and other configuration for unauthorized changes, preferably against a well-known configuration, with particular attention to the addition of unrecognized accounts (FBI and U.S. Secret Service, 2026-10-06).

incident18 Jun 05:10Zmulti-sourceOpen finding →

2026-08-23 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEupdatedNATOC2

A Zurich business school tells students their bank details and sick-leave records were stolen, not from its own systems, but through the infrastructure of an IT service provider whose leak-site listing names seven other Swiss customers alongside it, and does not close the list

HWZ Hochschule für Wirtschaft Zürich, a Zurich university of applied sciences business school, wrote to its students and alumni to confirm that an analysis of stolen data had identified personal information belonging to them, names, addresses and phone numbers, records from student administration, bank details, and data from sick-leave notifications (Inside Paradeplatz, 2026-08-22). On where it came from, the school is specific and, notably, exculpatory of its own estate: "Nach aktuellem Untersuchungsstand erfolgte ein Angriff über die Infrastruktur des Dienstleisters" (according to the current state of the investigation, an attack took place via the service provider's infrastructure) and it states separately that HWZ's own local IT infrastructure was not affected. The school has involved the police and asked recipients not to circulate unconfirmed information.

Two days before that letter was reported, the extortion group Payload listed a Swiss data-centre operator on its leak site, claiming roughly 490 GB of data and naming eight affected customer domains, the school's among them, alongside seven other organisations. The listing gives only domain names; no cited source describes what those other customers do, and this entry does not guess. The timing is consistent with a single underlying event, and the school's own description of a provider-side compromise matches the shape of the listing. But the connection is not independently established: no source other than the leak-site listing itself links that named provider to HWZ. The school names no provider. Neither outlet covering the story names one through its own reporting. This entry therefore does not name the company either, naming a firm as breached on the unverified assertion of the group extorting it is exactly the failure mode this pipeline's sourcing rules exist to prevent, and a different provider name circulating in the primary's reader comments is speculation with no sourcing at all.

What is established is the structure, and it is the reason a Swiss federal SOC should care about a business school's mailing list. One managed-IT or hosting compromise produced simultaneous personal-data exposure at several independent organisations that had no intrusion of their own, no security failure of their own to remediate, and (in HWZ's case) no ability to tell affected people anything until the provider's investigation reached them. The named customer set is seven organisations plus one higher-education institution, and the listing ends that enumeration with "etc.", so eight is a floor rather than the full extent. That is the ordinary shape of a regional IT provider's book of business, and therefore the ordinary shape of this blast radius: the organisations that know they are affected are the ones the attacker chose to name.

Nach aktuellem Untersuchungsstand erfolgte ein Angriff über die Infrastruktur des Dienstleisters

Inside Paradeplatz, quoting HWZ's letter to students

We can confirm that personal data are among the stolen data. (translated from German)

HWZ media office, via Inside IT
Updaterun 2026-09-01T0411Z-intelsummarysourcesevidencebody

Inside IT reported on 2026-08-31, under the headline "HWZ-Daten landen im Darkweb" ("HWZ data lands on the dark web"), that data from the breach has been published; the outlet attributes the provider-side intrusion to a ransomware group but hedges that attribution itself with "offenbar" (apparently) (Inside IT, 2026-08-31). That supersedes the position HWZ gave Netzwoche on 2026-08-26, when the school stated there were no indications the stolen data had been published or misused (Netzwoche, 2026-08-26). HWZ's confirmation that personal data are among the stolen records (quoted by Inside IT in the same article, but itself given to a separate Inside IT report the prior week) restates rather than extends what this entry already established from HWZ's original letter to students. The named provider's identity is still established only by the extortion group's own leak-site listing, and no source has named it independently.

incident23 Aug 05:18Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats2

Source distribution

  • bleepingcomputer.com3 (20%)
  • securityweek.com2 (13%)
  • arcticwolf.com1 (7%)
  • cisa.gov1 (7%)
  • fortinet.com1 (7%)
  • ic3.gov1 (7%)
  • ictk.ch1 (7%)
  • inside-it.ch1 (7%)
  • other4 (27%)
All cited sources (15)