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DarkLunnen

actor · actor:darklunnen single-source

Operator tracked by Group-IB whose exposed directory (Group-IB, 2026-11-11) shows mass exploitation of FortiOS CVE-2024-55591 that plants a 'service' super_admin account, a 4,725-target Swiss FortiGate scan list and recorded restic access to an S3 backup repository at a 'Swiss domain'; Group-IB says the lists do not confirm vulnerability or successful exploitation.

Coverage
1
first 2026-11-13 → last 2026-11-13
Latest activity
2026-11-13
Group-IB: DarkLunnen's FortiOS chain leaves a 'service' super_admin; Swiss FortiGates are scan targets only
Peak priority
notable
1 notable
Targets
public-sector
sectors: public-sector · regions: europe, switzerland
Sources cited
2
2 hosts

Action items (1)

Do-now tasks recorded on the entries about DarkLunnen, newest first. Check the date before acting on an older one.

  • On every FortiGate on FortiOS 7.0 below 7.0.17 (and FortiProxy 7.2 below 7.2.13 or 7.0 below 7.0.20) take the HTTP/HTTPS administrative interface off internet-facing interfaces, and on any unit whose interface was ever reachable list the administrators for an account named service or any unexplained super_admin account and review jsconsole logins; where one is found rotate every secret stored in the configuration, because a patch does not remove an account that already exists.
    2026-11-13Group-IB: DarkLunnen's FortiOS chain leaves a…

Defender insights

What each entry about DarkLunnen tells a defender to do, newest first.

2026-11-13NOTABLEexploitedGroup-IB: DarkLunnen's FortiOS chain leaves a 'service' super_admin; Swiss FortiGates are scan targets only

Exposure · detection

Story timeline

  1. 2026-11-13DarkLunnen: Group-IB's exposed operator directory shows mass exploitation of FortiOS CVE-2024-55591 that plants a 'service' super_admin account, a 4,725-target Swiss FortiGate scan list and restic access to an S3 backup repository at a 'Swiss domain'; Group-IB does not confirm any Swiss victim
    active-threatsGroup-IB: DarkLunnen's FortiOS chain leaves a 'service' super_admin; Swiss FortiGates are scan targets only
ATT&CK techniques (7 across 5 tactics)

7 techniques observed across 1 entry about this entity, derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v20.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

  • ReconnaissanceActive Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks · Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
  • Initial AccessValid Accounts · External Remote Services · Exploit Public-Facing Application
  • PersistenceValid Accounts · External Remote Services · Create Account: Local Account · Server Software Component: Web Shell
  • Privilege EscalationValid Accounts
  • StealthValid Accounts

Reconnaissance TA0043

T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks×1

Adversaries may scan victim IP blocks to gather information that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1595.002Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning×1

Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

Initial Access TA0001

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application×1

Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

Persistence TA0003

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1133External Remote Services×1

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1136.001Create Account: Local Account×1

Adversaries may create a local account to maintain access to victim systems. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

T1505.003Server Software Component: Web Shell×1

Adversaries may backdoor web servers with web shells to establish persistent access to systems. A Web shell is a Web script that is placed on an openly accessible Web server to allow an adversary to access the Web server as a gateway into a network. A Web shell may provide a set of functions to execute or a command-line interface on the system that hosts the Web server.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

Privilege Escalation TA0004

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

Stealth TA0005

T1078Valid Accounts×1

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

Evidence: 2026-11-13/darklunnen-group-ib-fortios-super-admin-swiss-scan-list · ATT&CK page ↗

Entries about DarkLunnen (1)

2026-11-13 · view entry permalink →

NOTABLEexploitedNATOB2

DarkLunnen: Group-IB's exposed operator directory shows mass exploitation of FortiOS CVE-2024-55591 that plants a 'service' super_admin account, a 4,725-target Swiss FortiGate scan list and restic access to an S3 backup repository at a 'Swiss domain'; Group-IB does not confirm any Swiss victim

Group-IB reports that in late July 2026 it found an open directory on a Latvian server that held the operator's /root/ directory, 457 files of which 35 were recovered, and documents more than 14 months of operations against Europe by an operator it tracks as DarkLunnen; Group-IB links it to no known actor and does not establish nationality or state affiliation (Group-IB, 2026-11-11). The main campaign used a modified watchTowr proof of concept for FortiOS CVE-2024-55591, designed to create a backdoor super-admin account named service (Group-IB, 2026-11-11); the recovered results list about 600 devices in Turkey (hospitals, industry and municipalities), 16 in Ukraine, 14 in Azerbaijan and 1 in Algeria, and a stolen FortiGate configuration from a Romanian organisation carried the same account and yielded 10 cleartext VPN passwords (Group-IB, 2026-11-11).

The Swiss content is thin. Group-IB recovered a list of 4,725 FortiGate scanning targets for Switzerland and says such lists identify scanning targets but do not confirm vulnerability or successful exploitation; a table of additional operations also lists restic commands with AWS credentials accessing an S3 repository at a Swiss domain in May and June 2025, with production snapshots enumerated, and the report names no organisation and says that for several operations the evidence is limited to recorded commands (Group-IB, 2026-11-11). Fortinet's advisory FG-IR-24-535 lists FortiOS 7.0.0 through 7.0.16 and FortiProxy 7.2.0 through 7.2.12 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.19 as affected, fixed in 7.0.17, 7.2.13 and 7.0.20, names FortiOS 7.2, 7.4, 7.6 and 6.4 as not affected and offers disabling the HTTP/HTTPS administrative interface as the workaround (Fortinet PSIRT, 2025-01-14).

DarkLunnen used a modified proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit developed by watchTowr for FortiGate CVE-2024-55591, designed to create a backdoor super-admin account named “service”.

Additional FortiGate scanning target lists were recovered for Switzerland (4,725 targets), South Korea (5,199), and Ireland (647). These lists identify scanning targets but do not confirm vulnerability or successful exploitation.

For several of these operations, the available evidence is limited to recorded commands. Unless otherwise indicated, the findings do not independently confirm successful exploitation, unauthorized access, or data exfiltration.

Group-IB Threat Intelligence 2026-11-11

Builds on: Six agencies publish the Gunra RaaS playbook, edge exploitation, an OTP-value MFA backdoor, and…

threat13 Nov 04:05Zsingle-sourceOpen finding →

Co-occurring entities

Derived: referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

Where this entity is cited

  • Threats1

Source distribution

  • fortiguard.fortinet.com1 (50%)
  • group-ib.com1 (50%)