ctipilot.ch

GREYVIBE

actor · actor:greyvibe-russia-nexus-ai-assisted-five-parallel-ukraine-attack

Russia-nexus AI-assisted threat cluster documented running five parallel attack waves against Ukraine.

Coverage timeline
2
first 2026-05-25 → last 2026-05-30
Peak priority
notable
2 notable
Sources cited
3
3 hosts
Sections touched
2
active-threats, weekly-long-running
Co-occurring entities
0
no co-occurrence
ATT&CK techniques
6
pinned v19.1 · see below
2026-05-252 appearances2026-05-30

ATT&CK techniques

6 techniques observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Initial Access TA0001

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link×1

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

Execution TA0002

T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell×1

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the <code>Start-Process</code> cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the <code>Invoke-Command</code> cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (though administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems).

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

T1204.001User Execution: Malicious Link×1

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

Collection TA0009

T1005Data from Local System×1

Adversaries may search local system sources, such as file systems, configuration files, local databases, virtual machine files, or process memory, to find files of interest and sensitive data prior to Exfiltration.

Evidence: 2026-05-30/greyvibe-newly-documented-russia-nexus-cluster-deploys-five · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-05-30GREYVIBE — newly documented Russia-nexus cluster deploys five parallel attack chains against Ukraine with AI-generated lures and two PowerShell RATs
    active-threats
  2. 2026-05-25GREYVIBE — independent corroboration; OPSEC slips enabled attribution; charity-front sub-campaign
    weekly-long-running

Where this entity is cited

  • weekly-long-running1
  • active-threats1

Source distribution

  • labs.withsecure.com1 (33%)
  • securityweek.com1 (33%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (33%)

explore in graph

Entries about GREYVIBE (2)

2026-05-30 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

GREYVIBE — newly documented Russia-nexus cluster deploys five parallel attack chains against Ukraine with AI-generated lures and two PowerShell RATs

WithSecure Labs disclosed GREYVIBE on 28–29 May 2026, a previously-unnamed Russia-nexus threat cluster active since at least August 2025, targeting Ukrainian military, government, civilians, and businesses (WithSecure Labs, 2026-05-29; SecurityWeek, 2026-05-28). Five parallel attack chains: PhantomMail (spear-phishing with ZIP/RAR archives via Google Drive and 4sync), PhantomClick (fake CAPTCHA/ClickFix pages impersonating Zoom and LAPAS), PrincessClub (fraudulent adult-club sites with WebRTC-based social engineering), DroneLink (counterfeit Ukrainian Armed Forces charity sites), and Nebo (fake Russian military login portals). Core malware: LegionRelay (PowerShell RAT with file theft, screenshots, credential harvesting, RDP access; RC4 C2 comms), PhantomRelay (PowerShell RAT with dynamic script loading and watchdog persistence), and FallSpy (Android spyware for contact, call log, and geolocation extraction). Four custom obfuscators — LOOKVALPS, LOOKVALJS, DAYLIGHT, TEASOUP — were assessed as LLM-assisted developments. Attribution evidence: Russian-language panels and code comments; C2 servers in UTC+3 (Moscow time); OPSEC failures including public scan-platform uploads. WithSecure identifies possible links to UAC-0098 (former TrickBot associates). MITRE ATT&CK: T1566.001/T1566.002, T1059.001, T1005, T1204.001, T1133. Detection: alert on PowerShell spawned from archive-extraction utility parent processes; hunt scheduled tasks created by PowerShell beaconing to dynamic DNS; Android MDM alerts on sideloaded APKs accessing mic/camera. Organisations supporting Ukrainian government or civil-society counterparts are within the targeting scope.

threat30 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗

2026-05-25 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLE

GREYVIBE — independent corroboration; OPSEC slips enabled attribution; charity-front sub-campaign

The Russia-nexus GREYVIBE cluster (2026-05-30 daily) gained independent in-window corroboration from SecurityWeek and Security Affairs of the original WithSecure Labs disclosure. The added detail: despite heavy AI integration in lure generation, the operators left Russian-language code comments and Moscow-timezone activity patterns that enabled attribution, and the PrincessClub sub-campaign masqueraded as Ukrainian-Armed-Forces charitable foundations (FPV-drone / UAV support) to harvest credentials. No expansion beyond Ukrainian targets was found. For CH/EU bodies with Ukraine-linked engagements, the relevant control is spear-phishing scrutiny on charity/fundraising lures referencing military support.

synthesis25 May 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗