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FFmpeg parser/demuxer heap or stack overflow (depthfirst AI-agent discovery; PoC public, fixed upstream)

cve · CVE-2026-39214

Coverage timeline
1
first 2026-06-07 → last 2026-06-07
Peak priority
high
1 high
Sources cited
2
2 hosts
Sections touched
1
research
Co-occurring entities
8
see Related entities below
ATT&CK techniques
1
pinned v19.1 · see below

Hunting pivots

Tags
ai-abusepatch-availablepoc-publicvulnerabilities

ATT&CK techniques

1 technique observed across 1 entry — derived from entry metadata and body evidence, never asserted without a published entry behind it · pinned to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 · compare on the matrix · Navigator layer (JSON)

Execution TA0002

T1203Exploitation for Client Execution×1

Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulnerabilities through targeted exploitation for the purpose of arbitrary code execution. Oftentimes the most valuable exploits to an offensive toolkit are those that can be used to obtain code execution on a remote system because they can be used to gain access to that system. Users will expect to see files related to the applications they commonly used to do work, so they are a useful target for exploit research and development because of their high utility.

Evidence: 2026-06-07/an-autonomous-ai-agent-finds-21-zero-days-in-ffmpeg-for-1-00 · ATT&CK page ↗

Story timeline

  1. 2026-06-07An autonomous AI agent finds 21 zero-days in FFmpeg for ~$1,000 — nine numbered (CVE-2026-39210 to -39218), parser bugs up to 23 years old
    research

Where this entity is cited

  • research1

Source distribution

  • depthfirst.com1 (50%)
  • thehackernews.com1 (50%)

Co-occurring entities

Derived — referenced by the same focused operational entries (weekly summaries and report roundups don't count); ×N counts the shared entries.

External references

NVD · cve.org · CISA KEV

All cited sources (2)

Entries about FFmpeg parser/demuxer heap or stack overflow (depthfirst AI-agent discovery; PoC public, fixed upstream) (1)

2026-06-07 · view entry permalink →

HIGHCVE-2026-39210 +8

An autonomous AI agent finds 21 zero-days in FFmpeg for ~$1,000 — nine numbered (CVE-2026-39210 to -39218), parser bugs up to 23 years old

Security startup depthfirst ran an autonomous AI analysis agent over FFmpeg's ~1.5 million lines of C and produced 21 confirmed, reproducible zero-days — each with a proof-of-concept input — for an estimated compute cost of about $1,000 (depthfirst, 2026-06-02; The Hacker News, 2026-06-06). Nine carry CVE identifiers (CVE-2026-39210 through CVE-2026-39218); twelve more are fixed but unnumbered. The classes are predominantly heap and stack overflows in parsers and demuxers — the TS (transport-stream) demuxer, VP9 decoder, and the AV1 RTP depacketizer — and several had been latent for 15–20 years, with one service-description-table stack overflow dating to 2003. The AV1-over-RTP overflow is the most operationally pointed because it is network-reachable without special flags, which matters for any service that ingests untrusted RTSP/RTP media. All bugs are fixed upstream; downstream and embedded copies vary. Why it matters to us: Two things for defenders. First, FFmpeg is embedded far beyond the obvious media players — browser stacks, Electron apps, conferencing clients (Teams/Zoom), surveillance/VMS transcoders, and Python wheels — and many ship their own non-auto-updating build, so SBOM/runtime inventory of bundled libavcodec/libavformat is the most reliable way to find exposure. Prioritise hosts that parse externally-sourced media or accept RTP/RTSP streams, and isolate media-processing services from internal networks. The open verification step for each environment is twofold: confirm whether your distribution has shipped the FFmpeg release carrying the upstream fixes (the fixes are upstream; distro packaging lag varies), and establish whether the network-reachable AV1-over-RTP path is actually exercised by any service you run (for example a WebRTC or RTP media pipeline) rather than assuming the parser is dormant. Second, the $1,000-for-21-bugs cost ratio is a signal that parser-class discovery against widely-embedded C libraries (libpng, zlib, libxml2) is now cheap enough to expect more of — treat embedded-parser memory safety as an accelerating attack surface. Maps to T1203 (Exploitation for Client Execution).

research07 Jun 05:00Zmulti-sourceOpen finding ↗
Sources: depthfirst — 21 zero-days in FFmpeg · The Hacker News